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The election cycle in foreign policy activity

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By

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B.A., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1976
M.U.A., University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 1979

Adviser: William J. Dixon

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the existence of a pattern in foreign policy activity corresponding to the domestic election cycle. A theoretical model developed based upon the notion that leaders exploit available resources in order to win elections. One resource is foreign policy. Foreign policy activity can be used to reinforce the image of the leader as a powerful elite. The image of power can be enhanced by portraying the leader as an important international executive, meeting with other heads of state to discuss and solve problems facing his and other nations. Foreign policy actions can also be used to boost government popularity by taking decisive steps against national enemies. The leader's rivals in an election may contest his expertise in domestic issues, but the incumbent is pre-eminent in foreign policy actions.

While previous research has not addressed the existence of a pattern in foreign policy activity corresponding to the domestic election cycle, there have been a number of studies in related areas. The three most closely related areas of research are presidential popularity, political economy, and studies of domestic and foreign conflict. This dissertation links these three areas of research.

The theoretical model is tested using events data and time series analysis. The events data used are those in Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). Changes in U.S. foreign policy behavior over the thirty-year period from 1948 through 1978 is examined. Behavior toward all nations in general as well as behavior toward the Soviet Union and two allies, Britain and Israel, in particular is examined. Overall, the statistical analysis supports the theory. Where significant impacts were found, the changes corresponded to the theoretical model.

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Chapter 1

The Timing of Foreign Policy Events

Less than nine months before the 1972 Presidential election, Richard Nixon embarked on an historic trip to China. Plans for the trip had been negotiated in secret over several years and the visit indicated that the U.S. finally was recognizing the government of the largest nation on earth.

Shortly after the trip was announced, a national opinion poll indicated that the U.S. public overwhelmingly approved of the President's plans, 68 percent to 19 percent (Time, January 3, 1972). Not only did the trip indicate a major change in U.S. foreign policy, but it also provided a major public relations boost for Nixon. To cover the activities of the president and his entourage, the three national television networks sent their evening newscast anchors to cover the journey. As a result of the half-day time change between the U.S. and Peking, most of the elaborate ceremonies took place during the day in China. The networks broadcast these ceremonies live to American households during prime time evening viewing hours, "an excellent (time)...for a presidential candidate seeking re-election to make a television appearance" (Time, January 21, 1972).

Nixon followed this trip to China with a trip to Moscow. These exercise in dramatic foreign policy actions yielded a tremendous increase in his popularity. In early January, less

than 50 percent approved of his performance as president. Following the two trips, his popularity rating surged; nearly two out of three Americans now approved of his leadership.

Nixon was not the only president to benefit from dramatic foreign policy actions in the months prior to a national election. In September 1950, American forces landed in Inchon, Korea. Truman's popularity jumped as the American public relived the victories of World War II (Mueller, 1973). Eight years later, in the midst of a major domestic scandal involving his White House chief of staff, Eisenhower ordered American troops into Lebanon. And, only a fortnight before the 1962 congressional elections, Kennedy appeared on national television to announce the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Two years later, before the election, Johnson ordered air strikes against patrol boat installations in North Vietnam following what was believed to be an attack on a Navy ship steaming in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Whether by fortuitous circumstances or careful planning, American presidents have profited from dramatic foreign policy actions that have occurred close to elections. In some instances, the proximity of events to elections may be pure coincidence. Nothing could have been done to control the timing of these actions. For example, in the case of Eisenhower sending troops to Lebanon, the armed forces were dispatched at the request of the Lebanese government following a coup in Syria.

In other instances, timing seems to have been arbitrary. For example, Nixon's well-publicized trip to China occurred in the spring of an election year. So did his subsequent summit with Brezhnev and Kosygin. So too did Carter's Camp David meetings between Egypt and Israel. Perhaps these activities could have been scheduled for different times. Their actual scheduling, though, may have affected the outcomes of the subsequent elections.

The foregoing examples suggest a high correlation between dramatic foreign policy action and popularity. In almost every instance of dramatic foreign policy action, the president's popularity rating increases (MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1973). This increase can be reasonably expected to equate with votes in the upcoming election.

This study will empirically test the idea that incumbent presidents manipulate foreign policy activity in order to increase their chances of re-election. This idea will be accomplished through a systematic examination of postwar U.S. foreign policy behavior. First, previous related research is reviewed. Next, a theoretical model based upon this previous research is developed. Next, American foreign policy activity is examined through the use of rigorous time-series statistical procedures. Finally, American behavior toward all nations as a group and toward a set of individual nations will be evaluated. The behaviors will be analyzed to determine a pattern that

corresponds to the domestic election cycle. Although the theoretical model is evaluated only with data measuring U.S. behavior, the model should apply to any nation in which there are periodic competitive elections.

The theoretical model used to describe the relationship between elections and foreign policy behavior is based on three fields of political science research. These three fields of research are (1) theories of presidential popularity, (2) the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict, and (3) theories of political economy. These three bodies of literature are related in a number of ways. To begin, theories of the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict suggest that leaders initiate foreign actions in order to distract the public's attention from internal turmoil. As a result, internal solidarity is increased as is the leader's power and control over government. This notion is similar to studies of presidential popularity that have shown that dramatic foreign events boost approval ratings.

Just as scholars of domestic-foreign conflict suggest that leaders manipulate foreign policy in order to maintain their control over government, so do many political economists that argue leaders manipulate economic policy in order to maintain their control over government. Instead of leaders maintaining power by pursing policies involving dispatching troops or recalling ambassadors, political economists suggest that they

pursue expansionary economic policies as elections approach in order to win elections. Some studies of presidential popularity have found that economic performance does affect popularity ratings; some studies of aggregate voting behavior support this idea.

For over twenty-five years, political scientists have explained international conflicts as the results of decisions by leaders who feel that they are losing power (Rosecrance, 1963). These leaders act in self interest; their chief concern is maintaining power (Mayhew, 1974). By initiating external conflict, they attempt to consolidate their power. In many cases, domestic discord is cited as the reason elites become insecure and instigate foreign conflict. In the model that is developed in this study, two sources of non-violent, institutional stress are identified as possible causes of elite insecurity. The first source is the election cycle. Leaders are vulnerable during elections because they may be removed from office. The second source of insecurity is the regime's level of popularity. Democratic regimes that lack popular support can be incapable of exercising power.

In order to maintain power, leaders are assumed to exploit resources such as the development and implementation of domestic and foreign policy. However, using this example, there can be limitations on the implementation of domestic policy in that policy initiatives may have to be approved by a legislative body.

Further, enabling legislation may have to be passed and funds appropriated. In the arena of foreign policy, however, national leaders generally have wide discretion. Policy can be developed by the leader and implementation can be accomplished through the leader's statements. Other instances in which implementation may involve actions that do not require legislative approval include a visit with a foreign leader, an executive agreement (Henkin,1972), or the stationing of a fleet off the coast of a nation in turmoil.

This idea that foreign policy actions are undertaken in an attempt to boost popularity suggests that there is a pattern in foreign policy activity corresponding to the domestic election cycle. This cycle would appear as an increase in the number of foreign policy actions initiated as an election approaches. In the case of the U.S., a president's popularity would increase as the number of foreign policy actions increases because reports of those events would portray the incumbent as the leader. These initiated foreign actions could be used as one way in which the incumbent is different from the competition. Although his competitors in the upcoming election may have equal expertise in domestic matters, only the president exercises foreign policy. And, just as in advertising, the repeated exposure through repeated foreign policy activities builds name recognition. The assumed resulting increase in popularity would increase the incumbents chance of winning the election.

The existence of the domestic election cycle will be tested using measures of foreign policy actions, or what McClelland calls "interactions" (McClelland and Hoggard, 1969). These measures will be aggregated by calendar quarter into a time series. The presence of interactions will be examined using Box-Jenkins and Box-Tiao models.

The Focus of the Research

There are several differences between this study and previous studies of presidential popularity. These differences concern the way foreign events are treated. The first difference involves the direction of causality. Previous studies view dramatic foreign events as independent variables that influence popularity ratings. These studies generally have been atheoretical, and only have attempted to explain variations in popularity levels. The theoretical model developed in this study will link the findings of the presidential popularity studies with theories of the behavior of nations used in other fields of political science. As a result, the order of causality used in these popularity studies is reversed. A second major difference involves the way in which events are operationalized. In popularity studies, only a small number of dramatic events are selected and used in the analysis. In this study, the total number of foreign events will be used. Single dramatic events will not receive special treatment or special weighting; they will be treated as single transactions. To

be sure, these dramatic events may provide their own weighting, because a dramatic event may spur additional events, or interactions.

The model that is developed will be tested using data for the U. S. only. The model, however, should hold for any nation with periodic competitive elections. If the model is true for any nation, it should be true for the U.S. because of its fixed election cycle and powerful chief executive. In parliamentary democracies, the cycle may be less pronounced because the governments may schedule elections when their popularity is at a peak. Also, power may be dispersed among members of a cabinet, thereby making it difficult for a prime minister to initiate foreign interactions.

Chapter 2

Previous Research

As noted in Chapter 1, a substantial amount of research has been conducted in areas related to this study. The major foci of this research are the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict, the study of presidential popularity, and the study of political control of the economy. The theoretical model that is the subject of this study is based on ideas contained in the literatures these areas and not on specific research problems addressed there. These three ideas are used to develop a model in which leaders manipulate foreign policy activity in order to win elections. The concept, that leaders attempt to distract attention from internal problems by initiating foreign hostilities, is extracted from studies of domestic and foreign conflict. The important idea obtained from studies of presidential popularity is that dramatic foreign events boost a president's approval rating. The important idea extracted from studies of political economy present a model where a leader manipulates economic policy to increase his chance of winning an election.

Domestic and Foreign Conflict

The idea that leaders manipulate foreign actions for their political gain, a key tenet of the theoretical model that is the

subject of this study, is not new to political scientists. For more than an half-century, scholars have explored the relationship between domestic problems and foreign conflict. Based in part upon group theory and the study of group behavior (Coser, 1973), an underlying assumption is that members of a group, such as citizens of a nation, are willing to put aside their disagreements when the group is faced with an external threat. Researchers have tested this assumption empirically in different settings. Their findings suggest that there is a relationship, but that the relationship is mediated by important intervening factors.

Sociologists and political scientists have suggested the existence of this relationship for more than fifty years. In his 1937 study of war and revolution, Sorokin reported that throughout history, war and domestic strife occurred simultaneously. Wright (1942) argued that leaders frequently use the threat of war as a means to instill domestic stability and order. Haas and Whiting (1956) posited that the leaders of a nation would use the existence of a real or imagined foreign threat to unite a badly divided nation. This argument was further explored by Rosecrance (1963), who concluded that there is a relationship between international conflict and the "domestic insecurity of elites."

The most influential empirical test of this relationship was presented in 1963 by Rummel. Reporting on an exploratory study

of the dimensionality of nations, Rummel described how patterns of domestic violence, such as riots and political assassinations, were related to foreign hostilities, such as war or verbal threats against other countries (Rummel, 1973). He reported that the data indicated that "foreign and domestic conflict behavior are not generally related to and generally cannot be predictors of each other" (Rummel, 1973:92).

Rummel analyzed twenty-two measures of domestic and foreign conflict for seventy-seven nations. The data were collected for the three-year period of 1955, 1956, and 1957. Nine of the measures concerned domestic strife, while the remaining thirteen indicated levels of conflict directed toward other nations. The domestic measures cover the presence of guerrilla warfare, the number of assassinations, general strikes, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, antigovernment demonstrations, and deaths due to intergroup violence. The foreign conflict measures include the number of anti-foreign demonstrations and the number of sanctions, such as a boycott or the withdrawal of aid. Also included are the number of protests to other governments, the number of countries with which diplomatic relations are severed, the number of ambassadors or other diplomatic officials expelled or recalled, and the number of threats or accusations toward other nations. Rummel also included four measures of military action: (1) the number of wars, (2) the number of troop movements, (3) the

number of mobilizations, and (4) the number of people killed in foreign conflicts.

Rummel assessed the relationships among these measures through factor analysis. The purpose of using this technique was to collapse the twenty-two measures into a smaller number of underlying dimensions. He collapsed the nine measures of domestic strife into three dimensions: (1) turmoil, comprised of assassinations, general strikes, government crises, riots, and demonstrations; (2) revolutionary, also comprised of the number of general strikes plus the number of purges, revolutions, and persons killed as the result of inter-group conflict; and (3) subversive, comprised of the number of assassinations and the presence of guerrilla warfare. Rummel suggested that the turmoil dimension represented sudden conflict behavior, while revolutionary dimension represented planned, overt conflict. The subversive dimension was an indication of the degree of covert, planned conflict in a nation.

Rummel also abstracted three dimensions of foreign conflict. The first, which he called the war dimension, was comprised of the number of protests, threats, accusations, military actions, mobilizations, and persons killed in foreign conflict. The second dimension, which Rummel referred to as the diplomatic dimension, was comprised of the number of expulsions of ambassadors or other diplomatic officials and the number of mobilizations. The third, or belligerency, dimension, was

comprised of the number of anti-foreign demonstrations, negative sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, and military actions.

Rummel analyzed the relationship among the six dimensions with multiple regression. He reported that the domestic conflict dimensions--turmoil, revolutionary, subversion--were only weakly related to the level of foreign conflict (the dimensions of war, diplomacy, belligerency) that a nation engaged in. He concluded that "domestic conflict cannot predict foreign conflict behavior (Rummel, 1973:91)."

Rummel's analysis was expanded by Tanter (1966). Using Rummel's twenty-two measures of civil and foreign conflict, he collected information on eighty-three nations for 1958, 1959, and 1960. In analyzing these data, he first compared them to those used by Rummel for the earlier three-year period. He found that domestic violence for the 1955-1957 period correlated fairly well with domestic violence for the 1958-1960 period. By the same token, however, the level of foreign conflict for the two periods was not highly correlated. In factor analyzing the data, Tanter extracted the same three dimensions--diplomatic, belligerency, and war--from the foreign conflict measures that Rummel found. He extracted only two dimensions from the domestic conflict measures: turmoil and internal war. The turmoil dimension is similar to that extracted by Rummel. The internal war dimension is a composite of the revolutionary and subversive dimension reported

by Rummel. "Domestic conflict behavior for 1958-60 may thus be separated into two independent scales--a disorganized spontaneous turmoil dimension and an organized violent internal war dimension (Tanter, 1966:50)." The turmoil scale extracted from the 1955-57 data correlates highly with the turmoil dimension found in the 1958-60 data. The internal war dimension from the 1958-60 data is not strongly associated with either the measure of subversion or revolutionary activity reported by Rummel.

After extracting the dimensions, he regresses the measures of foreign conflict onto the measures of domestic strife. He reports an even weaker relationship for the 1958-60 data than Rummel found for the 1955-57 period.

Tanter uses a different methodological approach from Rummel. He develops a regression model, but he uses actual measures of violence instead of the dimensions of violence abstracted through factor analysis. He also introduces a time lag. He regresses three measures of foreign conflict for the 1958-60 period--number of wars, number of diplomatic protests, and number of times diplomatic relations were severed-- onto three measures of domestic conflict for the 1955-57 period--anti-government demonstrations, revolutions, and guerrilla warfare. He reports that the domestic conflict measures explained eighteen percent of the variation in the number of diplomatic protests and sixteen percent of the variation in severance of diplomatic relations. The domestic conflict measures did not explain an appreciable

amount of the variation in the number of wars. Tanter's findings suggests that there is a causal ordering: domestic strife appears to be followed by foreign conflict. Second, the type of foreign conflict associated with domestic violence appears to be that comprised of rhetoric (diplomatic protests, severing diplomatic relations) instead of physical violence (war).

Most of the subsequent research in this area has been a replication or partial replication of Rummel's study. As Stohl (1980) points out in his review article, Rummel and Tanter shaped this research through their use of factor analysis and an atheoretic design that tended to report descriptive relationships instead of testing specific hypotheses. As a result of the atheoretic approach "little theoretical advance has occurred in the past fifteen years" (Stohl, 1980:303). Scolnick (1974) refers to this atheoretic approach as an "outstanding omission." He continues that "the most the reader is presented with is a group of comments from scattered works on international politics which suggest how and why the two types of conflict may be related (Scolnick, 1974: 499)."

In subsequent studies, Feierabend and Feierabend (1972) report a fairly strong relationship between the level of political instability of a nation and its propensity for external conflict. Political instability was calculated from measures of domestic conflict that the Feierabends had collected on eight-four countries. The level of external conflict for individual nations

was derived from the data collected by Rummel (1963) and Tanter (1966). The analysis presented by the Feierabends was based on fifty-three nations. They reported that there is a high degree of association between political ability and external aggression (r=.52).

Although there is overlap in the data used by Rummel, Tanter, and the Feierabends, the researchers obtained different findings. Rummel used measures of domestic and foreign conflict abstracted from the data with factor analysis to investigate the relationship. He found that the domestic measures were unable to explain change in the foreign conflict measures. Rummel's analysis was also cross-sectional. To discover a relationship between the domestic and foreign conflict measures, the change would have to occur simultaneously. Tanter, while using factor analysis to explore underlying dimensions, used raw measures in his regression models. He also introduced a time lag between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The Feierabends conducted their analysis using indices of domestic and foreign conflict. These indices were constructed using different techniques from those used by Rummel and Tanter. The domestic conflict/ political instability index was developed by assigning a value from zero to six for each act of domestic strife. The foreign conflict measure was developed by assigning a value ranging from one through four to each act for foreign hostility. The higher the value, the higher the intensity of the action. Thus, by using

different measures derived from the same data, different results were obtained.

The apparent contradictory results of these studies points out a severe problem with quantitative research: the operationalization of variables is critical to the subsequent analysis. In all three studies, data were collected on incidents of domestic and foreign violence. These data were then massaged into variables in different ways. As a result, the analysis of the variables yielded inconsistent findings. All methods used by Rummel, Tanter, and the Feierabends are reasonable. There is no optimal procedure for a data analyst to follow in operationalization. Rummel chose to treat the data collected on the twenty-two indicators of domestic and foreign conflict as interval-level observations. Accordingly, the use of factor analysis seems an appropriate a way to tap underlying similarities and collapse the indicators into a manageable number of variables. Also, his choice of a cross-sectional design is defensible. Tanter too used factor analysis to collapse the twenty-two indicators into a more manageable number. In continuing his analysis, though, he chose not to use the underlying dimensions. Instead, he reverted to a subset of variables that seem to be realistic approximations of the abstracted factors. Tanter also utilized a longitudinal design, which would allow for a lag between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The Feierabends used the same cross-sectional approach

that Rummel did, but they collapsed the measures of conflict into an ordinal scale. They also used a different measure of domestic conflict. As a result, different findings were obtained from the same or similar data.

In summarizing his analysis, Tanter suggested that there may be mediating factors at work that obscure the relationship between domestic turmoil and foreign conflict. He wrote that "There may be no 'simple' relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behavior, but there may be a causal relationship which is being obscured by other phenomena. That is, the relationship may be mediated by a third variable...(Tanter, 1966:60)." Wilkenfeld (1968, 1969, 1973) examined the impact of type of nation in the relationship between foreign and domestic conflict. By type of nation, Wilkenfeld suggests that the similarities among nations that allow them to be grouped or classified according to certain political variables is important in determining the link between civil strife and foreign conflict. He argued that Rummel's conclusion "was facilitated by the fact that he did not ...differentiate between the nations under consideration. Rummel's approach, therefore, in the interest of reaching generalized conclusions, may have tended to obscure any trends in the opposite direction (Wilkenfeld, 1973:108)." In grouping nations by type, Wilkenfeld used the classification suggested by Banks and Gregg (Banks and Textor, 1963) with some modification. Banks and Gregg grouped nations

into five categories: polyarchic, elitist, centrist, personalist, and traditional. Wilkenfeld eliminated a number of nations from the elitist and traditional categories because those nations were not included in the Rummel and Tanter studies. The remaining nations from those categories were collapsed into either the personalist, centrist, or polyarchic categories.

The personalist group is composed of fifteen nations. Two-thirds of the personalist nations are in Latin America. Many are dictatorships. Of the twenty-six nations in the centrist group, twelve were socialist during the period 1955-60. Four additional centrist nations (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Iran) are in the Middle East. The centrist nations "exhibit both dictatorial and highly centralized patterns of leadership (Wilkenfeld, 1973:119)." Almost all of the thirty-three nations in the polyarchic category are economically-developed Western nations.

In conducting his analysis, Wilkenfeld used the data collected by Rummel and Tanter. Due to differences between the studies and the nations used by Banks and Gregg, Wilkenfeld reduces the number of nations included in his study to seventy-four. He performed a factor analysis on the nine measures of domestic conflict and the thirteen measures of foreign conflict and uncovered the five dimensions similar to those reported by Tanter. Wilkenfeld used the loadings of each variable on the underlying factor to create scales of domestic and foreign

conflict. Unlike the factor loading scales created by Rummel and Tanter, which pooled the data for each three-year period, Wilkenfeld created a separate scale for each year for which data were available. As Wilkenfeld noted "...Rummel had one composite score for each variable, for a three-year period. This procedure was followed by Tanter in his analysis for the 1958-60 data. In the present case, the primary interest was in yearly data, so that time-lag analysis could be performed. In effect, each nation was treated as six separate cases, so that while Rummel and Tanter used 77 and 83 nations and cases, the present analysis includes 74 x 6, or 444, cases (Wilkenfeld, 1973:114)."

In conducting his analysis, Wilkenfeld evaluated the impact of classifying nations by type before studying the impact of time lags on the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict. To assess the effect of grouping nations by type, Wilkenfeld used the factor scores calculated by Rummel on the 1955-57 data. He then correlated the relationship between each of the three domestic conflict dimensions (war, diplomacy, belligerency) and three foreign ones (turmoil, revolutionary, subversive) for each type of nation (personalist, centrist, polyarchic). He reported that the relationships among the conflict measures varied across type of nation. For personalist nations, domestic unrest is related to diplomatic foreign conflict ($r \geq .49$ for all three measures). For centrist nations, the domestic turmoil measure is related to all three foreign conflict dimensions. In the case of

polyarchic nations, the strongest relationships are found between the domestic turmoil and the foreign war dimensions (r=.39) and between the domestic revolutionary and foreign belligerency dimensions (r=.45).

In conducting his time-lag analysis with the yearly values, Wilkenfeld used his two measures of domestic conflict (turmoil and internal war) and three measures of foreign conflict (war, diplomacy, and belligerency). He correlated the domestic measures with the foreign measures for lags of -2 to +2. By examining both positive and negative lags, Wilkenfeld suggests that the relationships are not symmetric. Indeed, based upon the size and sign of the correlation coefficient, one can ask on the causal ordering of the measures, Does domestic unrest result in foreign conflict or does foreign conflict cause domestic unrest?

Wilkenfeld found a significant, positive correlation between the domestic turmoil and diplomatic conflict dimensions at a lag of -1 (r=.26) and at lag 0 (r=.24) for personalist nations. This finding suggests that in the case of these fifteen nations, domestic turmoil results in foreign conflict in the current year and in the subsequent year. In the case of the centrist nations, Wilkenfeld reported strong positive correlations between domestic turmoil and foreign belligerency at lag +1 (r=.28) and between internal war and foreign war at lags 0 (r=.31), +1 (r=.32), and +2 (r=.43). This finding indicates that foreign conflict is followed by domestic unrest for these nations. For polyarchic

nations, such as the U.S., Wilkenfeld found strong, positive correlations between domestic turmoil and foreign war at lag 0 (r=.21), between turmoil and diplomatic conflict at lags -2 (r=.19), -1 (r=.21), 0 (r=.23), and +2 (r=.19)), and between turmoil and belligerency at lags -1 (r=.18), 0 (r=.23), and +1 (r=.19). This finding suggests that in most instances, domestic conflict is followed by foreign conflict in polyarchic nations. Wilkenfeld also reported that there was no significant relationship between internal war and "any sort of foreign conflict" for polyarchic nations (Wilkenfeld, 1973:120). He suggested that this lack of relationship was due to the stability of these nations.

By performing a separate analysis for each group of nations, Wilkenfeld found that the relationships between foreign and domestic conflict changed. "Clearly, as we shift our attention from the personalist, to the centrist, and finally to the polyarchic group, the particular dimensions of conflict behavior that are related change. Indeed, no one particular relationship exists between any pair of internal and external conflict dimensions which holds for all groups equally well (Wilkenfeld, 1973:121)." This change in relationship across nation type and across lag could be the reason Rummel concluded that domestic and foreign conflict were not associated. The mediating influence associated with type of nation obscured existing relationships between domestic strife and foreign hostilities. In subsequent

studies, Wilkenfeld continued his investigation between domestic and foreign conflict with the use of a Markov model and controlling for type of nation (Zinnes and Wilkenfeld 1971; Wilkenfeld and Zinnes 1973; Wilkenfeld, 1972). He reported similar findings in each study.

As noted, the work by Rummel, Tanter, the Feierabends, and Wilkenfeld tends to be atheoretical. As Scolnick (1974) noted, there were scattered references to Rosecrance (1963), Haas and Whiting (1956), and Wright (1942) concerning the theoretical relationship between internal and external conflict. Scolnick argues that no researchers attempted to operationalize hypotheses derived from the theories. It is only with Collins (1969), Scolnick notes, that there is an attempt to provide "a genuine theoretical framework."

Collins's study concerns the relationship between foreign conflict and domestic disorder in Africa. As part of his study, Collins collected information on thirty-three independent African nations for the period 1963-65. Collins outlines his theoretical model as follows: "(1) domestic disorder in country A causes country A to (2) exhibit foreign conflict behavior, and a subsequent result of real or imagined foreign conflict between country A and other countries is to (3) increase the internal solidarity in country A and thus reduce the domestic disorder (Collins, 1973:252-253)." Citing Good (1962), Collins notes that "The scanty literature on foreign policy...of developing states

frequently asserts that leaders intentionally externalize hostility as a response to internal solidarity problems." Collins points out that one key issue facing the leaders of a newly independent nation is solidarity building. "The people that comprise the nation-state must...be aware that they belong to the same political unit and must be willing to give their loyalty to that unit (Collins, 1973:253)." He argues that domestic discord is an indication that the solidarity-building process has not been successful. Further, because of the newness of the state, the disharmony is very threatening to the leadership.

Collins notes that there is a difference between real, or objective, threats and perceived threats. He states that a possible, but not necessary, correspondence between real and perceived threat can be assumed. Further, because "external threat is relevant to national response only insofar as it is perceived as such, the way is opened for opportunistic manipulation of threat situation perceptions by national leaders (Collins, 1973:260)." In other words, national leaders may manipulate fictitious external threats in order to increase internal solidarity.

Collins also suggests that there may be a linkage between domestic and foreign conflict found in the frustration-aggression-displacement (FAD) theory. Citing Dollard et al. (1939) and MacCrone (1937), he points out that a central concept

to FAD is a scapegoat. Since the source of frustration for a people is difficult to identify, the aggression that they feel can be directed toward other objects. Collins argues that national leaders act in a hostile manner toward other nations "in order to provide an available target for individual catharsis by the population."

In conducting his analysis, Collins collected information on seventeen measures of foreign conflict and twenty-two measures of domestic conflict. From these measures, he created seven composite variables, or scales, of domestic conflict and eight composite variables for foreign conflict. Collins analyzed the relationships among these composite measures with regression models. In first using a cross-sectional model, he found that there was a strong association between the domestic and foreign conflict measures. Further, in lagging the domestic conflict measures by a year, he reported strong positive coefficients, indicating that domestic conflict in one year is followed by foreign conflict in the subsequent year.

Collins notes that his findings for the cross-sectional analysis are "markedly different" from those reported by Rummel and Tanter. He suggests that the difference is due to his analyzing the behavior of African nations that were, in most cases, newly independent. He concluded that "for African states domestic disorder is a much more relevant factor for foreign conflict behavior than is the case in non-African countries

(Collins, 1973:279)." Collins argued that his findings for the time-lagged analysis reinforces the earlier analysis performed by Tanter. Collins' work is also consistent with the findings reported by Wilkenfeld. Collins' use of African nations can be seen as one way of controlling by type of nation. Instead of using the classification scheme developed by Banks and Gregg, he analyzed only African nations. These African nations, which Banks and Gregg classified as elitist, were for the most part omitted from Wilkenfeld's study because they emerged after the mid-1950s and were not included in Rummel's original analysis.

The development of a theoretical base for the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict continued with the work of Hazelwood (1973). Hazelwood introduces the concept of stress as a cause of domestic conflict. Using a general systems approach, he develops a causal model of factors related to domestic conflict and how this domestic unrest results in foreign conflict. Hazelwood identifies three measures of societal variety that mediate responses to stress. These factors are general societal diversity, indicated by such things as the size of the largest racial group, population diversity, indicated by the size of the largest linguistic group and the degree of religious heterogeneity, and ethnic diversity. He then identifies several conditions that can interact with these measures of diversity and produce stress. One such condition is social change brought about by rapid economic growth. The rapid

economic growth produces stress due to the conflict over the sharing and distribution of the benefits. The stress can manifest itself in a number of ways. One way is social disruptions such as strikes, demonstrations, and riots. Recall that Rummel and Tanter used these types of behaviors as indicators of domestic conflict. Governments attempt to manage this stress through rewards, such as social services, and through coercion, such as the use of armed force to quell demonstrations. Another option that governments can pursue is externalization. As Hazelwood notes, "the temporary excesses of internal variety can be reduced by mobilizing and directing the populace to support and/or engage in foreign conflict (Hazelwood, 1973:159)." Hazelwood adds that ineffective management of societal stress is likely to result in scapegoating with an external target that results in foreign conflict behavior.

Hazelwood's model views a nation as a social system. Societal change, such as rapid economic growth, enters the system and must be processed by different societal groups. This processing produces stress. The degree of stress is related to the diversity of the society. The stress manifests itself in domestic turmoil. The government deals with the turmoil through several approaches. One approach is social services, which offers rewards for supporting the institutions. Another approach is coercion, which penalizes deviance. "To the extent that internal variety is more extensive than internal constraint," the domestic turmoil will result in foreign conflict behavior. Hazelwood

tested his model statistically with a variety of measures and found that the relationships generally held as predicted.

Hazelwood's theory concerning the linkage between a nation's ability to handle stress and foreign conflictual behavior is supported by Kegley, Richardson, and Richter (1978). These authors examine the relationship between a nation's ability to coerce and its conflictual behavior. The ability to coerce is measured by the level of militarization and is treated as an intervening variable. The authors grouped seventy-three nations according to the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) devoted to defense expenditures. The nations were classified as low, medium, and high. In examining the correlation between domestic and foreign conflict for each of the three types of nations, the authors reported a small, positive relationship between domestic and foreign conflict for nations with a low level of militarization and a nonexistent relationship between domestic and foreign conflict for nations with a medium level of militarization. For the ten nations with a high level of militarization, there was a strong, negative relationship, just as Hazelwood predicted. The authors conclude that "This evidence tells us that in militarized countries, the higher the level of civil strife, the lower the level of external conflict and, conversely, that militarized nations experiencing low levels of domestic turmoil tend to be more conflictual in the behavior they

direct toward foreign targets (Kegley, Richardson, and Richter, 1978:751)."

The use of a longitudinal design does not guarantee that the analyst will find a significant relationship between changes in domestic and foreign conflict. Burrowes and Spector (1973) examined Syrian domestic turmoil and its relationship to foreign conflict from 1961 through the Six Day War in 1967. Syria was chosen because of the high level of variation on domestic and foreign conflict measures, a reported close relationship between Syrian domestic and foreign politics, and an abundance of information on Syrian domestic and foreign conflict. Burrowes and Spector note that Syria has been referred to as the most unstable nation in the world in terms of regime turnovers.

In analyzing the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict, Burrowes and Spector abstracted information on 3,478 domestic acts and 1,232 foreign acts. These actions were classified using fourteen indicators of foreign conflict and cooperation and ten measures of domestic conflict and cooperation. The idea of including both hostile and cooperative actions was innovative in their research. In massaging their data, the authors summed the number of actions in each of the twenty-four categories over each of the seventy-four four-week periods from September 29, 1961 through June 4, 1967. Due to the extremely high and low values in certain categories, they log transformed all values. The resulting dataset had twenty-four

variables--one variable for each category--and seventy-four observations, one observation for each four-week period.

The authors reported that there was high intercorrelation among the ten measures of domestic conflict and cooperation. The measures of foreign conflict and cooperation did not yield the same level of association. Factor analysis was employed to uncover underlying dimensions. Initially, only one factor emerged from the domestic conflict and cooperation measures. Since this factor explained only 51.7 percent of the variation (Burrowes and Spector, 1973:304), the measures were reanalyzed and massaged, using orthogonal and oblique rotations, until three domestic factors emerged. These factors explained 70.1 percent of the variation among the domestic measures. The foreign conflict measures were also factor analyzed, with seven dimensions ultimately identified. The domestic and foreign measures were also factor analyzed jointly. The domestic and foreign measures were associated with different dimensions and these results led the authors to conclude that there was "virtually no relationship between the...domains during this recent and turbulent period of Syria's political history (Burrowes and Spector, 1973:311)." Similar conclusions were reached after regression of scales of foreign conflict and cooperation, computed from the factor scores, were regressed upon scales of domestic conflict and cooperation, computed from the same factor scores.

Although the research by Burrowes and Spector was thorough, several of their data analysis procedures are unusual. First, they created a dataset that counted the number of incidents of a particular type for a given four-week period. Due to a high level of variation caused by a number of high values and low values--presumably zero incidents of a given type--the data were logged. The logging reduced the variation, but it still did not result in the data having a normal distribution. The authors proceeded with the analysis utilizing statistical procedures that rely upon correlations among the variables (factor analysis). In order to obtain a high correlation, two variables must covary. Some of the variables did not vary routinely; they had zero values. The particular statistical procedures used would neither examine nor identify what changes in other variables were associated with a change from a zero to a non-zero value.

The authors also based some of their conclusions on a factor analysis that indicated that domestic and foreign measures were associated with different dimensions. Factor analysis is an exploratory technique. In its native form, it does not test hypotheses. It is possible to test hypotheses, such as the ones Burrows and Spector drew from their data, through the use of confirmatory factor analysis. There is no indication that confirmatory factor analysis was attempted.

With the methodological problems encountered by Burrowes and Spector, it is not surprising that other scholars examining

Middle Eastern nations with other statistical procedures concluded that there was a relationship. Wilkenfeld, Lussier, and Tahtinen (1972) found relationships for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Overall, the researchers in this research area have supported the notion that there is a relationship between domestic turmoil and foreign conflictual behavior. Similar findings have been reported by both those analysts who use factor analysis and a cross-sectional design and examine data for a large number of countries and by those who conduct longitudinal studies of one or more countries. Also, the relationship seems to exist for both violent domestic strife, such as political assassinations, and for other forms of societal stress. There is also a clear indication that intervening variables, such as type of nation or level of militarization, play a strong role in the relationship. The foreign conflictual behavior includes both violent forms, such as war, and non-violent actions, such as threatening statements. In both cases, this foreign conflict appears to reduce stress and to increase societal solidarity.

The findings of these studies also support the notion that leaders manipulate foreign policy activity for domestic political purposes. The difference between these studies and the theoretical model being tested involves both the motivation and the type of foreign behavior. In the studies just reviewed, foreign actions were either associated with or caused by domestic

conflict. The foreign actions are theorized to be undertaken as means of increasing domestic solidarity, thereby reducing turmoil. In the model being tested, foreign policy actions are undertaken in an attempt to win elections, not as the results of domestic conflict. Further, the types of actions undertaken are not always hostile ones. The motivation for these acts, though, is similar. The acts are intended to increase solidarity and popular support that will translate into votes for the incumbent during elections.

Presidential Popularity

The study of presidential popularity is important to this research because the analyses identify factors related to changes in approval ratings. This body of research is young and, by and large, atheoretical. In most of its published works, researchers have presented a group of variables that plausibly affect presidential approval ratings. The consensus regarding this literature is that, first, a president's popularity declines over time. Second, at least one factor, dramatic international events, results in a short-term boost in approval ratings. There are conflicting findings on the effects of other factors on popularity scores. The impact of international events, though, is directly related to the theoretical model being tested.

Analysts have found that a dramatic international event, such as the invasion of a Caribbean island or a hostage rescue

attempt, results in a boost in popularity for the president. This jump in approval ratings occurs even though the event may be considered a failure. The important linkage for the model being tested is that foreign events boost popularity. The theoretical model that is tested in this study differs from the previous research on presidential popularity in that the model does not concentrate solely upon dramatic events. Instead, it examines the frequency of all foreign actions and their average intensity. The finding, that international actions boost popularity, provides motivation for the incumbent to initiate foreign policy actions as an election approaches in order to increase the approval ratings.

The first comprehensive study of presidential popularity was presented by Mueller (1970). In his study, he introduced a model of presidential popularity based on analysis of Gallup Poll data. Mueller suggests that a president's popularity is due to four factors: (1) a coalition of minorities variable, (2) a "rally 'round the flag" effect, (3) an economic slump measure, and (4) an indicator of whether the United States was engaged in a war. The coalition of minorities factor was a measure of time a president had been in office. Mueller takes his concept of a coalition of minorities from Downs (1957). Mueller argues that a president wins his first election by building a coalition of minorities with diverse interests. After taking office, the president is forced to make decisions that alienate different groups of his

supporters. Mueller assumes that this decline is linear over all four years of the president's term.

The "rally 'round the flag" variable is a measure of U.S. involvement in dramatic international crises. Mueller named the effect based upon the public's tendency to rally behind U.S. policy in times of international crisis. The mass behavior that Mueller describes is similar to that cited by Coser (1973). In describing his use of the rally variable, Mueller argued that "certain intense international events generate a 'rally 'round the flag effect' which tends to give a boost to the President's popularity rating" (Mueller, 1970:21). Quoting Polsby (1964), Mueller argued that public response to the president's actions during an international crises is favorable, "regardless of the wisdom of the policies he pursues" (Mueller, 1970:21). His analysis indicated that there was no difference in the way the public reacted to what Mueller calls "good" events (such as the Cuban missile crisis) or "bad" events (such as the Bay of Pigs invasion): popularity rose in either case (Mueller, 1970:22).

To be classified as a rally event by Mueller, the action has to meet three criteria. First, it has to be international. Mueller argues that dramatic domestic events, such as riots or strikes, can produce internal division. International events, by the same token, do not produce the divisions because they confront "the nation as a whole." Second, the event has to involve the U.S. and the president directly. The third criteria

is that the event must be specific, dramatic, and sharply focused. For the twenty-four year period between 1945 and 1969, Mueller identified thirty-four rally points.

A third factor Mueller thought related to presidential approval is economic performance. Mueller measured economic performance in terms of the change in the unemployment rate since the president took office. A fourth factor used by Mueller was whether the U.S. was engaged in a war. He used the war variable to measure the impact of the Korean and Vietnam Wars on popularity. Mueller draws a distinction between a war and a dramatic international crisis that produces a rally point. A war is not specific, dramatic, and sharply focused. It takes place over time. While the war may not be classified as a rally point, specific actions during the war may qualify. Examples of rally points occurring during wars are the Inchon landing in Korea and the Tet offensive in Vietnam.

Mueller found that each president began his term with a different approval rating. Also, the rate at which that rating declined appeared to vary among presidents. Accordingly, his final statistical model included terms for each of the four presidents in office.

Mueller reported that, overall, a president's popularity declines at a rate of slightly more than six percentage points a year. Although an international crisis can provide a sudden boost to a sagging popularity, a president's approval rating will

continue to fall over time. This decline was measured by his coalition of minorities variable. Mueller blamed the decline on the president being forced to make decisions that alienated his supporters. Early in his term, the president enjoys the support of a multitude of groups and individuals. Over time, he is forced to make decisions on issues that disappoint his supporters. As a result, his popularity declines. Economic performance seems to be a problem for a president: no matter how good the performance, it never seems to increase his popularity. Poor performance, however, can deflate his popularity.

Much of the subsequent research on presidential popularity was in response to Mueller. Hibbs (1974) reevaluated Mueller's model using a different statistical technique. His findings also indicated that dramatic events boost a president's popularity rating. Stimson (1976) developed a cyclical model of presidential popularity. He, too, found that dramatic foreign events were related to increases in a president's popularity.

Unlike previous researchers, Kernell (1978) reported that dramatic events were negatively associated with a president's popularity. The focus of Kernell's research was on the utility of time as an independent variable. With that focus, he did not attempt to clarify or explore related findings. He treats his findings concerning dramatic events as an anomaly. Without attempting to reconcile he findings with the theoretical work of Polsby and others, he concludes that the rally events either

decreased a president's popularity or "occurred more often during periods of relatively low popularity" (Kernell, 1978:514). In evaluating Kernell's explanation, we are faced with two options. One is that previous theoretical and empirical work is wrong; dramatic events deflate popularity. The implication of the other explanation is that dramatic events are initiated when a president's popularity is waning. Kernell does not suggest whether these dramatic events are staged by some foreign entity that wishes to take advantage of a president who is not popular or by the president himself in an attempt to boost his approval level. There is not a great deal of previous research to suggest that a nation or entity would initiate a dramatic event against a nation whose leader has sagging approval ratings. Much of the literature reviewed in the previous section of this chapter, however, would support the idea of a leader who undertakes foreign intrigue when his domestic support is faltering. Indeed, the throwaway explanation offered by Kernell offers strong support to the theoretical model being tested.

In a 1983 article, MacKuen also analyzes the impact of economic issues and political events on presidential popularity. MacKuen points out that the implications for democratic theory are substantially different for the public to evaluate the president based on his ability to manage the economy successfully compared with an evaluation based on a president's ability to act out dramatic events. The difference between the two types of

public is that one chooses its leaders after thoughtful consideration of his actions, while the other chooses leaders based on emotional reactions. MacKuen found that dramatic events, both foreign and domestic, provide as large an impact on popularity as do economic conditions. Dramatic foreign events were found to explain seven times more variation in popularity than domestic events, though.

MacKuen reported that events varied in the amount of boost they produced in approval ratings. He offered no explanation concerning why some events produced large increases, while other events produced only minor increases. This variation in the size of the increase and the length of time popularity ratings remained high as a result of the dramatic events were also reported by several other researchers (Lee, 1977; Brody, 1984; Brody, 1986; Sigelman and Conover, 1981). The consensus among these analysts is that the public responds favorably to the president no matter what action he takes in response to a dramatic foreign event. As time passes, the public's response to the event appears to be colored by opinion leaders. If these opinion leaders, such as the elites of the opposition party, support the president's action, his popularity will increase. If these leaders criticize the president's actions, the popularity surge will be short lived.

Wittkopf and DeHaven (1985) expand the statistical model used by Kernell (1978) to investigate the impact of Soviet foreign

policy actions toward the U.S. on presidential popularity. Their analysis was based on the widely-held belief that the Soviets attempt to interfere in the domestic politics of open societies. The Soviet interference is through official statements made in response to policy initiatives. This behavior allows them to act "in a manner not unlike domestic political actors (Wittkopf and DeHaven, 1985:1)." Their model was based on the assumption that Soviet behavior was purposive and designed to penetrate the domestic political arena of the United States. To evaluate the impact of Soviet actions on presidential popularity, the authors used Kernell's model of presidential approval ratings. They used a variable that measured the impact of the frequency of Soviet conflictual and cooperative acts on popularity. They found that, at best, Soviet behavior is only weakly related to fluctuations in presidential popularity.

The timing of the dramatic event may be fortuitous. Norpoth (1986) reports that the Falkland Islands war boosted the popularity of Prime Minister Thatcher's government. That boost resulted in a increase of between five and six percentage points in the June 1983 election. Based upon his analysis, Norpoth (1986:29) concludes that "To put the Falklands bonus for the Conservatives in perspective, let us note that it would take a reduction of unemployment by more than half a million in one year to achieve such a gain."

The studies of presidential popularity report that popularity responds to dramatic foreign events. A dramatic foreign event is one that is international, involves the U.S. and the president directly, and is specific and sharply focused. These events boost a president's approval rating. The timing of these events may be lucky for the president. Kernell (1978) reports that these events tend to occur when a president's popularity is low. Norpoth (1986) found that the Falkland Islands conflict, which qualifies as a dramatic event for the British, resulted in an increase of five to six percentage points in a subsequent election for the incumbent Conservative party.

Although not previously linked, the impact of these dramatic events on approval ratings is very similar to the relationship explored in the first section of this chapter between domestic turmoil and foreign conflict. That body of literature can trace its theoretical roots to social psychology and theories of group behavior. Those theories suggest that when faced with an external threat, group cohesion increases. Accordingly, when faced with foreign conflict, domestic turmoil decreases. Also, as the presidential popularity studies show, when faced with sudden and dramatic uncertainty, such a dramatic foreign event, group cohesion, as measured by support of national institutions, increases.

If, as the domestic turmoil/foreign conflict literature suggests, leaders of nations undertake conflictual foreign

intrigues in an attempt to reduce domestic disunity, it seems reasonable that leaders would also initiate dramatic foreign events to boost their political popularity. The fact that there is a payoff for involvement in a dramatic foreign event is a key motivating factor for the theoretical model being tested. Further, the institutional framework of most nations, and the U.S. in particular, allow for the leader to initiate a dramatic foreign event, such as dispatching Marines to rescue merchant seamen held captive by Cambodian pirates or the staging of a state visit to a mysterious and photographically appealing nation such as China.

Political Economy

Studies of political economy, particularly those concerned with the political business cycle, have developed separately from the study of presidential popularity. Their findings, however, are closely related. One of the basic assumptions of the sub-field of political economy concerning political control of the economy is that political leaders manipulate economic conditions in order to win elections. This manipulation is accomplished through either fiscal or monetary policy. As elections approach, leaders pursue policies that increase prosperity in terms of reducing unemployment. At other times, leaders pursue other policies that may increase unemployment but decrease inflation. These policies may produce prosperity by lowering inflation, but

in the short term, these policies may produce poverty for certain individuals. The assumption that there is a tradeoff between unemployment and inflation is based on the "Phillips Curve" (Phillips, 1958). According to Phillips, there is an inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation. When unemployment is high, inflation is low. By the same token, when inflation is high, unemployment is low.

Kalecki (1943) first described how governments manipulate the economy in order to minimize the impact of recessions. The focus of Kalecki's work is on the impact of government spending on the economy. He explored the economic foundations and the political problems of full employment. He argued that the government could initiate spending programs, such as public works projects or transfer payments, that would increase consumption of available goods and services in the economy and result in full employment. Kalecki reasoned that business leaders would object to the government-induced full employment due to dislikes of government interference, government spending, and the social and political consequences of full employment. Although government intervention would be tolerated to end a slump, business interests would demand that the government reduce its spending after the economy begins to rally. A slump will follow shortly after the government reduces its spending. The government will then return to its expansionary policies. Kalecki calls this pattern of slump

followed by boom the "political business cycle (Kalecki, 1943:330)."

More than thirty years later, Nordhaus (1975) refined the idea of a political business cycle. Basing his argument on the Phillips Curve, Nordhaus maintained that a government could manipulate the economy to a desired point on the curve through the selective use of fiscal and monetary policies. As Nordhaus notes, "It is assumed that unemployment is a control or policy variable of the economic system which the policymakers can set at any level they wish (Nordhaus, 1975:170)." In order to reach a desired level of low inflation, governments have to accept an increase in unemployment. As an election approaches, the government pursues policies that decrease unemployment. Voters who recently acquired jobs are presumed to support the incumbent government.

Nordhaus's research differs from Kalecki in the motivation of government intervention in the economy. Kalecki suggests that governments were motivated by popular demand to intervene in the economy to end a slump. Nordhaus argues that governments manipulate the economy to win elections (Nordhaus, 1975:174). Also, as Nordhaus argues, "Kalecki's model assumes, implicitly, that business leaders and capitalists have a disproportionate control of the political mechanism (Nordhaus, 1975:182)." Nordhaus's model assumes that political control is vested in the masses.

Nordhaus also offers empirical proof of the existence of the political business cycle. He analyzes unemployment rates for nine nations for the period 1947 through 1972. He compares unemployment rates prior to and following elections. According to his model, unemployment rates should fall as an election approaches and rise following the election. He uses nonparametric statistics to test for the existence of a political business cycle. His analysis indicates the marked presence of a business cycle in three of the nine nations--Germany, New Zealand, and the United States. Two other nations--France and Sweden--also had "modest indications" of a political business cycle. He concludes that "it is clear that a political business cycle is a significant factor in the operation of some capitalist democratic economies (Nordhaus, 1975:187)."

MacRae (1977) explores Nordhaus's model and suggests that leaders choose a level of inflation and unemployment in election years that will minimize the number of votes lost due to public dissatisfaction with economic performance. Through the development of geometric models, MacRae argues that this "vote-loss-minimizing behavior" results in a stable behavior of the economy between elections. Further, this behavior generates a "stable business cycle with a period equal to the election period (MacRae, 1977:248)." This cycle is marked by a high level of inflation and unemployment in the first year of a president's

term. The level of inflation and unemployment fall by the fourth year of his term.

Tufte (1978) expands Nordhaus' model of the political business cycle in the American economy to a two- and four-year cycles. The two-year cycle corresponds to the congressional election period, while the four-year cycle corresponds to both congressional and presidential elections. Using a variety of economic indicators, Tufte finds numerous examples of fluctuations in the economy that correspond to the domestic election cycle. The two-year cycle is comprised of an acceleration in disposable income that is related to transfer payments. The four-year cycle, which corresponds to the presidential election period begins with a high level of unemployment in the first year of a president's term, followed by expansionary policies that reduce unemployment near the end of the four-year term. This four-year cycle corresponds to MacRae's political business cycle. In expanding his analysis to other countries, Tufte examines the GNP growth rate for seven capitalist economies. He reports that the growth rate in election years is nearly double that of non-election years for six of the seven countries. Further, in his study of twenty-seven democracies, Tufte reported that nearly three out of four showed signs of a political business cycle. He concludes that the "timing of elections influences the rate of unemployment and growth in real disposable income, the short-term management of inflation and unemployment, the flow of transfer payments, the

undertaking of expansionary or contractive economic policies, and the time perspective of economic policy-making (Tufte, 1978:137)."

In a series of articles, Frey and Schneider develop a "politico-economic" model of the relationship between government and the economy (Frey, 1978; Frey and Schneider, 1978a; 1978b; 1979). In these models, voters evaluate governments in terms of economic performance. The decision to implement policies to increase popularity depends on a staisficing model based on how a government perceives its chances of re-election. "If...re-election seems likely, the government pursues an ideological policy (Frey, 1978:211)." On the other hand, if a government perceives its chances as less than even, it will institute economic policies in order to win back its popular support.

Several authors have examined fiscal and monetary policy actions for the existence of a political business cycle (Monroe, 1983; Shughart and Tollison, 1985; McCallum, 1978; Beck, 1982; Golden and Poterba, 1980). As a rule, they have been unable to find any evidence in the measures they examined of the government taking any action to create the cycle. Although they have not been able to identify specific policy instruments that produce the cycle, the authors generally do not refute that a pattern that corresponds to the domestic election cycle exists in some aggregate measures of economic performance.

Other authors have reported patterns in governmental expenditures that correspond to the election cycle. The

particular expenditures examined involve national defense. Ninic and Cusack (1979) found a pronounced pattern in defense spending corresponding to the presidential election cycle. As a presidential election approaches, defense spending increases. Following the election, defense spending declines. This pattern persisted when controlling for war, aggregate demand, and incremental defense budgeting. Cusack and Ward (1981) reported similar results concerning the presence of a cycle in defense spending.

By the same token, Zuk and Woodbury (1986) were unable to find a four-year cycle in defense spending when controlling for foreign policy behavior toward adversaries. In examining U.S. defense spending from 1946 through 1982, Zuk and Woodbury were unable to find the four-year pattern reported by Ninic and Cusack when controlling for U.S. foreign policy behavior toward the Soviet Union. The difference in findings between the two studies could be due to the statistical technique used or the inclusion of the foreign policy behavior measure. Ninic and Cusack used a regression model to statistically test the existence of the four-year cycle in defense spending. Zuk and Woodbury used a Box-Jenkins time-series model and tested the presence of the election cycle with a Box-Tiao intervention model. The Box-Jenkins models are more rigorous than the regression technique and may be more likely to produce a Type I statistical error. Further, as Zuk and Woodbury note, because of the small

number of time periods available for analysis, their "results are suggestive at best (Zuk and Woodbury, 1986:462)." Their inability to find the four-year cycle could be due to their use of a rigorous technique or the availability of only a small number of time periods for analysis.

The inability of Zuk and Woodbury to find a four-year cycle in defense spending could also be due to model misspecification due to the inclusion of a measure of U.S. foreign policy behavior toward the Soviets. Zuk and Woodbury assume that there is no relationship between two of their independent variables in their model: U.S. foreign policy behavior and the presidential election cycle. It is possible, given the number of independent variables in their model (foreign policy behavior, the presence of a war, and the presence of a national election) and the small number of time points (twenty-nine to thirty-five, depending on the model), the relationship between the election cycle and defense spending could be obscured. The theoretical model tested in this dissertation suggests that there is a relationship between the election cycle and foreign policy behavior. If this model is correct, Zuk and Woodbury incorrectly specified their relationship. Instead of specifying that defense spending is the result of foreign policy behavior and the election cycle, they should have estimated a statistical model where, first, foreign policy behavior is related to the election cycle. A second step would be to then estimate the impact of the domestic election

cycle on defense spending directly and through foreign policy behavior indirectly.

The literature on the political control of the economy provides a theoretical basis for a leader who is manipulating domestic policy in order to win elections. This model assumes that leaders want to remain in office. Leaders are perceived to be knowledgeable of the workings of the economy. Through the institutional framework, they have access to a variety of fiscal and monetary policy levers. With purposive actions, these leaders may adroitly manipulate the policies to produce a desired economic outcome for a myopic populace. As elections approach, voters respond to current economic conditions and return the incumbents to office. The basic concept of this body of literature is directly related to the theoretical model being tested.

Manipulation of policies produces a cycle in the economy that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. This cycle is called the political business cycle. The presence of this pattern has been demonstrated repeatedly in the analysis of macroeconomic measures. Analysts have yet to identify satisfactorily the particular policy options that produce this political business cycle. Only one major study (Ninic and Cusack, 1979) has revealed a pattern in fiscal policy corresponding to the domestic election cycle. A subsequent expansion of that study that included

additional explanatory variables was unable to identify a significant electoral cycle pattern (Zuk and Woodbury, 1986).

The inability to empirically prove the existence of a domestic election cycle in either fiscal or monetary polices is problematic but does not detract from the importance of the political control of the economy theories. Aggregate economic indicators consistently reveal a political business cycle. Zuk and Woodbury, in discussing the findings of their study point out the lack of an empirical demonstration in specific policies but add "This may mean that the so-called political business cycle...could be...more complicated than we once thought" (Zuk and Woodbury, 1986). The degree to which the policy process that produces the cycle is complicated could be the factor that limits the ability to prove its existence empirically.

Summary

The research presented has a number of similarities. The domestic turmoil-foreign conflict research suggests that leaders create foreign conflict in order to increase domestic solidarity. The research on presidential popularity has found that a leader's popularity increases when there is a dramatic foreign event. Taken together, what is observed by popularity researchers is what is suggested as the end result by domestic-foreign conflict and group theory research. The "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon reported by Mueller is what would be expected based upon group

theory. When confronted by an external threat, the group rallies. This rallying is observed as an increase in popularity of the leader.

There are several linkages between political economy and presidential popularity research, too. Political economists maintain that leaders manipulate the economy in order to win elections. The motivation for manipulating the economy can be found in presidential popularity studies and in some studies of aggregate voting (Kramer, 1971; Stigler, 1973; Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975a, 1975b; Goodman and Kramer, 1975; Bloom and Price, 1975; Tufte, 1975). The popularity studies suggest that poor economic performance deflates approval ratings. Prosperity may not increase popularity, but it certainly doesn't hurt. This plan to improve the economy will provide insurance in case some unforeseen or uncontrollable event should damage economic performance. Leaders therefore are motivated to improve their economic performance as an election approaches. Having the approval of more than half the electorate may mean that the election will be won.

The suggestion by the political economists that a leader manipulates the economy in order to stay in office is similar to the type of political leader described by Neustadt and Mayhew. This leader has an array of resources he may exploit. He is motivated by self interest. His fundamental self interest is winning elections. Several of his resources are related to

economic performance. He therefore manipulates the economy out of his interest in staying in power.

There is no reason to think that this leader would limit his exploitation of resources to the domestic policy arena. In the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3, a leader is posited as taking advantage of his free hand in foreign affairs to create and manipulate foreign policy interactions. The reason for this manipulation is simple: foreign policy interactions can be portrayed as being dramatic events. Dramatic foreign events increase the leader's popularity.

The first study to link these three bodies of literature was conducted by Stoll (1984). He examined how a president could use military force near elections in order to boost his chances of winning. Stoll's model is based on a president whose primary goal is to be reelected. This president has more freedom to act in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Part of this freedom comes from Article II of the Constitution, which designates the president as commander in chief of the armed forces and the point of contact for other countries (Henkin, 1972). The method used to make foreign policy also contributes to the president's control of the process. As Stoll points out, "in some cases, policy can be made simply by issuing a statement or an order." Domestic policy, on the other hand, generally requires action by Congress. If there is a disadvantage to the president and his freedom to make foreign policy, it is that the issues involved

are not very important or salient to American voters. The only times when these issues tend to become important is when they create a "rally 'round the flag" effect or when there is a war.

Stoll examines whether there is a relationship between the domestic election cycle and the use of military force. The use of force is also affected by whether the U.S. is at war. He hypothesizes that if a war is going on, there will be a number of uses of military force during years the president seeks reelection. If a war is not going on, these occurrences of military force will be limited. In examining data on the use of force collected primarily by Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Kaplan (1981), he finds that the pattern does exist. There tend to be frequent visible uses of military force during election years when the United States is at war. Further, when the U.S. is not engaged in war, the visible use of military force is very small.

Stoll's image of a president who exploits available resources to maintain power is similar to that suggested by Neustadt (1976). Neustadt argued that there was a great deal of discretionary power available to the president. As a result, the skillful president could use this power to his advantage in implementing policies. This discretionary power could be used to win elections. The manipulation of discretionary power to win election is a central theme in Mayhew's 1974 text. Mayhew describes how congressmen, acting in self-interest, manipulate

discretionary power in order to win elections. In all three instances, the authors present portraits of leaders who act in their own self-interest in order to stay in office. Stoll's findings also suggest a president who uses visible military force when the U.S. is at war in an election year, but who is hesitant to send in troops to a foreign conflict that might require a long commitment.

More recently, a study by Ostrom and Job (1986) examined the major use of U.S. military force. Major use is defined as the deployment of major force components or nuclear-capable forces. The authors reported that the domestic election cycle was not a significant factor in the use of major force when controlling for such things as the level of tension and the balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviets, economic performance, and presidential popularity. The authors note that their study is not directly comparable with Stoll's (Ostrom and Job, 1986:558). Stoll examined any use of U.S. military force, not just the use of major, strategic forces. Reasonably, there are differences between the visible use of military force and the deployment of strategic forces. The visible use of force can be a sign of strength. The use strategic force can be a prelude to war.

Even though the findings between Stoll's research and that of Ostrom and Job are different, the implications are not inconsistent. Stoll found that there was an increase in the use of U.S. military force during election years, particularly if the

U.S. was engaged in a war. This increase allows for a president to manipulate symbolic gestures for political gain without the threat of starting additional conflict. Stoll expected and found that the visible use of force will be limited if the U.S. was not engaged in a war. The suggested reason for this limited use of military force is due to the president not wishing to create an armed conflict situation. Ostrom and Job found just that: the domestic election cycle does not appear to be a factor in the use of major force or of strategic forces.

In Chapter 3 a theoretical model is developed that predicts there will be a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. This change is caused by the president using policy options available to increase the chances of winning elections. To the extent that the activity is a symbolic gesture, there are limited negative consequences.

Chapter 3

The Logic of the Timing of Events

In Chapter 2, three bodies of literature were reviewed. In this chapter, the underlying assumptions and ideas of those literatures are identified and used to construct a theoretical model. According to this model, leaders want to remain in power. To that end, they exploit available resources such as the ability to identify foreign threats. In identifying threats, the leader is able to arouse the support of the population to protect the nation. The increased protection of the nation results in increased popular support of the leader. With increased popular support, the leader is able to maintain the power and control of the government.

Although previous research has discussed important factors concerning the existence of a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle, the three bodies of literature are disjointed. We know that there is a relationship, albeit weak, between internal turmoil and foreign conflict. This relationship also varies by type of regime. Presumably, the relationship is due to insecure leaders attempting to consolidate their power by rallying the public to fight a common enemy. The research also reports that election outcomes are related to the performance of the economy (Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975). Governments that do a good job of managing the economy are allowed to stay in office while those who do a poor

job are voted out. Many analysts have found patterns in the economy that correspond to the domestic election cycle. Not only is economic performance related to election results, but the popularity of a nation's leader at any time appears to be related to the performance of that nation's economy. Economic performance is not the only significant predictor of a government's popularity, though.

The analysis of presidential popularity has uncovered a number of factors related to a high approval rating. To begin, an American president's popularity, as measured by the percentage of persons who approve of the performance in office is high at the inauguration. This percentage is always greater than the proportion of persons who voted for that president the previous November. From inauguration until the time of leaving office, the long-term trend is for a president's popularity to decline. Certain things, however, affect that rate of decline. A president's public appeal, or charisma, appears to be important. Those presidents who are considered likable or fatherly, such as Eisenhower or Reagan, tend to have a slower rate of decline than colder men who have held the office.

The way in which a president functions as a leader, particularly in terms of the way that leader manages the economy, is important also. If there is poor economic performance, such as an increase in unemployment or the rate of inflation, the president is held accountable. A president's popularity clearly

benefits, though, from dramatic events in which the president is involved as the nation's leader. However, the impact of these events is immediate and fairly short-lived. There is usually a substantial surge in popularity following the event, but after a short period, it resumes its decline.

The motivation for the behavior of political leaders predicted by the political business cycle model integrates well with what we know of presidential popularity in that economic performance is related to approval ratings. The motivation for the political business cycle behavior also corresponds with studies of the effects of economic conditions on election outcomes. Scholars of the political business cycle believe that the pattern in economic performance that follows the domestic election cycle is caused by the leader attempting to win votes. The underlying assumption (Nordhaus, 1975; MacRae, 1977), is that the economy can be managed fairly precisely in order to achieve a particular rate of inflation and a particular level of unemployment.

According to Nordhaus, leaders are willing to accept the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. They will tolerate a given level of unemployment because it is associated with a decrease in the level of inflation. As the election approaches, leaders switch their preferences and are willing to accept a higher level of inflation in order to decrease the rate of unemployment. The reason for this switch is the belief that those

persons who have found jobs because of the decrease in unemployment will vote for the incumbent because of their recent good fortune. The exact method of this manipulation is not clear, however. Studies of the American politico-economic process have failed to uncover any changes in either fiscal or monetary policy that would produce the cycle.

Other research, reviewed in Chapter 2, suggests that leaders who are facing domestic dissatisfaction, ranging from low popularity to major riots, may be motivated to focus internal frustrations on external enemies. Theorists have recognized that group morale and cohesion increase in the presence of an external threat. Group members unite and refocus their within-group hostility on an outside entity. Adroit leaders may be able to defuse internal turmoil by redirecting it externally. The leader of a group or nation has a number of resources at hand that can be exploited to redirect conflict. First, because the leader is the official with the greatest assumed knowledge of the external environment, he is the eyes and ears of his nation (Henkin, 1972). In this role, he is able to perceive external threats, either real or alleged (Haas and Whiting, 1956). If a threat does not exist, he can invent it. According to Knorr (1976:114), leaders have frequently invented threats to meet their needs. By the same token, an external entity becomes a threat because the leader perceives it as one. Knorr points out that a threat is not an observable entity. Instead, it is a cognitive construct

based upon observable realities that have ambiguous meanings. Consequently, these realities are subject to different interpretations over time. They are, as Knorr states, "conditional, potential, hypothetical." The leader is able to describe the nature of the threat and to prescribe the appropriate response to it. He then is able to marshall forces at a level of effort that he determines necessary to counter the threat. The leader also has the power of determining that an entity is no longer a threat.

The leader is constrained in deciding what is a threat, however. To identify an entity as a threat, there needs to be some prior justification. As Jervis (1976) points out, individuals are constrained by cognitive dissonance: they do not want to hear inconsistent information and attempt to minimize it. As a result, existing images and beliefs are not easily changed. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a president to convince the public that Canada was a military threat to the U.S. By the same token, though, he would not have a difficult time swaying a large portion of the electorate by stating that the Cuban government is the instigator of any civil disturbance in Latin America. The difference between these two hypothetical threats is the pre-existing image of the particular actor involved. Canada, by and large, is seen as a friendly nation. Cuba, on the other hand, is seen by many as a puppet of the Soviet Union.

For the U.S., the president is the principal point of contact for other nations, according to Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. John Marshall described the president as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations" (Henkin, 1972). In addition, the president is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He has the ability to enter executive agreements with other nations. These agreements cover all types of foreign relations issues, from cultural exchanges to the division of spoils after war (Henkin, 1972; Gilbert, 1973). Formal treaties, however, must be ratified in the Senate by a two-thirds majority. Although he is slightly limited by the War Powers Act, the president may dispatch the armed forces to foreign countries without prior approval. As head of the executive branch, he can control the activities of the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, or other federal agency involved with international activities. Further, he has control over the intelligence-gathering agencies.

In addition to being responsible for identifying the external threat, the leader is responsible for undertaking appropriate action to defend the country. He has at his disposal an array of actions that he may initiate. Many may be undertaken without prior approval of a legislative or judicial body, and range from rhetoric to total war. Just as the internal threat that caused the insecurity does not have to be violent, neither does the response to the threatening entity. The response that

is given must be sufficient in the eyes of the public to meet the threat, though. In selecting an appropriate response, a leader must rely on his skill in rallying support. If his response is seen as insufficient, he is subject to charges of being a weakling or an appeaser. If his response is too harsh, however, he may be seen as brutal. The choice of a response is related to how the threat is portrayed.

The ability of a leader to increase group solidarity in the face of an external threat is directly related to the "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon reported by Mueller (1973). In the presence of an external threat, group cohesion increases, as is evidenced by the rise in a president's popularity. As Sigelman and Conover (1981: 303) note, "It is a well established principle that threats from outside a system promote cohesion within the system. One familiar manifestation of this principle is the tendency of the American people to rally in support of the president when the nation become embroiled in international conflict." After the threat disappears, the within-group dissension reappears. Accordingly, the president's popularity begins to fall again.

In expanding Rosecrance's model on why domestic turmoil leads to foreign conflict, later expanded by Wilkenfeld, Hazelwood, and others, we find a leader who is made to feel insecure by some set of events. What is it about these events that makes a leader insecure? Previous researchers have assumed

that domestic strife causes insecurity. Other factors, though, that are non-violent in nature also could make a leader insecure. Could there be something in the institutional framework that would make a leader insecure?

One institutional factor that could cause insecurity is an election. An election is a decision point where the electorate decides whether a leader stays in office. The incumbent's fear of being voted out of office may produce in him stress and insecurity. Even if the leader is not seeking re-election, he may have a vested interest in an election. If he has served the maximum number of terms allowed by the nation's constitution, he could maintain power through the election of his designated successor. A leader has an interest in off-year, or by-elections also. He wants his party's candidates to win. A loss of seats could threaten his coalition. A large win by his party's candidates could discourage rivals from seeking his office, too. A substantial loss of seats by his party in a off-year election indicates the leader's vulnerability. Since that election will ultimately be interpreted as a referendum on the leader's policies, a sizable loss indicates that a large number of the voters don't favor the path that the government is taking.

Why do threat's come from external entities rather than from domestic ones? If the electorate does not have strong views or opinions on external entities, a leader may have an easier time creating or describing an external threat. In the U.S., for

example, many scholars have suggested that the electorate does not have strong opinions or views about foreign countries or leaders. Edelman (1964) described a typical voter as having a series of images and visions foreign places and leaders. These images are shaped by television news and statements by American leaders. Deutsch and Edinger (1959) described how government leaders could change attitudes toward foreign entities by providing experiences. If the experiences were strong enough, they would change the attitudes held by voters. Almond argued that the public has structured opinions and views on domestic issues that are salient to them but respond to foreign policy issues with "formless and plastic moods which undergo frequent alteration in response to changes in events (Almond, 1960:53)." Rosenau, too, suggested that public response to foreign policy "is less one of intellect and more one of emotion; less one of opinion and more one of mood, of generalized, superficial, and undisciplined feelings which easily fluctuate from one extreme to another (Rosenau, 1961:35)."

This relationship of external foreign policy activity caused by a leader who is made insecure through the nation's institutional framework can be tested empirically. A particular test would involve examination of the nation's foreign policy activity to determine if there were a pattern that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. The notion is that the election cycle produces insecurity in the leader of the nation. As a

result, he will identify external threats and take appropriate action. As Knorr suggests, these threats do not have to be real; they just need to be perceived. The appropriate action will vary from hostile rhetoric to armed conflict to consultation with strategic allies.

The relationship between foreign policy actions, popularity, and votes is illustrated in Figure 3.1. As the figure indicates, the leader initiates foreign policy actions. These actions increase the popularity of the leader. This increase in popularity translates into an increase in votes during the pending election.

The following six hypotheses will be used to test the model:

1. There is a pattern in U.S. foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle.

This pattern would appear as a result of the president initiating foreign policy actions in response to a real or perceived threat as an election approaches. As an election nears, the president will attempt to focus attention on foreign policy issues. These interactions will be used to portray the president as a leader.

This pattern appears as a monotonic increase in the number of foreign policy interactions. Between elections, the number of foreign policy actions will fluctuate around some fixed level. Some months it will be higher than normal, while in other months it will be lower than normal. As an election approaches, the

number of actions will rise. Following the election, the number of actions will return to their normal level.

A foreign policy action is a statement or an act by a government toward an external entity. In the case of the U.S., a foreign policy action can be initiated by the president or another top member of the executive branch, such as the Secretary of State or of Treasury.

2. The number of conflictual actions toward ideological adversaries, such as the Soviet Union, will decrease as an election approaches.

In his role as the leader, the president must defend the U.S. against foreign adversaries. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the chief enemy has been the Soviet Union. Over time, the tone of foreign policy behavior toward an adversary is negative and conflictual. As the election approaches, there will be a change in this behavior. In order to avoid the stance of a warmonger, the leader will initiate positive and cooperative acts in order to assume the facade of a peacemaker. There will be a decrease in the number of conflictual actions toward the Soviet Union. These conflictual actions include rhetorical attacks against the Soviet way of life, charges of treaty violations and unwillingness to bargain on issues, and overt actions such as delaying grain sales or suspending airport landing rights. The purpose of this change is twofold. First, the change in behavior makes every minor action noteworthy because it is different.

Prior to elections, behavior is adversarial. As an election nears, the behavior becomes cooperative. The second reason for this change in behavior is to portray the president as a leader who wants peace. In normal pre-election times, the president is alert to Soviet threats. His stance toward the Soviets is conflictual. His position changes as the election nears. He assumes the role of a world leader who wants peace through cooperation.

In undertaking an action toward the Soviet Union, some justification is provided as a reason for taking the action. This justification provides the rationale for undertaking the action and explains why the action was appropriate. Over time, behavior toward the Soviet Union is conflictual. As an election approaches, the president undertakes positive actions, such as conducting a summit meeting or the signing of a nuclear weapons reduction treaty. These positive actions are provided wide news coverage, offering an opportunity for the president to increase his popularity and, thereby, his chances of winning the upcoming election.

3. The number of cooperative acts toward allies will decrease as an election approaches.

Not only is the president in a position where he must defend the nation against adversaries, he also must function as a leader for our friends. Governments routinely undertake series of cooperative acts toward their allies. To be sure, that is why

there is a friendly relationship between them. These cooperative acts include treaties, cultural exchanges, and state visits. To demonstrate that the U.S. is the dominant partner in the relationship, the president decreases the number of positive actions as the election approaches. Indeed, he may also increase the number of negative acts toward the allies. Again, the motivating force is more show than substance. Following elections, the behavior toward allies resumes its positive, cooperative tone.

4. The intensity of interactions will increase as an election approaches. Conflictual acts will become more hostile and antagonistic while cooperative acts will become more friendly in nature.

As the election approaches, the president will attempt to make foreign policy actions more dramatic. One way of doing this is to increase their intensity. Verbal attacks will become stronger as an election approaches. Overt conflictual actions will become more physical. On the other hand, cooperative acts towards allies will become more friendly in nature. Statements issued about friendly nations will be more positive. Attempts will be made to make these friendly acts more physical. The number of state visits from foreign friends will increase. The intent of these actions again is to show the president as an international leader acting in behalf of the U.S.

5. The pattern will be more pronounced in presidential election years than in off-year congressional elections.

6. The pattern will be more pronounced when the incumbent president is seeking re-election.

The pattern in foreign policy interactions is due to the president acting in self-interest. That interest is strongest when the president is struggling to keep his job. As a presidential election approaches, the incumbent wants to maintain continuity in the office. If he is seeking re-election, he will exploit his policy options in order to win. He will have a stronger motivation to initiate foreign interactions. Accordingly, the political events cycle will be more apparent in those years. Further, as Stoll (1984) suggests, the president's behavior may be affected by whether the U.S. is engaged in a war. If so, there may be an increase in conflictual behavior. If not, there should be an increase in cooperative behavior.

Even if he is not seeking reelection, the president has an interest in choosing a successor. The party nominee may be hand-picked. If not, the incumbent still is more likely to prefer a successor from his party than from the opposition. Since the president is not seeking re-election in these circumstances, he may lack some of the motivation an incumbent would have to fully exploit foreign policy interactions. As a result, the foreign events cycle will not be as apparent.

Even when voters are only electing members of congress, the president will be interested in minimizing the number of seats lost by members of his party. He would like to maintain or even increase his power in Congress. Further, as Abramowitz (1985) points out, presidential appeal can be an important determinant of the outcome of mid-term congressional elections. As a congressional election approaches, the president will initiate foreign interactions. These interactions will increase his image as a leader, thereby providing a coat-tail effect for members of his party in the upcoming election. In addition, it will increase the benefit of his campaigning for candidates. The political event cycle should therefore be apparent for off-year congressional elections. The pattern should not be as pronounced in these elections as in presidential elections, though. Further, the president's behavior may vary depending on whether the president's party is the majority party in the House of Representatives.

In summary, this model attempts to explain how foreign policy actions are manipulated by a national leader in order to affect the outcome of an upcoming election. This model is derived from the research on domestic unrest and foreign conflict, the political business cycle, and factors affecting the popularity of national leaders. It is being tested using data for the United States, but it should apply to any nation in which there are competitive elections. This model suggests that there

is a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. As elections approach, there is an increase in foreign policy actions. The actions toward adversaries both increase and become more cooperative as the election approaches. By the same token, the actions toward allies increase and become more conflictual.

The procedures to be used to test these hypotheses will be discussed in Chapter 4. In addition, the data that will be used for these tests will be discussed.

FIGURE 3.1

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS, POPULARITY, AND VOTES



Chapter 4

Data and Analysis

In Chapter 3, a theoretical model was developed. It suggested that there are changes in a nation's foreign policy activity that correspond to the domestic election cycle. A set of hypotheses was presented to test the existence of that model. In this chapter, the concepts used in developing that model are identified and an array of possible measures of those concepts are presented. In addition, a statistical procedure that will use those measures to test the hypotheses will be discussed.

This chapter provides a framework in which the model can be tested. As Blalock (1964:5) points out, "One thinks in terms of a theoretical language that contains notions such as causes, forces, systems, and properties. But one's tests are made in terms of covariations, operations, and pointer readings." This chapter identifies the connection between the theory and the things that can be measured.

In addition to identification of possible measures of the concepts used in the theoretical model, the strengths and weakness of those measures will be explored. The specific time period the study covers will be presented, along with the research design to be used. This chapter enumerates the steps to be followed in the development of the statistical model. That enumeration will include the creation of the measures, the

iterative steps used in building the model, and the guidelines to be followed in determining impact. In assessing whether there is a cycle in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle, a particular time frame before elections during which a change is anticipated must be identified. In addition, a concept of a change must be defined. In this chapter, the time frame in which a change is expected to occur will be presented, along with the definition of what is a change in foreign policy activity.

Theoretical Concepts

The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 indicated that there are changes in foreign policy behavior corresponding to domestic elections. Further, foreign policy behavior is expected to respond to changes in governmental approval ratings. Leaders are hypothesized to use foreign policy actions to boost their popularity. The changes in foreign policy behavior include fluctuations in the number of friendly and hostile actions and, on a different dimension, variation in the content of these acts. These patterns apply to all domestic elections. The changes may be more apparent in certain elections than in others. In this section, these concepts are identified. Measures of these concepts are discussed. Sources of data for those measures are reviewed also. In addition, a method of classifying elections is presented.

The concepts to be operationalized can be grouped into three major categories: (1) foreign policy activity, (2) domestic election cycles, and (3) government popularity. Although the theory that was developed in Chapter 3 should apply to any nation in which there are competitive elections, it is being tested using behavior by the U.S. As a result, the operationalization of factors may be slightly different than if the hypotheses were being tested for a nation with a parliamentary democracy. The indicators of the domestic election cycle will specifically address the case of the U.S. The types of elections identified for the U.S. may not apply to parliamentary democracies.

In addition to defining foreign policy activity, a method must be developed to quantify "the flow of day-to-day international activity in such a way that discrete behaviors...can be observed and catalogued (Dixon, 1983)." These observed behaviors must be systematically and reliably classified according to some scheme before the hypotheses can be tested. This classification involves two different dimensions. The first dimension is the number of actions. The second concerns the content of the act, which will be assessed by the level of cooperation. A conflictual act will have a negative value for the level of cooperation.

Ideally, the model could be tested statistically by determining whether there is a significant change in foreign policy activity when elections occur. In fact, this test will be

conducted. There may be confounding factors concerning elections, however, that mitigate the change in the level of activity. These factors include whether the election is for the presidency or an off-year congressional contest or whether the president is seeking re-election. Another factor that could confound the impact of the election cycle is whether the U.S. is engaged in a war.

In order to control for these confounding factors, the hypotheses will be tested with elections classified according to several schemes. The first type of classification is that of an election in general. The second classification scheme will be based on type of election: presidential or off-year congressional. The third scheme concerns the type of presidential election. According to the theoretical model, behavior in presidential elections will differ depending on whether the president is seeking re-election or whether the U.S. is at war. Presidential elections will be classified as either open elections, elections in which the incumbent is attempting to stay in office and the U.S. is not at war, and elections in which the incumbent is attempting to remain in office and the U.S. is engaged in a war. To complement this structure used for presidential elections, off-year congressional contests will be classified according to whether the president's party controls the House of Representatives. Although the previous research reviewed in Chapter 2 does not suggest that there is a difference

in behavior due to control of Congress, the classification of off-year races corresponds to the grouping of presidential elections by context. The reason for classification of the elections by control of the House instead of control of the Senate or the total number of seats controlled by the president's party is that all House seats are at stake in off-year elections, while only one-third of the Senate seats can be contested. Further, off-year House elections are national in character because they involve every House district. In addition, off-year elections are frequently evaluated as a referendum of the policies of the incumbent (Abramowitz, 1985; Kernell, 1977; Tufte, 1975; Hinckley, 1967; Kramer, 1971).

A related concept that requires definition is pattern of activity. The theoretical model suggests that certain factors, such as domestic elections or government popularity, produce a change in the pattern of foreign policy activity. It is expected that there are ebbs and flows in foreign policy activity that routinely occur and are due to factors exogenous to the theoretical model. The analysis to be undertaken is only coincidentally interested in the normal pattern of behavior that occurs outside of the election cycle. What is of interest are systematic changes in this behavior. As Rood (1975:135) points out, "The scientific analysis of foreign policy involves a search for patterns of foreign policy behavior and for those factors which are associated with, or account for, variations in those

patterns." The changes being studied as part of the current project are thought to occur consistently with particular types of elections.

Several scholars have offered definitions of foreign policy actions. One definition of foreign policy could be everything a nation does toward a foreign entity. This constitutes the nations behavior toward that entity. A foreign entity can be a government, organization, corporation, or individual. A foreign policy activity can include everything from a declaration of war to the importing of goods and commodities. Foreign policy activity can also include the refusal to purchase goods from an external entity. Under this definition, much of foreign policy activity is ordinary. An example of an ordinary activity is the granting of a visa. The type of foreign policy activity that is of use in testing the theoretical model is the unusual or extraordinary. This type of action includes such things as the signing of a cooperative agreement or the indictment of a foreign leader on drug trafficking charges.

One problem in studying foreign policy behavior is determining what foreign policy behavior is. As Kegley (1975) points out, "one cannot reliably observe a phenomenon until one conceptualizes it in terms which allow him to specify what constitutes an instance of it." To Kegley, foreign policy behavior is "the things states do and say to others abroad."

This definition is based on the conceptualization of foreign policy behavior by Rosenau (1970; 1971).

McClelland and Hoggard (1969) differentiated between the everyday activity and the unusual foreign policy activity by referring to the ordinary as transactions and the extraordinary as interactions. Transactions are defined as foreign policy actions that have become so numerous and commonplace that they are accounted for conventionally in aggregated form. Indeed, as McClelland and Hoggard point out, these transactions are so common that they are measured by some unit other than single item frequency. These transactions are measured by such terms as metric tons of cargo, millions in aid, and plane-loads of supplies. By the same token, interactions are, if not unique, single events and measured individually. They are "single action items of a nonroutine, extraordinary, or newsworthy character that in some clear sense are directed across a national boundary and have, in most instances, a specific foreign target (McClelland and Hoggard, 1969:713)."

In defining foreign policy behavior in terms of public acts, it is possible to study patterns of activity through records of official acts, such as speeches by government officials, government documents, press releases, and news reports. Analysts may also be able to witness the actions directly. In many cases, these descriptive histories can be analyzed as case studies. The information as reported through government sources or through

news media is useful both in analyzing the specific actions taken and the priorities of those acts as indicated through biases of the content of the article. It is reasonable for bias to be found in any record of an event. Only a subset of facts will be addressed. Generally, only key figures such as the chief of state or the foreign minister are identified as responsible parties when treaties are negotiated. Seldom is credit given to the career civil servant who is the primary author. The decision about which persons to include--either by giving credit or blame--is important in understanding and interpreting a situation. Much is made concerning who stands where on Lenin's Tomb on May Day.

In addition to using information from public sources as case histories, these same sources can be systematically abstracted for data that can be used in longitudinal studies. The data used in longitudinal studies will not be as rich as those available for case studies of particular events. Not every action or event will have the same level of detail or information about the same set of factors. In order to abstract these data for longitudinal studies, the key facts that will be available for every action that will be included must be identified. These key facts become the lowest common denominators for these events. Information that undoubtedly will be available for every action of interest includes the nation undertaking the particular action, the entity

toward which the action is directed, the time period in which the action was initiated, and the action taken.

To be sure, there is a wealth of information on certain interactions between nations. The amount of information available is generally proportionate to the drama of the situation, although there may be a non-recursive relationship between drama and information availability. The drama arises from several factors such as the tension due to possible conflict or the intrinsic historical significance of the act. Dramatic events result in greater press coverage, and more information is demanded by reporters and the public. By the same token, the availability of information on an event may reveal high drama that would not necessarily be uncovered. To analyze only highly dramatic actions, such as the confrontation between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands or the U.S. air raids against targets in Libya, would eliminate most interactions between nations.

By reviewing public historical records and by abstracting information that is available on each interaction between nations, a substantial quantity of data can be obtained. These data can be analyzed cross-sectionally to study the relationships between nations or types of nations and their foreign policy behaviors. The information combed from historical records can also be used in longitudinal studies to examine changes in one nation's foreign policy behavior over time. In order to conduct

either cross-sectional or longitudinal analyses, the information must be abstracted and coded consistently. This abstraction has similarities to content analysis (Burgess and Lawton, 1972). The consistency of the abstraction and coding results in reliability of the data.

A variety of public histories available can be abstracted. These collections include government documents published by individual nations, press releases, and news media accounts. In the U.S., for example, government documents are available in libraries at many college campuses and in most major cities. Government documents from Great Britain and France are available in a few American universities. For other nations, government documents are available only within the country, if at all. Although publications of international organizations, such as the United Nations or OECD, are available at many libraries, these documents generally do not report interactions between individual nations. Instead, the documents contain information about domestic conditions of nations or on ordinary transactions, such as trade. Government documents appear to be useful in obtaining information on a small number of nations.

One source that appears to be useful in obtaining information on a large number of nations is the news media, particular newspapers. Although it would be possible to abstract information from transcripts or tapes of radio and television news reports, coverage of contact between nations may be limited

to dramatic situations. Also, transcripts may not be readily or widely available. Newspapers, on the other hand, are widely available and, through wire services or their own bureaus, are able to provide coverage on a large number of nations. Several groups of scholars have been collecting this type of information for several years and their datasets are readily available. These datasets include the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and the Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB). The type of information available from these studies is frequently referred to as events data, since it consists of facts about foreign policy events.

The information in COPDAB was abstracted from a variety of sources. The COPDAB project developed from the Conflict/ Cooperation Research Group (Burgess and Lawton, 1972). The focus of the initial project was the Middle East. In collecting information, actions between nations were coded according to a fifteen-point scale that indicated the level of conflict or cooperation. Azar subsequently expanded the focus of the research group's project to include large western industrial states. The level of analysis in COPDAB is foreign policy action. The information sources used by COPDAB coders are scanned for reports of actions involving nations. As with WEIS, each action is coded according to a dyadic perspective. For every action, there is an actor, or nation, or organization initiating the event, and a target (the nation or organization to which the act is directed).

Additional information is recorded on the content of the action, the date, and the source of information on the action.

The present study will use the COPDAB data to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The primary reason for choosing COPDAB is that it provides information for a thirty-year period. The WEIS data contain information for a twelve-year period only.

Event data have been the subject of a great deal of research concerning their validity and reliability. One problem with event data is that many scholars claim that they do not accurately measure foreign policy. This concern with event data will be minimized in this study. The foreign policy activity, or interaction, that is manufactured as part of an election cycle is designed to be newsworthy. Secret actions, so long as they remain secret, can't be used to stir the public's interest. Only actions that are publicized through news sources are of interest.

A major issue concerning events data is their validity. Scholars have debated whether they are valid measures of foreign policy activity. Undoubtedly the data are measures of something; the question remains "Of what are they measures?" Events analysts maintain that the data are reasonable measures of one aspect of foreign policy activity and thus the measures allow for the quantitative study of foreign policy. Kegley (1975) suggests that events data are valid measures of foreign policy activity. In order to measure foreign policy activity, a definition of

foreign policy must be developed. According to Kegley, events data analysts define foreign policy as "overt state behavior." This definition excludes from their analysis the "motives or intentions" of actors. It also excludes foreign policy conducted "in secret, behind closed doors." By concentrating on overt actions, events data analysts are able to systematically examine the public behavior of nations. It also seems reasonable that there is a consistent relationship between a country's public behavior and its secret, covert behavior. The problems faced by events data analysts are similar to those of other social scientist who attempt to measure any non-physical phenomenon. When a survey respondent is asked whether he or she is better off now than a year ago, the analyst is more interested in whether the respondent perceives he or she is better off than whether this is true. Yet, the response to a survey question does not even measure that. Instead, it indicates whether the respondent is willing to state that he or she is better off today than a year ago. Similarly, events data analyst assume that it is more important that the leader of a Latin American nation flies to Moscow and has his picture taken with Soviet leaders than whether he has negotiated secret treaties with them. Over time, the outward appearance will provide a fairly good indicator of what is going on.

Another issue with the validity of events data is their limitation in covering the content of a foreign policy

interaction or event. Events researchers, such as McClelland (1983) and Hermann (1978) warn that events data should not be used to measure things that they are not designed to measure. Hermann (1971) creates the analogy of an event as it appears in most data collections as resembling a box. This analogy can be expanded further to how the contents of an event can be treated. Just as a box travelling down a conveyor belt hides its contents as the box passed before us, the passing of the box does reveal certain information. The box is of some size and although we can't stop the conveyor to measure it, we can see that it is smaller or larger or similar to other boxes we have seen. We also can gather some information about frequency of boxes travelling down the conveyor. They may travel as a number of boxes all together or, at other times, be spread out with a substantial amount of space between them. The boxes may be of a particular color, too. Although there is no guarantee that all blue boxes contain the same merchandise or be the same shade, it may be useful to analyze whether blue boxes pass by at different rates from red or yellow boxes.

Most events data are collected from newspapers or other records of daily activity. According to Kegley (1975), newspapers are good sources of information for a number of reasons. First, they used by policymakers in making decisions. Second, they are convenient. They are probably more objective than government archives. Fourth, they are designed to gather

information on a world-wide basis in a timely manner. The reliance of events data analysts on newspapers, particularly on just one newspaper, the New York Times, have caused these researchers to defend themselves against charges of biased coverage. Burgess and Lawton (1975) note that studies have found the New York Times to yield the "same approximate volumes of interactions as, and often will have greater coverage than, some regional sources." McClelland and Hoggard (1969) report that comparisons between the New York Times and Le Monde have yielded similar numbers of events.

Although the data may be valid and reliable measures of foreign policy activity, the validity of the analysis could be questioned due to the manipulation of events by a foreign actor. For example, suppose that the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan in an attempt to manipulate the outcome of an upcoming election in the United States. Wittkopf and DeHaven (1985) examined Soviet behavior toward the U.S. to determine whether there had been an attempt to affect American politics. They concluded that if there had been an attempt to manipulate elections, the Soviets were not successful.

Several measures will be developed from the COPDAB data. The first measure is the number of actions initiated by the U.S. toward a nation or a group of nations. This measure will be created from a count of the number of actions undertaken during a quarter. The total number of foreign policy actions is an

indication of the pace at which a nation's foreign policy organization is operating. A low value indicates that little attention is devoted for foreign policy activity. An increase in the number of actions indicates that more resources are being devoted to foreign policy.

Additional measures will be developed utilizing the ordinal measure of conflict and cooperation proposed by Azar and Havener (1976). The COPDAB data include an ordinal value for each action that corresponds to the relative level of conflict and cooperation. A value of seven indicates that the act was neutral. A value between one and six indicates that the act was cooperative, while a value greater than seven indicates that the act was hostile. The type of actions indicated for each value of the fifteen-point scale is shown in Figure 4-1.

As an indicator of the number of cooperative acts, the number of events with a value less than eight will be counted. This measure illustrates the degree to which a nation is undertaking actions meant to assist other nations. By the same token, a similar measure of the number of acts with a value greater than eight will be created as an indicator of the hostility exhibited by the nation. Each of these measures will provide an indication of the cooperation or hostility shown other nations at particular points in time. Increases or decreases in these measures will reflect changes in foreign policy behavior.

To be sure, the measure of the total number of acts is a linear combination of the number of positive acts, negative acts, and neutral acts. (A neutral act is one with a value of seven on Azar's conflict and cooperation scale.) There may appear to be redundancy in examining total acts and both positive and negative actions. Analysis of all these measures, though, provides additional insights into foreign policy behavior.

In addition, the use of all three measures is important in examining the type of change occurring in foreign policy. The absence of change in the total number of actions between two time periods does not imply that the number of positive and negative acts remained static. In fact, the lack of change in the total number of actions could be due to large offsetting changes in the number of positive and negative actions. For example, the number of positive acts could drop by twenty-five between two time periods while the number of negative actions increased by twenty-five. The measure of the total number of acts would not indicate a change in foreign policy behavior while in fact there was a substantial change.

The fourth measure to be developed from the COPDAB file is the level of cooperation shown other nations. Azar and Havener (1976) proposed a weighted scale developed by a panel of foreign policy scholars. This weighted scale assigns a value to each of the fifteen ordinal categories used to classify interactions between nations. The scale was designed to provide a relative

index of cooperation and conflict. The weighted scale ranges for -102 to 92.

A positive value indicates cooperative behavior. A negative value indicates hostile behavior. The panel that assigned the values to the actions was asked to weight them according to their intensity (Azar and Havener, 1976). The results of that weighting are shown in Figure 4-2. The figure indicates that the merging of two nations into one--the most cooperative action identified--is nearly twice as cooperative as two nations establishing a dyadic alliance. The values of ninety-two, for the merging of two nations into one, and forty-seven, for the establishment of an alliance, do not have a real world referent. There is no direct meaning of a one-point increase in cooperation. Instead, the values should be interpreted as relative levels of cooperation. The weighted values will be used to create a measure of relative cooperation of foreign policy behavior. As the values for actions decrease, the level of cooperation decreases. This scale could also be interpreted as changes in the level of hostility. A decrease in the value between two time periods indicates an increase in the level of hostility. Since Azar and Havener (1976) assigned positive values to cooperative behaviors and negative values to hostile behaviors, the positive interpretation will be used. As a result, the measure will be interpreted as a change in the level of cooperation.

In the current study, this measure will be evaluated in terms of its change across time. The direction of change will indicate an increase or decrease in cooperative behavior. The size of the change, while not directly interpretable, will be an indicator of the relative magnitude of the change over time.

These measures will be aggregated by calendar quarter. Although a variety of time periods are available, the quarter was chosen for a number of reasons. One reason is that units involving a longer period of time might not reveal changes in behavior. It is anticipated that the changes in behavior associated with the domestic election cycle will appear during the election year. Aggregation of actions by year could mute the impact associated with elections. A second reason for choosing quarters as the time period is that previous analysis has shown that behavior patterns in quarters and other time periods, such as months, are similar (Duncan, 1986). Also by choosing quarters, changes in behavior can be compared across target nations. There are sufficient actions by the U.S. toward all nations in general and toward the Soviet Union in particular to conduct the analysis utilizing months as the time period for aggregating events. In examining U.S. behavior toward friendly nations, there may be a large number of months in which no actions are initiated. By utilizing a calendar quarter however, it will be possible to compare changes in behavior across target nations.

Foreign policy behavior will be examined toward all nations in general, toward the Soviet Union, and toward two allies, Great Britain and Israel. The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 suggested that the domestic election cycle would produce changes in foreign policy actions in general and toward friendly and hostile nations in particular. Much of the scientific analysis of foreign policy behavior examined dyads. In examining American behavior toward the world, the behavior of the U.S. will be treated as a monad. The purpose of examining U.S. behavior toward all other nations is to identify any changes in foreign policy associated with domestic elections.

The theoretical model suggests different patterns of changes in behavior toward hostile nations and friendly nations. From the U.S. perspective, the best example of a hostile nation over time is the Soviet Union. There are a number of possible choices as friendly nations. Two were chosen from that number in order first to test the hypotheses and second to compare the changes across friendly nations. Great Britain was chosen because of its close relationship to the U.S. Israel was chosen because it too is an ally. In addition, Israel has been the focus of a number of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, such as Middle East peace plans, since it was created.

In examining the relationship between elections and patterns in foreign policy behavior, the analysis will evaluate the impact of elections in different contexts. The impact of elections will

be examined at three levels. First, all national elections--presidential and off-year congressional--will be grouped. A single election measure will be created. The analysis will be conducted to determine the relationship between elections in general and changes in foreign policy behavior.

At a second level, national elections will be classified according to whether they are presidential elections or off-year congressional contests. The theoretical model suggests that both kinds of elections should affect foreign policy behavior. The impact should be greater for presidential elections than for off-year congressional contests. A significant change should be noted for both classifications of elections, though.

At a third level, presidential elections and off-year contests will be classified by type. Analysis will then be conducted using kinds of presidential elections and off-year congressional contests. Presidential elections will be classified according to two separate groups: open elections and contests in which the incumbent seeks reelection. Previous research by Stoll (1984) suggests that races involving incumbents should be classified according to whether the U.S. is engaged in a war. That classification scheme will be used in this analysis. The theoretical model indicates that changes in foreign policy behavior are affected by whether the U.S. is engaged in a war. The three kinds of presidential elections used in this analysis

will be: open elections; re-elections in which the U.S. is not at war; and re-elections in which the U.S. is at war.

Previous research does not address the possible impact of types of off-year congressional elections. The classification of presidential elections suggests that there may be variation in foreign policy behavior for different kinds of off-year contests. One possible method of categorizing off-year contests is based upon control of the House of Representatives. In off-year elections, every seat in the House is at stake. Many scholars (Abramowitz, 1985; Kernell, 1977; Tufte, 1975; Hinckley, 1967; Kramer, 1971) have referred to House elections as referendums on presidential performance. It is reasonable that the president would want to have a good showing in these contests, both for his legislative agenda and as a sign to political adversaries that he maintains a great deal of power. A good showing is defined as an increase or only a slight decrease in the number of seats held by the president's party in congress. It is likely that the more seats the president's party controls in each body of congress, the better the chances for his legislative proposals. If his party controls a body, there is a better chance that his proposals will be passed intact.

Off-year elections could also be classified by whether the president's party controls the Senate. In any off-year elections, however, only one-third of the seats in the Senate are at stake. These thirty-three to thirty-four contested elections

are scattered across the U.S. Although control of the Senate may change as the result of off-year elections, the results may not accurately reflect a president's national appeal.

A better indicator appears to be control of the House, where every seat can be contested in off-year races. The results of House elections may be an indicator of the president's broad based appeal. It seems reasonable that a president would pursue different strategies if his party controlled the House going into an election than if his party was in the minority. In order to maintain control, he may be more willing to exercise available options that would increase his appeal and thereby increase the electability of members of his party in House races. The relationship between control of the House and changes in foreign policy behavior will be examined as part of the analysis of this study.

In choosing to use the COPDAB data collection to test the theoretical model, only a thirty-year period will be examined. That period includes a number of different types of presidential and off-year congressional contests. The COPDAB study covers the period of 1948 through 1978. That time frame includes eight presidential elections and eight off-year congressional contests. Classification of the congressional races can be determined by examining the composition of the House prior to the November election. Of the eight off-year races, four occurred when the president's party controlled the House (1954, 1962, 1966, 1978)

and four occurred when the president's party was the minority party (1950, 1958, 1970, 1974). This breakdown overlaps with what would be obtained by classifying off-year races by whether U.S. troops were engaged in armed conflict. Of the four elections occurring when the president's party was the minority party, U.S. troops were engaged in foreign conflicts on three occasions (1950 in Korea; 1958 in Lebanon; and 1970 in Vietnam). The fourth election in this category, 1974, took place after the resignation of President Nixon.

Classification of presidential elections is not necessarily as easy as the classification of congressional races. The 1952 and 1960 presidential elections are clearly open contests: the incumbent did not seek reelection. In the elections of 1948, 1956, 1964, 1972, and 1976, the incumbent sought reelection. The 1968 race, however, is difficult to classify. This difficulty lies in the fact that through March 1968, the incumbent, Lyndon Johnson, was seeking reelection. At the end of March, however, Johnson withdrew from the race. As a result, the election in November meets the requirement as an open election.

In any taxonomy, decisions are made that could go another way. What becomes important in these situations is discussing the reasons for making the particular classifications and interpreting the results in light of the classification. It doesn't take a great deal of analysis to determine that the 1968 election is a unique election. The 1968 election has two

distinct aspects. It was both an election where the incumbent sought re-election and an open election. Classifying the 1968 election exclusively as an incumbent seeking re-election would belie the fact that the election was open after March. In order to tap both aspects of 1968, it will be classified as both an incumbent seeking reelection and as an open election. In order to observe both aspects, the 1968 election will be treated as an incumbent seeking reelection in March 1968 and as an open election in November.

There are also problems in the classification of re-election campaigns as occurring while the U.S. is at war. If being at war is defined in terms of the U.S. having made a substantial commitment of troops and that those troops are engaged in battles, at least two presidential reelection campaigns occurred during those conditions. One is the 1972 re-election bid of Richard Nixon. The Vietnam war was still underway although it was showing signs of winding down. The 1968 reelection campaign of Lyndon Johnson, until the March abdications, also occurred during times of war. It was the Vietnam War, in fact, that was the central issue in Johnson's party's presidential primaries. Johnson's strongest competition for his party's nomination in 1968 initially came from Senator Eugene McCarthy. McCarthy was by and large a single issue candidate. His issue was the Vietnam War and he advocated withdrawal of all U.S. troops. The presence of war was a key part of the 1968 election.

One other re-election campaign has also been classified as occurring during war (Stoll, 1984). That campaign was Johnson's first re-election bid in 1964. Stoll, who was testing for the presence of a particular type of foreign policy behavior, argues that even though troops were not engaged in a shooting war, there was a strong national commitment for armed intervention in South Vietnam in an attempt to keep the communists from coming to power. Shortly before the 1964 election, the alleged attack on a U.S. naval vessel in the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese patrol boats resulted in a congressional resolution that Johnson used to expand the use of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. At the time of the election, however, American troops were not engaged in warfare in South Vietnam in large numbers. Although troops were stationed there, their role was to serve as advisors and not as combatants. Since a large number American troops were not engaged in armed conflict, 1964 does not meet the definition of a war reelection bid. Further, the 1964 election can be distinguished as occurring less than a year after the assassination of John Kennedy. After Johnson assumed the office of president, his popularity approached that of Kennedy. Since Johnson had been in office for less than a year, the 1964 election differs from a re-election campaign conducted by a president who has had four years to discover the discretionary power available to him. The difference between the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 and the analysis conducted by Stoll

is that Stoll was looking for a particular type of foreign policy action, i.e., armed conflict. The current study examines variations in patterns of behavior. It evaluates all types of actions, cooperative and conflictual.

Table 4-3 presents the classification schemes used for presidential elections. Three presidential elections will be treated as open elections: 1952; 1960; and November 1968. Four reelection campaigns will be classified as occurring when the U.S. was not engaged in a war: 1948; 1956; 1964; and 1976. Two reelection campaigns will be classified as occurring when the U.S. was engaged in a war: March 1968; and 1972.

The theoretical model suggests that there are changes in foreign policy behavior that occur prior to domestic elections. The model does not specify the exact timing of those changes. Previous research does not provide a great deal of guidance concerning the timing of those changes either. The body of literature concerning the political business cycle examines policy changes corresponding to an election. Nordhaus (1975) discusses a cycle that has a length equal to one-half the period of time before elections. MacRae (1977) describes the timing of the cycle in years. Frey and Schneider (1978a) examine patterns in years, too. Tufte (1975; 1978) also uses years in describing cycles. Tufte (1978) does refer to specific months in examining changes in Social Security benefits. He charts a sharp rise in benefits in the months before the November election. He refers to this as an

"October kyphosis." This October peak was later described as being exaggerated (Brown and Stein, 1982).

In this study, behavior will be examined to detect a change any time during the calendar year the election is held. A change could occur more than a year before the election. If that is the case, it will not be detected using the statistical procedure described in a subsequent section of this chapter. It seems unlikely that a leader would consistently initiate a short term change designed to increase his chances of winning an election more than a year before the election. There may be instances when certain behavior is altered toward a particular nation prior to an election year. So long as these instances are infrequent and case-specific, they would not correspond to the behavior expected by the theoretical model. The reason that changes implemented in an attempt to boost electability are not likely to occur more than a year before an election is that the public will probably forget them. This point was raised by several political economists (Nordhaus, 1975; MacRae, 1977; Frey, 1978; Frey and Schneider, 1978a). In addition, separate analysis will be conducted to evaluate the relationship between approval ratings and foreign policy behavior. Changes in behavior that occur prior to the election year will more likely be associated with popularity than distant elections.

There may be a number of reasons why changes in foreign policy behavior would be implemented throughout the calendar year

before an election. Carmines and Stimson (1980) present a classification of issues as easy and hard. An easy issue is one that does not arouse controversy. It is symbolic instead of technical. Implementation of a policy or taking a position on an easy issue is like a gut response; it seems natural. An example of an easy foreign policy issue is a tough stance against Soviet expansionism. Easy issues could be used early in an election year, before voters have made up their minds, or late, in an attempt to boost enthusiasm.

An early change in foreign policy behavior also could be designed to reach voters before the presidential primaries. These may occur in open presidential elections, where the incumbent is attempting to aid his chosen successor, or when an incumbent is being challenged. Even if no challenger has appeared, an incumbent may undertake a change in behavior to discourage possible challenges. Changes in behavior also could occur late in the election year in an attempt to boost enthusiasm. These changes could occur for incumbents or in open elections. By the same token, changes in foreign policy behavior could occur throughout the election year for congressional elections. Early changes would affect primary elections, while later changes are designed to affect the general election.

The timing of the changes could also be influenced by the nation toward which the actions are intended. Certain nations, such as the Soviet Union, may be the targets of the easy issue

stances described above. Other nations, such as Israel, may not produce easy issue stances. The timing in the changes in behavior toward these nations may occur either early or late, depending on the type of voter the change is intended to affect.

In this study, the timing of the changes will be determined empirically. The presence of a change in behavior will be explored in each calendar quarter. A statistical model will be used to test for significant changes. The final model will contain appropriate tests for all time periods in which the change in behavior was found to be significant.

To be sure, foreign policy behavior is the result of a number of factors outside the realm of the theoretical model being tested. A key factor in foreign policy behavior is reciprocity (Phillips, 1978; Wilkenfeld et al., 1980; Thompson and Rapkin, 1982; Dixon, 1986). The idea of reciprocity implies that much of a nation's foreign policy behavior is in response to actions by other nations. Reciprocity suggests reaction; a *quid pro quo* relationship between nations. When nation A does something to nation B, nation B responds in kind. As Thompson and Rapkin (1982:247) note, "A hostile action tends to bear a hostile reaction; a cooperative signal is frequently met with a cooperative response."

The theoretical model being tested in this study attempts to explain changes in the pattern of foreign policy behavior due to the domestic election cycle. The theoretical model is not

intended to explain all variation in foreign policy behavior. Because inertia and reciprocity have been used by other analysts to explain variation in foreign policy actions, these concepts will be included in the statistical models used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3.

Reciprocity will be operationalized by accounting for the foreign policy actions initiated toward the U.S. from a nation or groups of nations. In developing a statistical model, the number of actions initiated toward the U.S. during a calendar quarter will be used as one of the independent variables. This control variable will be the measure of the number of foreign policy actions (total acts, number of positive actions, number of negative actions, level of cooperation) directed toward the U.S. The other independent variables are types of domestic election. The dependent variables in the statistical models will be the measures of foreign policy behavior described earlier. A statistical model will be developed for each of the four measures of foreign policy behavior for each type of election.

The use of the measure of reciprocity is not without its consequences. By including the number of actions directed toward the U.S. as an independent variable, American foreign policy is treated as reaction based. The only other variables used to explain changes are the domestic election cycle and, in separate models, presidential approval ratings. The portrayal of U.S. foreign policy as reactive overstates the amount of activity

undertaken due to reciprocity. Not every action initiated by the U.S. is in response to an action received. Further, the use of measures of actions initiated by the U.S. during the current time period as the dependent variable and the simultaneous actions received by the U.S. as the independent variable, no regard is given to actions received by the U.S. in previous time periods. The statistical model also does not account for actions directed toward the U.S. in response to previous U.S. actions. In an ideal situation, U.S. behavior would be classified as reciprocal or not. Each action would be classified according to whether it was undertaken in response to a previous action. Reciprocal acts would be matched across calendar quarters. Such matching is not possible with data used in this study. There is no way to identify an act as whether it is initiated in response to a previous action.

By the same token, however, if the measures of the domestic election cycles are found to be statistically significant, their importance as a factor influencing foreign policy activity is clear. The portrayal of U.S. behavior as reactive in the statistical model may overstate the impact of reciprocity. The finding that the domestic election cycle is important, though, will lend strong support to the credibility of the theoretical model. The use of actions directed toward the U.S. becomes a control for all other factors that affect foreign policy behavior.

The inertia factor in foreign policy behavior will not be operationalized as a variable. Instead, inertia will be controlled for with statistical techniques. The idea of inertia corresponds to the statistical concept of autoregression. Inertia implies that the best indicator of a phenomenon, such as behavior toward a nation or government expenditures, is the observation of the phenomenon during the previous time period (i.e., the behavior toward a nation or the expenditures the government made during the previous time period). Autoregression implies that there is a relationship or correlation between observations of a particular phenomenon over time; the observation of phenomenon A at time *t* is related to the observation of phenomenon A at time *t-1* (or *t+1*). The strength of this correlation is expressed as *r*. The particular statistical technique used to control for inertia will be discussed in the following section.

Statistical Methods

In the selection of a statistical technique for testing the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model, several factors must be considered. First, the procedure must be applicable to a longitudinal research design. In testing the hypotheses, changes in foreign policy behavior over time will be evaluated. The technique must produce information for valid tests of the parameter estimates under the circumstances. The technique must

also accommodate multiple independent variables. The statistical models will include as independent variables measures of foreign policy behavior directed toward the U.S. and indicators of a number of different types of elections or of presidential approval. Third, the technique must be able to handle autoregressive relationships in the dependent and independent variables. Ideally, the technique would be easy to use and easy to interpret. In addition, it should have necessary and sufficient tests to determine the adequacy of the statistical model.

One statistical procedure that is frequently used in political science research is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. There are a number of benefits to using a regression approach. First, regression is easy to use and is a widely accepted technique. The coefficients are easily interpreted, also. There is a problem in using regression when the data form a time series. There may be a relationship between observations that could produce incorrect coefficients. The problem occurs when observations for a particular time period, such as Month *n*, is related to the observation for the next time period, Month *n+1*. This problem manifests itself with a disturbance in the residuals known as autocorrelation. The autocorrelation causes incorrect estimates of the variances of coefficients and may make some coefficients appear to be statistically significant that in fact are not. It also makes standard inferential tests, such as a

t test or an F test, inapplicable (Neter and Wasserman, 1974: 352).

There are several ways to deal with the autocorrelation problem. One is to use a technique known as generalized least-squares (GLS). GLS takes account of the correlation between observations across time periods in developing parameter estimates. It is used a frequently in economic analysis. The coefficients from GLS have the same interpretation as regression coefficients. A problem with GLS is that, like regression, it is sensitive to model specification. If the model omits an important independent variable, the coefficients or parameter estimates for other independent variables can be wrong.

A technique that handles autocorrelation problems and is much more robust in terms of parameter estimation when some variables are omitted is time-series analysis (Box and Jenkins, 1976). This technique is used frequently by political scientists to examine a number of different phenomena (see Rasler and Thompson, 1985).

Both univariate and multivariate models can be developed using Box-Jenkins procedures. In order to develop a Box-Jenkins model of some phenomenon, measurements must be available from discrete, equispaced time points. In the univariate case, this series of observations is manipulated to make it stationary around a fixed mean. Additional manipulation may be required in order to stabilize fluctuations in variance in different parts of

the series. An autoregressive, integrated, moving average (ARIMA) model is developed for the series. This ARIMA model extracts "the predictable movements from the observed data" (Vandaele, 1983). The parameters for the model are estimated by an iterative procedure. The procedure attempts to minimize the amount of variation unexplained by the model (i.e., it iterates until it reaches a solution that has the smallest sum of squared error). In that regard, it is similar to the process underlying OLS.

In the multivariate case, one or more independent variables are used to explain the behavior of a dependent variable. Box and Jenkins called multivariate models "transfer functions." They represent the "transfer" of some pattern or level of activity from the independent or predictor series to the dependent series. The independent variables can consist of series of observations from an ongoing process. Analysts also may use a time series composed of an indicator or binary variable. The use of an indicator variable is frequently referred to as "impact assessment" (McCleary and Hay, 1980), "intervention analysis" (Box and Tiao, 1975; Glass, Wilson, and Gottman, 1975; Hibbs, 1977; Vandaele, 1983), or "interrupted time-series analysis" (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Multivariate models also can be constructed utilizing a combination of dynamic or indicator variables.

The use of one or more indicator variables allows a researcher to assess the impact of an action or intervention on

an ongoing process. The notion of intervention analysis was developed by Campbell (1963) and Campbell and Stanley (1966). As originally proposed, this type of analysis consisted of conducting observations on some social phenomenon, applying a treatment or intervention, and continuing the observations. This multiple-pre and post-test quasi-experimental design would allow for the assessment of the change brought about by the particular intervention. This design was developed further by Box and Jenkins (1970, 1976) under the name of discrete transfer function models. This model was further developed by Box and Tiao (1975) in a study of the changes in ozone in Los Angeles. This technique has frequently been used to assess the impact of a governmental policy change (Campbell and Ross, 1968; Deutsch and Alt, 1977; Glass, 1968).

In the proposed analysis, this technique will be used to assess the impact of the U.S. election cycle on measures of foreign policy behavior. An ARIMA model will be developed for the foreign policy activity process, and intervention terms will be applied for the election periods.

Summary

In order to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model in Chapter 3, appropriate measures of foreign policy activity need to be derived. One source of these measures is collections of information on foreign policy behavior. These

archives are known as events data. These data are abstracted from published news reports and contain information on actions initiated by nations or international organizations toward other entities.

One such dataset, known as the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), will be used in the analysis in the following chapters. The information in COPDAB was amassed under the direction of Edward Azar. The data were abstracted from a variety of sources and cover foreign policy activity for a thirty-year period, from 1948 through 1978. In addition to information on the nation initiating the action and the nation that was the target of the behavior, COPDAB also provides an indicator of the friendship or hostility of the act. An additional weighted scale developed by Azar and Havener (1976) provides a measure of the relative cooperation of the action.

The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 will be tested by examining the behavior by the U.S. Information in COPDAB will be used to generate measures of total foreign policy activity, the number of friendly acts, the number of hostile acts, and the relative level of cooperation of foreign policy. These measures will be used to examine the presence of an election cycle in U.S. behavior toward the world in general, the Soviet Union, and two allies, Great Britain and Israel. Possible variations in foreign policy behavior toward these nations or groups of nations due to changes in presidential approval ratings will also be examined.

To test the presence of an election cycle, a variety of indicators will be used. One measure is the presence of a national election--either presidential or off-year congressional. A second measure will be the type of national election. As a third measure, the impact of types of presidential elections will be examined. Presidential elections will be classified as open, re-elections when the U.S. is at war, and re-elections when the U.S. is not at war. To complement the types of presidential elections, off-year elections will also be classified by type. Off-year races will be grouped according to whether the president's party controls the House of Representatives. The impact of type of off-year contest on foreign policy behavior will be examined.

Much of the variation in foreign policy behavior among nations has been attributed to reciprocity and inertia. Accordingly, the statistical models used to test the hypotheses will include controls for both factors. Reciprocity will be operationalized by accounting for the number of foreign policy actions directed toward the U.S. by the particular target nation or group of nations. Inertia, which corresponds to the statistical notion of autocorrelation, will be controlled for using statistical tools.

The statistical models will be developed using the autoregressive, integrated, moving average (ARIMA) procedures described by Box and Jenkins (1976). The impact of elections

will be determined through Box-Tiao (1975) intervention analysis. Theory does not provide a great deal of guidance on the timing of changes in foreign policy behavior. As a result, the timing of the impacts of any changes will be determined empirically by fitting separate intervention models for each time period. A final statistical model will be developed that contains terms for each intervention and multiple terms if a particular type of election has a significant impact during more than one time period.

Figure 4.1

Azar's 15-Point Scale

Value	Action
1	Voluntary Unification Into One Nation
2	Major Strategic Alliance
3	Military, Economic, and Strategic Support
4	Non-Military Economic, Technological, and Industrial Agreement
5	Cultural and Scientific Agreement and Support
6	Official Verbal Support of Goals, Values, and Regime
7	Minor Official Exchanges, Talks, and Policy Expression
8	Neutral or Non-Significant Acts for the Inter-Nation Situation
9	Mild Verbal Expression Displaying Discord in the Interaction
10	Strong Verbal Expression Displaying Hostility in Interaction
11	Diplomatic-Economic Hostile Actions
12	Political-Military Hostile Actions
13	Small Scale Military Acts
14	Limited War Acts
15	Extensive War Acts Causing Death, Dislocation, and High Strategic Cost

Source: Azar (1980)

Figure 4.2

Azar and Havener's Weighted Scale

Value	Action
92	Voluntary Unification Into One Nation
47	Major Strategic Alliance
31	Military, Economic, and Strategic Support
27	Non-Military Economic, Technological, and Industrial Agreement
14	Cultural and Scientific Agreement and Support
10	Official Verbal Support of Goals, Values, and Regime
6	Minor Official Exchanges, Talks, and Policy Expression
1	Neutral or Non-Significant Acts for the Inter-Nation Situation
-6	Mild Verbal Expression Displaying Discord in the Interaction
-16	Strong Verbal Expression Displaying Hostility in Interaction
-29	Diplomatic-Economic Hostile Actions
-44	Political-Military Hostile Actions
-50	Small Scale Military Acts
-65	Limited War Acts
-102	Extensive War Acts Causing Death, Dislocation, and High Strategic Cost

Source: Azar (1980).

Figure 4.3

Classification of Presidential Elections

Type	Years
Open Election	1952, 1960, November 1968
Re-election, U.S. Not at War	1948, 1956, 1964, 1976
Re-election, U.S. Involved in a War	March 1968, 1972

Chapter 5

Analysis of U.S. Behavior to the World

In Chapter 3, a theoretical model of an election cycle in foreign policy activity was developed. This model is based on three areas of research in political science: (1) presidential popularity; (2) the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict; and (3) political economy. After reviewing previous research in those areas, a theoretical model was developed and a set of hypotheses to test that model was presented. In this chapter those hypotheses are tested using measures of U.S. foreign policy actions toward all nations. In Chapters 6 and 7, the hypotheses are tested in dyadic relationships. The first involves the U.S. and the Soviet Union; the second examines U.S. behavior toward two allies.

The hypotheses to be tested in this chapter involve the presence of an election cycle in foreign policy behavior. The first of four specific hypotheses involving the election cycle is that there is a pattern in U.S. foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. This pattern would appear as a change in foreign policy behavior as the elections approach. The second hypothesis is that foreign policy actions become more intense as elections approach. The acts, on average, will become either more cooperative or more conflictual. The third hypothesis is that this pattern will be more pronounced in

presidential elections than in off-year congressional contests. The fourth hypothesis is that the pattern is more apparent in those presidential elections in which the incumbent is attempting to succeed himself than in an open election. Further, the behavior will vary depending upon whether the U.S. is engaged in a war when the incumbent is seeking re-election.

To test the existence of the cycle in foreign policy behavior corresponding to the domestic election cycle and the impact of presidential popularity, four measures of foreign policy activity will be used. The first measure is the number of actions initiated toward all other nations. This measure is the sum of the number of positive and the number of negative actions. The measure provides an indication of foreign policy activity in general. The second measure is the number of positive actions. This measure is an indicator of the type of foreign policy actions being undertaken. The third measure is the number of negative or hostile actions taken against other nations. Although these two measures sum to the first, there are several reasons for examining all three.

First, the number of positive acts and the number of negative acts could change dramatically and offset each other without affecting the total number of actions. For example, if the number of positive actions dropped by fifty in a time period (in this analysis, a calendar quarter) and the number of negative actions increased by fifty during the same period, the measure of the

total number of actions would show no change. Similarly, the measure of the total number of actions could show an decrease of ten acts, but the change could be due to a drop of sixty positive actions, partially offset by an increase of fifty negative actions. The third measure can be computed from the other two. Another reason for using all three, however, is that the changes might not be consistent across elections. There could be a slight change in the total number of actions, an insignificant change in the number of positive actions, and a large and consistent change in the number of negative actions. Because the change in the number of positive actions is not consistent for each election (it increases for one, decreases for another), the impact of elections would not be significant. In statistical analysis, this wavering in the number of positive actions would muffle the impact of elections on the total number of actions, indicating that the change in foreign policy activity was minimal. By not using all three measures, the nature and the importance of the change would be masked. These measures are computed by summing the total number of each type of act in each time period.

The fourth measure to be used is the level of cooperation shown to other nations. By examining only the number of actions, the intensity of those actions is hidden. This measure adds a second dimension to the actions. Instead of examining only frequency, the content of the actions is also included. The level of cooperation is computed using a weighted scale proposed

by Azar and Havener (1976) that ranges from 92 (for voluntary unification of two nations) to -102 (for total war). This weighted scale was developed by asking a panel of scholars to assign values to different cooperative and conflictual categories. This weighted scale provides a measure of intensity of cooperation. Cooperative acts have positive values while hostile acts have negative values. As actions become more cooperative, the values increase. A decrease in value indicates that actions are less cooperative. This measures is computed by summing the weighted value for each action in a calendar quarter and dividing by the number of actions. Accordingly it becomes a measure of the average level of cooperation shown toward other nations.

Four equations, or models, will be used to test the existence of the election cycle in each of the four measures of foreign policy activity. The equations will be estimated with Box-Jenkins transfer functions and Box-Tiao intervention analysis. Each of the four models examines elections in a different context. The first model examines the existence of a pattern by grouping all elections--both presidential and off-year congressional--together. The second classifies the elections by whether they are presidential or off-year congressional. The third examines only presidential elections. These elections are classified as either those in which the incumbent in seeking reelection (and the U.S. is not at war), those in which the

incumbent is seeking reelection and the U.S. is engaged in a war, and open elections. The fourth examines only off-year congressional races. These elections are classified as either those in which the president's party controls the House of Representatives or those in which the president's party is the minority party.

Changes in Foreign Policy Activity Over Time

One way to determine if there is a pattern in the data is to plot it and to visually examine the series. Although this method is not rigorous, it can provide insight into the behavior of the series. Plots of two of the measures are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Figure 5.1 illustrates the changes in the total number of foreign policy actions over time.

As Figure 5.1 indicates, the U.S. has generally initiated between 120 and 380 actions each quarter toward all other nations. During the thirty-year period shown, the total number of events has exceeded 400 per quarter only eight times, and it has dropped below 100 only four times. Although the lowest point of the series occurred in the late 1940s and the highest point in the 1970s, the number of actions generated each quarter seems fairly stable or stationary over time; there does not appear to have been a monotonic increase.

A cursory examination of Figure 5.1 does not indicate the presence of an election cycle. There is no periodic ripple of

peaks and valleys that corresponds to domestic elections. Considering the three open elections in this study, the total number of events dropped during the election quarter on two occasions (1952, 1960) and rose in the third (1968). In the case of the incumbent attempting to retain his seat, the changes are also mixed. In 1948 and 1956, the number of actions rose during the election quarter. In 1964, 1972, and 1976, the total number of actions dropped.

Figure 5.2 shows the change in the level of cooperation over time. It does not show a pattern corresponding to the election cycle in the level of cooperation shown other nations. The figure does indicate that foreign policy actions undertaken toward other nations are generally cooperative in nature. Overall, the acts tend to range between zero and ten. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, though, the content of foreign policy acts became less cooperative and more hostile, dropping below a value of -10 on three occasions. Following both wars, the level of cooperation returns to it pre-war level. The series appears to be stationary in that regard.

Again, a cursory examination of the series in Figure 5.2 does not indicate a consistent pattern in behavior as elections draw near. In the open presidential elections, the level of cooperation drops in two elections (1952, 1968), and increases during the third (1960). This pattern does not correspond to what was found in the examination of the total number of events, again

indicating that the level of cooperation measures a different dimension of foreign policy activity. In terms of elections in which the incumbent is attempting to maintain his seat, the level of cooperation increases in three elections (1948, 1972, 1976) and drops in the other two (1956, 1964). This pattern in the level of cooperation fails to indicate a consistent change corresponding to the election cycle. The changes at each election do not correspond to the pattern found for the measure of the total number of actions.

The Election Cycle and Foreign Policy Actions Toward Other Nations

To determine the impact of elections on the number of foreign policy actions directed toward other nations, a series of ARIMA transfer functions were developed. They account for actions directed toward the U.S. from other nations, the presence or absence of elections, and the ongoing systematic pattern of U.S. actions. The first step in fitting the transfer function model is to prewhiten, or extract, the systematic structure from the number of U.S. actions. These models require a term for the mean of the series. In addition, a term was required to remove an autoregressive pattern from the residuals. This additional term is referred to as a noise model. After developing the initial transfer function, the model was re-estimated with one or more

terms included for the type of election. The results of these models are discussed next.

The relationship between elections and the total number of foreign policy actions generated each quarter are shown in Table 5.1. The table contains the results of all four models examined. The models are presented vertically. Within each model, two or more impacts are evaluated: the impact of acts directed toward the U.S. and the impact of the type of election. The measure of acts directed toward the U.S. is used as a control. Descriptions of the parameters for the impacts are presented. Column 1 presents the type of parameter (μ, ω_0, ϕ). Column 2 presents the time lag of the impact. A value of zero for the election variable indicates the impact is felt during the election quarter. A value of 1 indicates the impact occurs one quarter prior to the election, or during the months of July, August, and September. A lag of 2 indicates the impact is felt during the months of April, May, and June. A lag of 3 indicates the impact is felt during the months of January, February, and March. Column 3 provides the parameter estimate. Column 4 contains the T ratio for the parameter estimate. The ratio is obtained by dividing the parameter by its standard error.

The table indicates that the transfer function remained fairly stable across the four types of election classification or models. The estimate of the mean (μ) ranged from 42.39 to 48.96. The estimate of the impact of actions directed toward the U.S.

(ω_0) ranged from 0.93 to 0.96. The estimate of the noise model term (ϕ_1) ranged from 0.55 to 0.57. All four models appear to fit the data adequately as indicated by the low value of the Q statistic. Probability values on the Q statistic are no lower than 0.8. The models suggest that, on average, the U.S. would initiate forty-two to forty-nine actions a quarter. In addition, for each action initiated by a nation toward the U.S., the U.S. responds with an action. The action generated in response may or may not be directed at the original nation. These models are not examining traditional dyadic relationships.

Model 1 presented in the table examines the impact of any election--presidential or off-year congressional--on the level of activity generated by the U.S. The model indicates that in the quarter prior to an election there is an increase of about thirteen actions. This increase is not statistically significant as the T value of 1.29 indicates. There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, it may be that elections have no impact on foreign policy activity. This finding suggests that in order to assess the impact of elections, they must be viewed in context. Some types of elections may result in an increase in the number of actions while others result in a decrease. If this is true, the variation in impact across types of elections could result in the estimate of the impact of elections in general failing to meet standard statistical tests.

When elections are broken down by whether they are presidential or off-year congressional contests, a significant impact is found. As Model 2 indicates, there is a decrease of close to thirty-four actions during the period October through December of presidential election years. Off-year congressional elections result in an increase of slightly more than twelve events, but this increase is not significant. The theoretical model suggests that elections result in an increase in the number of foreign policy actions. The data, though, do not support that conclusion. Instead of showing an increase, the data indicate that there is a decrease in foreign policy actions as the election approaches. This impact supports the idea that elections affect foreign policy activity. There are several possible explanations why the total number of foreign policy actions decrease as an election approaches. First, the campaign itself may draw the incumbent's attention away from foreign policy. The decrease may also be due to the incumbent's hesitation in undertaking foreign policy actions that could backfire as the election approaches. Again, if this is the case, there are flaws with the model. A third reason for the decrease could be due to a decrease in a particular type of action--either positive or negative. The number of actions is the sum of the number of positive actions and the number of negative actions. A decrease in the number of positive actions could offset an increase in the number of

negative acts. This possibility will be examined later in this chapter.

The type of presidential election appears to be important in determining the impact of elections on the number of events. In Model 3, presidential elections are evaluated in terms of whether the incumbent is seeking re-election, the incumbent is seeking re-election and the U.S. is at war, or whether the election is open. When an incumbent is seeking re-election, there is a decrease of close to eighteen actions in the election quarter. This decrease is not significant, though. There is a significant decrease, however, in those years in which the president is attempting to remain in office and the U.S. is at war. Under these circumstances, there is a significant decrease of more than fifty-four actions during the October through December quarter. If the election is open, there is an increase 40.90 actions on average. This increase occurs during the January through March period of election years. The decrease in the number of actions when the incumbent is attempting to succeed himself while the U.S. is in a war could be due to a number of factors. First, he may be attempting to limit foreign involvement, in which case he wishes to down play the importance of the war. The decrease could also be due to the president attempting to avoid the image of trying to manage too many events at one time. By sharply limiting the number of foreign contacts, he appears to be in better control. Another reason for the drop in foreign involvement could

be the logistics of the election. During the six weeks prior to the election, the president may be too involved with his re-election campaign. His interests may be focused on last minute details of the election. Because of the war, he may have had to forego many campaign activities. As a result, he tries to pursue as many activities as possible shortly before the election. Further, a decrease in the total number of actions could be due to a decrease in the number of positive acts that offset an increase in the number of negative acts.

The increase in events prior to open elections is interesting. Even though the increase occurs in the months of January, February, and March, it could reasonably have an impact on the November election. These actions occur at the time of the early primaries. The change in behavior could affect primary elections. The increase could be due to a number of factors. First, the increase could be the result of the incumbent attempting to tie up a number of loose ends before he leaves office. He may have instituted a number of policies that require follow-up contact. These contacts are made prior to the start of the campaign period for his successor. In addition, the incumbent may see his last few months in office as a way to enhance the way he will be remembered. Accordingly, he attempts to emphasize his foreign policy leadership. Further, the increase could be a way for the incumbent to help his designated successor win the nomination of his party. If intra-party

competition was fierce, the incumbent possibly could boost the fortunes of his personal choice as a successor by boosting his own importance as a world leader.

Presidential elections are not the only types of elections to have a significant impact on foreign policy actions. Some off-year congressional elections also have a significant impact on the number of actions directed toward other nations. The model evaluates the impact of these off-year elections by classifying them contextually according to whether the president's party controls the House going into the election. Even though Model 2 indicated that off-year elections did not have a significant impact, disaggregation of the elections may yield additional insight. The table indicates that when the president's party controls the House, there is a decrease of forty-six actions in the spring prior to off-year elections. Although being the minority party in the House is also associated with a decrease in the number of actions, the decrease is not significant. The decrease in actions may be due to the president attempting to avoid foreign contacts that could affect the upcoming election. He may wish to stress his domestic policy instead. By limiting the number of foreign policy actions, the president is better able to coordinate the remaining actions, too. Another factor that could be related to the decrease in actions is the election itself. In an attempt to maintain control of the House, the president may devote more time to

campaigning. As a result, less time is available for foreign endeavors.

Also, this finding for Model 4 is disturbing because the theoretical model suggests that there should be an increase in the number of actions. The most plausible explanation, that the off-year election campaign has distracted the incumbent's attention away from foreign policy actions, is the least consistent with the hypothesis. The one finding in the results from Model 4 that supports the hypothesis is that off-year elections do have a significant effect on foreign policy activity. Further, this variation is contextual and not structural. A significant impact is found only in those off-year elections in which the president's party controls the House of Representatives. If the effect were structural, a similar significant impact would be found for off-year elections in which the president's party is in the minority. This finding suggests that foreign policy activity does change as an election approaches. The reason for the change, though, is not clear.

The results found in Table 5.1 are not encouraging for the model developed in Chapter 3. Although the table generally supports the idea that there is a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the election cycle, the pattern can be explained by a president who takes his mind off foreign policy matters and devotes attention to campaigning as the election approaches. The only type of election that generated an increase

in foreign policy actions was one for open presidential elections. A tenuous explanation for this finding is that the incumbent is increasing foreign policy actions in an attempt to ensure that he can name his party's designee to succeed him.

Although certain types of elections have an impact on the total number of actions generated by the U.S., this impact is not as apparent when only positive actions are examined. The relationship between elections and positive actions is presented in Table 5.2. In evaluating the impact of elections on the number of positive actions directed toward other nations, a transfer function was developed that accounted for both the impact of actions directed toward the U.S. from other nations and the impact of the various types of elections. In developing this transfer function, a noise model term was required for an autoregressive disturbance in the residuals. As the table indicates, the estimate for the mean of the model ranged from 27.33 to 31.58. The estimated effect of incoming positive actions ranged from 1.12 to 1.15. This finding suggests that the U.S. gives a slightly better than a one-to-one return for positive actions. For each positive action directed toward the U.S., the U.S. responds with about 1.12 positive actions. Taken as a whole, U.S. actions are generally cooperative in nature. This tendency toward cooperation could result in the slightly greater than one-to-one response for positive actions.

The estimate of the noise term of the model ranged from 0.50 to 0.53. The Q statistics indicate that the four models adequately fit the data. The probability values for the Q statistics range from 0.874 to 0.968.

Table 5.2 indicates that national elections, as a whole, tend to decrease the number of positive actions. Model 1 reveals that there is a decrease of 9.67 actions during the election quarter. This decrease does not pass the standard tests for statistical significance, though. When elections are classified as either presidential or off-year congressional races, a significant impact is found. During presidential elections, there is a decrease of close to twenty-one positive actions. This decrease occurs in the three-month period in which the election is held. Off-year contests show a slight decline in the number of positive actions, but this decrease is not significant. The decrease associated with presidential elections could be due to attempts to manipulate the foreign policy process. The decrease also could be the result of the election requiring that more time be devoted to campaigning activities and less time to foreign policy actions. Again, this finding does not support the theoretical model.

Although there is a significant impact for presidential elections in general, the impact is obscured when these elections are classified by type. There is a decrease in the number of actions for elections in which the incumbent is seeking re-

election, when the incumbent is seeking re-election and the U.S. is at war, and for open elections. Further, this decrease appears to occur during the election quarter. But this decrease is not significant for individual types of elections. The impact of these types of elections ranges from -18.86 for incumbents to -26.74 for war incumbents. The failure to gain statistical significance is due to the variation within each type. By grouping the elections together as a whole, the variation is lessened. Again, this finding fails to support the theoretical model. Instead, it supports the notion of an incumbent who withdraws his attention from foreign affairs as the election approaches and concentrates on the election campaign. One reason that the analysis fails to support the hypothesis could be due to the aggregate nature of the data. By aggregating the data and conducting the analysis on a monad, actions that are initiated as the result of the election cycle are obscured.

Table 5.2 also shows that off-year congressional elections when classified by whether the president's party controls the House are associated with decreases in the number of positive actions, but that these decrease are not significant. Model 4 suggests that if the president's party controls the House, there is a decrease of twenty-four positive actions in the spring before the election. Being the minority party is also associated with a decrease in the number of positive actions. In neither instance are these changes statistically significant; the parameter

estimates were not large enough in relation to their standard errors to indicate an off-year electoral impact.

The analysis of the relationship between elections and negative actions is presented in Table 5.3. Just as with the positive foreign policy actions, a transfer function was developed using the impact of incoming negative events to prewhiten the measure of the number of negative events directed toward other nations. That model required a term for the mean of the series, a single transfer parameter, and an autoregressive term for the noise model. The analysis yielded estimates of the mean that ranged between 26.71 and 30.37. The estimate of the impact of negative actions directed toward the U.S. (ω_0) ranged from 0.49 to 0.55. This term suggests that for each two negative actions it receives, the U.S. responds with one negative action during the same quarter. The estimate for the autoregressive term in the noise model ranges from 0.66 to 0.69. All four models revealed adequate Q statistics, with p-values ranging from 0.501 to 0.905.

Table 5.3 indicates that elections in general have an impact on the number of negative events. Model 1 reveals that the presence of either a presidential or off-year congressional election results in an increase in the number of negative events. During election years, the number of negative actions increases by close to eleven during the January through March quarter. The timing of this increase is such that the events could be

initiated without demanding time from the election campaign. These negative events could be symbols of U.S. resolve. Further, because they occur so early in the campaign, it might be possible for the incumbent to recover if the action backfired.

Model 2 provides a better indication of the pattern of negative events during an election year. This model suggests that negative events increase during the entire January through September period prior to presidential elections. In the preceding analysis, the impact was found in only one quarter, although the presence of an impact was examined in all four quarters of the election year. The negative coefficients may be a little misleading. The model being presented is:

$$\text{Negative Actions}_t = \mu + (\omega_0 - \omega_1 B^1 - \omega_2 B^2)\ \text{Presidential Elections}_t + \ldots .$$

where B is the backshift operator such that $B^1 X_t$ is the same as X_{t-1}. Table 5.3 indicates that the estimate of ω_1 is -15.77 and the estimate of ω_2 is -22.27. Substituting these values into the equation yields

$$\text{Negative Actions}_t = \mu + (21.92 - (-15.77)B^1 - (-22.27)B^2)\ \text{Presidential Elections}_t + \ldots$$

The impact, being a subtracted negative value, takes on a positive value. Because the variable measuring the impact of presidential elections is one during the quarter in which an election is held and zero otherwise, Model 2 indicates that in the first quarter of an election year, there is an increase of about twenty-two negative actions. During the second quarter, the increase in the number of negative actions due to the presidential election is 15.77, slightly lower than the increase found in the first quarter. During the July through September quarter of presidential election years, the number of negative events increases by almost twenty-two. These increases are not additive; there are not 15.77 additional negative actions during the second quarter on top of the twenty-two from the first quarter. Instead, they represent an increase in the number of negative actions over what would normally be expected. All three of these increases are statistically significant. These findings support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between elections and the number of foreign policy actions. Off-year congressional elections, while associated with an increase in the number of negative actions, are not significant.

In classifying presidential elections by type, the impact over three calendar quarters disappears. Significant effects are found, though, for the impact of incumbents seeking re-election when the U.S. is at war and for open presidential elections. There is not a significant increase for incumbents seeking re-

election in general. In election years when the U.S. is at war and the president is attempting to succeed himself, there is an increase of 36.68 negative actions in the January through March period. This finding is consistent with that of Stoll (1984) who reported that there is an increase in the visible use of force in those years in which the U.S. is at war and the incumbent is seeking re-election. When there is an open election, there also is an increase in the number of negative actions during the same period of time. This increase is only one-half that of when the U.S. is at war.

There are several plausible explanations for this increase during open elections. One is that the incumbent is manipulating foreign affairs in an attempt to help the election effort of his designated successor. Another would be that the incumbent can take decisive action that he otherwise might hesitate to undertake because of the election. The model indicates that the change in the number of negative actions during those years in which the incumbent seeks re-election is not significant. Although this finding does not support Stoll's other findings that there is only limited use of force when incumbents seek re-election and the nation is not at war, it is not inconsistent with them.

Model 4 indicates that there is a significant relationship between types of off-year congressional elections and the number of negative actions. Although there is not a significant impact

on the number of negative actions when the president's party controls the House going into the election, the model indicates that being the minority party is associated with an increase in the number of negative actions. There is an increase of 17.59 negative actions during those years in which there is an off-year election and the president's party does not control the House. This finding also supports the hypothesis that the president manipulates foreign actions in order to win elections. This increase in negative actions could arise as part of an effort to elect members of president's party to congress.

Even though elections do not appear to affect the number of positive events, they do appear to have an impact on the number of negative events as Table 5.3 indicates. Further, where previous relationships indicated that elections reduce the number of actions, giving rise to the plausible explanation that the reduction was caused by devoting more attention to campaigns than foreign policy actions, elections are associated with an increase in the number of negative actions. Although there is an overall net decrease in the number of actions, the increase in the number of negative or conflictual actions support the initial hypotheses that the president manipulates foreign policy actions in order to win elections.

The changes in the number of positive and negative actions has a mixed impact on the content of American foreign policy. According to Table 5-4, many of the types of elections that had

an impact on either the number of positive or negative events also have an impact on the level of cooperation the U.S. exhibits toward other nations. Not every type of election that affected the number of actions has an impact on foreign policy content.

Prior to estimating the models shown in Table 5.4, a transfer function model was developed to account for the level of cooperation in actions directed toward the U.S. by other nations. This transfer function required a term for an autoregressive disturbance in the residuals. A set of transfer functions that included measures of the types of election was subsequently developed. The estimate of the mean of the series ranged from 2.67 to 3.01. The model suggests that the impact of the level of cooperation directed at the U.S. range from 0.76 to 0.80. This means that an increase of ten in the level of cooperation directed toward the U.S. will result in an increase of 7.6 to 8 in the level of cooperation shown other nations by the U.S. during the same calendar quarter. This compares with a return of 0.50 on negative actions and of 1.12 on positive actions. The level of response in the level of cooperation falls between the rate of response for negative actions and positive actions. Where every two negative actions directed toward the U.S. generates one negative action in return, every four-unit decrease in cooperation directed to the U.S. results in at least a three unit decrease in the level of cooperation shown other nations. By the same token, where positive actions appear to be rewarded with a matching

positive action, an increase of four units in cooperation is met a three unit increase in return. This finding indicates that the level of cooperation may be independent of the number of positive or negative actions. The number of actions may be in one dimension while the level of cooperation is measured in a second dimension.

In examining the impact of negative actions, a significant increase was found prior to national elections. This increase occurred during the January through March period. Analysis of positive actions suggested that these elections resulted in a decrease in the number of actions during the election quarter. Table 5.4 indicates that these elections have an impact on the level of cooperation shown other nations, too. This impact, which approaches standard levels of statistical significance, occurs during the calendar quarter preceding the election. Because of the timing, this change in behavior does not appear to be directly related to either the increase in the number of negative events or the decrease in the number of positive events. The decrease in cooperation, though, would indicate a more hostile tone in dealing with other nations. This increase in hostility is similar to that found with the earlier measures. This change supports the hypothesis that there is a pattern in foreign policy actions that corresponds to the domestic election cycle.

In analysis presented earlier in this chapter, a significant decrease in the number of positive events and a significant increase in the number of negative events was reported. Model 2 in Table 5.4 reports a related change in the tone of foreign policy actions. The model indicates that the level of cooperation drops 3.34 units in the calendar quarter before elections. This increase in conflict is consistent with a decrease in the number of positive actions during the election quarter and an increase in the number of negative actions during the January through September time period preceding the election. Although the number of negative events shows an increase over a nine-month period, those changes are associated with a change in the level of cooperation only during the last three months. Further, the decrease in the number of positive actions follows the change in the level of cooperation and occurs after the number of negative actions have fallen to their normal state. This finding is similar to that found in the previous model and suggests that following an increase in the number of negative actions, the level of cooperation falls. Subsequently, the number of positive actions declines. All of these changes occur as part of a domestic election cycle. This relationship appears to hold only while elections are aggregated or partially aggregated. As elections are broken down further by type, the relationship is obscured or disappears.

This partial breakdown is found in Model 3 where presidential elections are classified by type. The relationship holds for certain types of presidential elections but not for all types. The relationship is consistent for open presidential elections, but it does not hold for elections where the incumbent is attempting to remain in office. Prior analysis indicates that open elections are associated with an increase in the total number of events (Table 5.1) and the number of negative actions (Table 5.3). Open elections appear to be related with a decrease in the number of positive actions (Table 5.2). The increase in the number of negative events begins in the January through March quarter preceding the election. In the quarter before the election, there is a drop in the level of cooperation shown to other nations. In the subsequent quarter, there is a decrease in the number of positive actions.

In the case of incumbents, the relationship between negative actions, level of cooperation, and the number of positive actions begins to fall apart. Earlier analysis indicated that three calendar quarters prior to an election, there is a significant increase in the number of negative actions. Further, in the election quarter, there is a significant drop in the total number of actions directed toward other nations and a corresponding drop in the number of positive acts that approaches statistical significance. There is not a corresponding significant decrease in the level of cooperation before the election. In fact, the

model suggests that there is an increase in the level of cooperation. This increase, while not significant, occurs in the early summer before the election. This finding indicates that all presidential elections do not have the same effect on foreign policy actions. The presence of a war may inhibit an incumbent from decreasing the level of cooperation in policy actions.

When the U.S. is not at war and the incumbent is seeking re-election, the number of foreign policy actions and the tone of those acts follows yet a different pattern. In none of the previous analyses was a significant relationship between the number of actions and this type of elections found. Prior results indicated that there were decreases in the total number of actions and the number of positive actions. In neither instance was the decrease significant. Further, a slight increase in the number of negative events, about one-fourth that for incumbents seeking re-election during war years, was indicated, but this change also was not significant. Table 5.4 indicates, however, that there is a shift in the tone of foreign actions associated with these elections. In the calendar quarters preceding these elections, the level of cooperation declines by 4.57 units. This is a larger decline than that found for any other type of election. This change implies that although the incumbent may not alter the frequency of his behavior, he does alter its content. Actions become more hostile. This change could be due to the incumbent attempting to portray a leader who is firm and

aggressive in dealing with other nations. Because the change occurs immediately prior to the election, it may be undertaken for maximum impact.

Table 5.4 also shows that although off-year elections may influence the number of actions, they do not appear to affect the content. Neither those elections in which the president's party controls the House nor those in which the president's party is in the minority have a significant impact on the tone of foreign policy actions.

Summary and Conclusions

Analysis of U.S. foreign policy actions toward all other nations indicates a number of different patterns. In the thirty-year period covered in this study, the number of actions tended to vary between 120 and 380 per quarter. The number of acts exceeded 400 in only eight quarters, and dropped below 100 only four times. The number of positive and negative acts indicated a similar stability. The number of positive actions exceeded 280 only 10 times, with eight of these related to a peak in the total number of actions. The number of negative actions exceeded 150 on only four occasions, each time occurring with a related peak in the total number of actions.

The tone of foreign policy actions has been stable over time, also. Generally, the level of cooperation ranges between zero and ten. There have been noteworthy dips in the levels of

cooperation during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Also, during the Vietnam War, the series as a whole dropped.

Elections were found to have several significant impacts on both the number of foreign policy actions and the content of those actions. There is a significant decrease in the total number of foreign actions during all presidential election years. If these elections are classified according to type, varying impacts are found. When the U.S. is at war and the incumbent is seeking re-election, there is a decrease of fifty-four actions. If the election is an open election, there is an increase in the number of actions. A significant decrease in the number of positive actions was noted for all presidential election years. These decreases could be due to a number of factors. First, the decreases could be an indication that the president manipulates foreign policy actions to his advantage. Prior to elections, the president purposively undertakes a foreign policy strategy that is designed to win votes. The decreases could be due to a rival explanation, however. Because of the election and associated campaign activities, the president has less time to devote to foreign policy. Therefore, the number of foreign policy acts decreases.

This rival explanation does not hold for the number of negative actions, however. A significant increase in the number of negative actions was found in election years. Prior to all national elections, there appears to be an increase in the number

of negative actions. This increase occurs for the entire January through September period of presidential election years. When classifying presidential elections by type, the increase was found for both elections in which the incumbent was attempting to succeed himself and the U.S. was at war and for open elections. Further, an increase was found for off-year congressional races when the president's party was the minority party. These changes support the hypothesis that there is a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. A similar impact was found for the tone of foreign policy actions. There is a decrease in the level of cooperation prior to all national elections. This decrease held for all presidential elections. When classifying presidential elections by type, however, the decrease was found only for open elections.

TABLE 5.1
Analysis of the Total Number of Events

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		44.08	2.94
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.94	16.02
Any Election	ω_0	1	12.78	1.29
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.55	7.05

Q at 24 lags = 15.74; Prob. = 0.828

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		48.96	3.25
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.93	16.04
Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-32.72	-2.57
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	0	12.35	0.90
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.57	7.50

Q at 24 lags = 15.60; Prob. = 0.835

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		44.16	2.83
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.95	15.95
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	0	-17.79	-0.91
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-54.18	-1.97
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	3	40.90	1.83
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.57	7.24

Q at 24 lags = 15.18; Prob. = 0.854

Continued on next page

TABLE 5.1-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		42.39	2.81
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.96	16.12
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	-46.06	-1.99
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	1	-18.30	-0.93
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.55	6.95

Q at 24 lags = 15.11; Prob. = 0.857

TABLE 5.2
Analysis of Positive Actions

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		30.93	3.66
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	1.12	19.66
Any Election	ω_0	0	-9.67	-1.53
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.51	6.21

Q at 24 lags = 11.45; Prob. = 0.968

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		31.51	3.62
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	1.13	19.42
Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-20.83	-2.45
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	3	-5.72	-0.59
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.52	6.34

Q at 24 lags = 13.12; Prob. = 0.930

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		31.58	3.69
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	1.12	19.51
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	0	-18.86	-1.50
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-26.74	-1.50
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-20.75	-1.43
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.53	6.49

Q at 24 lags = 13.58; Prob. = 0.916

Continued on next page

TABLE 5.2-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		27.33	3.17
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	1.15	19.42
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	-23.99	-1.59
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	3	-9.95	-0.76
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.50	6.10

Q at 24 lags = 14.71; Prob. = 0.874

TABLE 5.3
Analysis of Negative Actions

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		28.21	3.75
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.52	8.75
Any Election	ω_0	3	10.89	2.45
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.66	9.27

Q at 24 lags = 21.32; Prob. = 0.501

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		27.95	3.68
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.49	8.37
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	21.92	3.16
	ω_1	2	-15.77	-2.01
	ω_2	3	-22.27	-3.23
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	0	8.87	1.45
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.69	9.87

Q at 24 lags = 19.36; Prob. = 0.623

Continued on next page

TABLE 5.3-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		30.37	4.01
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.68	9.62
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	9.98	1.14
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	3	36.68	3.00
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	3	18.29	1.84
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.68	9.62

Q at 24 lags = 19.10; Prob. = 0.639

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		26.71	3.46
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.55	8.72
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	-9.84	-0.91
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	17.59	1.96
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.66	9.35

Q at 24 lags = 13.90; Prob. = 0.905

TABLE 5.4
Analysis of Level of Cooperation

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.01	2.81
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.80	6.90
Any Election	ω_0	1	-1.42	-1.74
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.68	10.07

Q at 24 lags = 11.87; Prob. = 0.960

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.78	2.58
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.80	6.97
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	-3.34	-3.19
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	2	1.56	1.32
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.70	10.47

Q at 24 lags = 13.39; Prob. = 0.922

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.97	2.60
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.76	6.69
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	-4.57	-2.90
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	2	2.90	1.32
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	-3.76	-2.11
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.71	10.83

Q at 24 lags = 13.15; Prob. = 0.929

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TABLE 5.4-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.67	2.48
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.79	6.72
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	1	1.18	0.62
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	2	2.12	1.29
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.68	9.90

Q at 24 lags = 13.08; Prob. = 0.931



Figure 5.1: Analysis of U.S. Actions Toward All Nations



Figure 5.2: Analysis of the Cooperation Shown Other Nations

Chapter 6

The Election Cycle and U.S. Foreign Policy Actions Toward the Soviets

In Chapter 3, a theoretical model was developed that suggested there is a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. In Chapter 5, that model was tested in a monadic scheme with data on U.S. foreign policy actions toward all nations. In this chapter, the model is tested by analyzing U.S. foreign policy behavior toward the Soviet Union.

A key point of the theoretical model is that as elections approach, the president, acting as the eyes and ears of the nation, identifies threats. There are several constraints, however, on what can be labeled a threat. Jervis (1976) argues that the set of possible threats is limited by cognitive dissonance. Knorr (1976) says threats are similar to hypotheses; there must be some referent or suggestion to believe that an entity is a threat. What better possible threat for the U.S. than the Soviet Union?

In Chapter 5, the foreign policy actions of the U.S. toward all other nations was examined for the existence of a pattern corresponding to the domestic election cycle. This macro, non-dyadic relationship yielded mixed findings. The strongest evidence of a domestic election cycle was found in the analysis of

the number of negative actions. The likelihood of a cycle seems greater in U.S. behavior toward the Soviets, though.

In examining the existence of a cycle, four hypotheses will be tested. The first hypothesis is that there is a pattern in foreign policy activity toward the Soviets that corresponds to the American domestic election cycle. Second, this pattern will manifest itself as an increase in the intensity of foreign policy activity. As elections approach, foreign policy actions will become more cooperative. Third, this pattern will be more pronounced in presidential elections than in off-year congressional elections. Also, this pattern will be more apparent when an incumbent is attempting to retain the presidency than during open election. There also should be a difference if the presidential election occurs while the U.S. is engaged in a war.

The theoretical model suggests that the number of conflictual acts toward ideological adversaries such as the Soviets will decrease an election approaches. Similarly, the number of positive acts toward the Soviets should increase near elections. Also, the level of cooperation shown the Soviets should increase during election periods.

These hypotheses will be tested using the same measures of foreign policy activity utilized in Chapter 5. The four measures were developed in Chapter 4. The first measure is the total number of acts directed toward the Soviets by the U.S. government. The second measure is the number of positive acts

and the third is the number of negative acts. Although the total number of acts is the sum of the positive and the negative acts, and the third measure can be calculated from the other two, all three will be used in the analysis. The reason for using all three measures is that it allows closer scrutiny of foreign policy behavior. As discussed in Chapter 5, there could be offsetting changes in the number or positive and negative actions that would not appear in the summary measure. Also, there may be systematic changes in one measure, such as the number of negative acts, while changes in the other measure may be random. Inclusion of all three measures will provide for a clearer analysis of changes in behavior.

The fourth measure of foreign policy activity to be used is the average level of cooperation shown the Soviets. This measure utilizes a scale proposed by Azar and Havener (1976) that ranges from 92 (for voluntary unification of two nations) to -102 (for total war). This weighted scale was designed with the aid of a panel of scholars and researchers who were asked to assign values to different types of actions based upon both the intensities of the actions and the ratio of the intensity of a particular act to other actions. This weighted scale provides a measure of the relative intensity of conflict and cooperation. Cooperative acts have positive values while conflictual acts have negative values. This scale can be interpreted as a measure of cooperation. An increase in value along the scale indicates that acts are

becoming more cooperative. A decrease indicates that actions are becoming less cooperative or more hostile. The value of the level of cooperation for a particular time period is computed by summing the weighted scale value for all actions undertaken by the U.S. toward the Soviets during that period and dividing by the number of actions. The measure is actually a measure of the average level of cooperation.

To test the hypotheses, four equations, or models, will be estimated for each of the measures of foreign policy activity using Box-Jenkins transfer functions and Box-Tiao intervention analysis. Each equation also includes a term measuring the number of the same type of foreign policy actions directed at the U.S. by the Soviets during the particular time period. The transfer function for the number of positive acts contains a term for the number of positive acts generated by the Soviet Union toward the U.S. This measure of Soviet actions is a control variable that accounts for U.S. actions that may be generated in response to Soviet actions. By including only the Soviet actions and a term for elections, the statistical model assumes that U.S. actions are generated only as a response to Soviet actions or actions generated as the result of domestic elections. The problem of including the term as a general explanatory variable of U.S. actions toward the Soviets is that it takes a simplistic if not incorrect view of the motivation for foreign policy behavior. Explaining all foreign policy behavior is not the goal

of this research. The goal is to identify changes in behavior due to domestic elections. Inclusion of the term for Soviet behavior serves as a catchall to explain most variation behavior. Further, the use of an ARIMA transfer function eliminates that part of foreign policy action that is due to inertia or the general trend in activity.

The four equations classify elections in contextual terms. Model 1 examines the impact of all elections--presidential and off-year congressional--as one impact. Model 2 classifies elections as either presidential or off-year congressional. Model 3 examines only presidential elections. It classifies these elections as either those in which the incumbent is attempting to remain in office and the U.S. is not at war, those in which the incumbent is attempting to win re-election and the U.S. is at war, and open elections. Model 4 examines only off-year congressional races. It classifies them according to whether the president's party controls the House of Representatives or whether the president's party is in the minority in the House.

Changes in U.S. Behavior to the Soviets Over Time

U.S. foreign policy actions toward the Soviet Union has fluctuated over time. As the world has changed, so too have the particular issues that provoke action from the United States or the Soviet Union. Although some issues that once nearly provoked a war are still unresolved, the tension caused by their lack of

resolution has decreased. Other events that resulted in sharp and sudden increase in the amount of conflict between the two nations are now interesting footnotes to history.

As Figure 6.1 indicates, there have been ten peaks in the foreign policy actions of the U.S. toward the Soviets where the number of acts has approached or exceeded forty per quarter. The peaks occur at irregular intervals and do not indicate an apparent underlying cycle. The first four peaks involve Berlin. The fifth coincides with the Cuban missile crisis. The next five peaks, however, are not associated with particular dramatic events. Overall, the figure does not indicate the existence of an apparent pattern in the number of events that corresponds to the election cycle. Examination of the type of behavior in presidential elections does not indicate a pattern either. As the figure indicates, the total number of actions decreased in two open presidential elections (1960, 1968) while they increased in the third (1952). For those elections in which the incumbent was running, a more consistent pattern emerges. In four of these elections (1956, 1964, 1972, 1976), the total number of actions toward the Soviets increased during the election quarter. In the fifth instance, 1948, the total number of actions dropped. Although this pattern is encouraging, it does not prove a pattern in behavior.

Figure 6.2 illustrates changes in the level of cooperation shown the Soviets over the same time period. As the figure

indicates, there were two occasions when the level of cooperation dropped below -15; the fourth quarter of 1950 and the third quarter of 1960. Both of these occasions are associated with major confrontations between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The first occasion corresponds with the invasion of South Korea. The second followed the downing of a U2 spy plane over Russia and the collapse of the Paris Big Four Summit.

A close examination of the figure does not indicate a cyclical pattern corresponding to domestic elections. In terms of presidential elections, the figure indicates that the level of cooperation shown the Soviets dropped in two open elections (1952, 1968), while it rose during the third (1960). The level of cooperation dropped during the election quarter three times when the incumbent was seeking reelection (1956, 1972, 1976) and rose during the remaining two elections (1948, 1964). There does not appear to be a consistent pattern in the level of cooperation shown the Soviets. Further, the changes in the level of cooperation are not consistent with the total number of actions generated toward the Russians. Additional analysis is indicated.

The Election Cycle and the Frequency of Events

Although Figure 6.1 suggests that there may be a pattern in the total number of actions generated by the U.S. toward the Soviet Union, that pattern is less pronounced when controlling other factors such as previous U.S. actions and the number of actions directed toward the U.S. from the Soviet Union. As Table

6.1 indicates, elections in general do not have an impact on the number of actions initiated by the U.S. toward the Soviet Union. The only instance when the impact of an election approaches statistical significance involves presidential elections when the incumbent either does not or can not seek re-election. In those elections, there is an increase of 7.55 events in the quarter preceding the election. In every other instance, however, the impact of an election is not statistically significant.

To evaluate the impact of elections, an ARIMA transfer function was estimated for the impact of actions initiated by the Soviets toward the U.S. Analysis indicated that the impact of these events occurs contemporaneously. As Table 6.1 shows, the U.S. responds to Soviet actions on a less than one-to-one basis. An increase in one action toward America by the Soviet Union results in a .63 to .66 of an act in return in the same quarter. Although actions are discrete, an the idea of two-thirds of an action in response is meaningless. In real terms, an increase of ten actions by the Soviets will result in an increase of six to seven acts toward them by the U.S. This increase of six to seven acts is important given that, according to the model, there is an average of seven acts per month directed toward the Soviets (μ=7.02). The transfer function for the frequency of events also required a noise model term that ranged between ϕ=.051 to ϕ=.053. Also, each model met the necessary condition of having a fairly

low value of Q at 24 lags, with p-values ranging from .168 to .294.

In Model 1, which examines the impact of any election--presidential or off-year congressional--the estimate of the impact is positive but non-significant. It is unclear from the theoretical model what type of change would be expected. This non-significant impact in the total number of actions could be due to an increase in the number of negative actions and an offsetting decrease in the number of positive actions. If that is the case, an insignificant change in the total number of events is consistent with the theoretical model.

Model 2, presented in Table 6.1, explores the impact of elections depending upon whether they were presidential or off-year congressional contests. As the table indicates, neither type of election has a significant impact on the number of actions directed toward the Soviets. Although there appears to be a decrease of close to four actions a quarter in the months of October, November, and December of presidential election years, this change is not statistically significant. This model also indicates an increase of close to one-and-a-quarter events in the last three months of the year in which off-year congressional elections are held. This increase is not statistically significant. Again, this lack of statistical significance does not mean that there is a problem with the theoretical model. If the lack of significant change in the total number of actions is

due to a trade-off between positive and negative actions, a non-significant impact would be expected.

Model 3, presented in Table 6.1, examines the impact of types of presidential elections on the number of events directed toward the Soviets. In this model, one term--an indicator of whether the presidential contest is an open election--approaches statistical significance. The indicators for other types of elections, however, are not significant. The model suggests that there is an increase of about four-and-one-half actions directed toward the Soviets in the quarter preceding the election if the incumbent is seeking re-election. In those years in which the U.S. is at war and the incumbent is seeking re-election, there is a decrease of 6.43 events during the October through December period. If the election is open, there is an increase of slightly more than seven-and-one-half events in the July through September quarter preceding the election. Again, the theoretical model being investigated does not require a change in the total number of actions for presidential elections. It would have been reassuring if a change were found, but the failure to find a change does not indicate a problem with the theory or the method being used to test it.

Model 4 evaluates the impact of types of off-year congressional elections. In those elections in which the president's party controls the House of Representatives, there is an decrease of 2.5 events directed toward the Soviets during the

election quarter. In those years in which the president's party is in the minority, there is an increase of close to four-and-two-thirds actions. Neither of these changes is statistically significant, however. Clearly, a significant impact due to the types of off-year races would be desirable, yet its absence does not indicate a problem.

The impact of elections on the number of positive events are reported in Table 6.2. Each of the four models in the table was estimated after determining the impact of positive actions directed toward the U.S. by the Soviet Union. The estimate of the impact of incoming actions ranged from .68 to .70, indicating that if the Soviets increased the number of positive actions per quarter by ten, the American government would increase the number of positive actions toward the Russians by about seven. Each of the four models indicated that, on average, the U.S. made between three and four (3.43 and 3.69) positive actions toward the Soviet Union each quarter. Each model required a separate autoregressive noise term (ϕ_1), which ranged between .48 and .50. The models seem to explain most of the systematic variation in the number of positive events as evidenced from the low values of Q at 24 lags. The p-value for the Q statistic ranged from .187 to .317.

Model 1 evaluates the impact of any election on the number of positive actions. The analysis indicates that in the quarter preceding an election, the number of events decreases by slightly

less than one (ω_0 = -.86). This change is not statistically significant. Although the sign of the parameter is negative, indicating a reduction in the number of positive acts as an election approaches, the value is less than two-thirds its standard error, indicating, first, a great deal of variability across elections and second, that the parameter is not significantly different from zero. Based upon the theoretical model, an increase in the number of actions would have been expected. Failure to obtain a significant value requires further review of the table.

When elections are classified as either presidential or off-year congressional contests, Model 2 indicates that there is an increase of about one-and-one-half positive actions in the July through September period before the election. Off-year congressional elections result in a decrease of .85 events during the same time period. In neither instance is the change statistically significant. The increase in the number of positive acts was predicted by the theoretical model. The decrease associated with off-year congressional races has the same degree of variability, as measured by the ratio between the parameter estimate and its standard error, as the estimate of all election. It is a negative value, which is not the type of impact that was anticipated. The failure to find a significant impact for either presidential or off-year elections could be an

indication of a problem with either the theoretical model or the method used to test it.

The number of positive events directed toward the Soviets fluctuates prior to presidential elections depending on whether the incumbent is seeking re-election. Although the changes are not statistically significant, Model 3 suggests that there is an increase of close to three positive events towards the Soviets in the quarter preceding open presidential elections. By the same token, if the incumbent is seeking re-election, there is a decrease of about two-and-two-thirds positive actions in the months of April, May, and June prior to the election. If the incumbent is seeking re-election while the U.S. is at war, there appears to be an increase of about one positive action during the election quarter. The increase in the number of positive acts for open elections, although not significant, lends support to the theory. The increase is in the direction the theory would suggest. The value reported for the change associated with those elections in which the incumbent is seeking re-election and the U.S. is engaged in a war also supports the theoretical model. This increase in the number of positive acts supports the findings of Stoll (1984). Stoll said that during elections in which foreign policy is important, such as those taking place while the U.S. is engaged in a war, presidents will undertake acts in order to create a rally effect in an attempt to win re-election. One way to obtain a rally point could be to increase the number of

positive acts. The increase in positive acts could be an indicator of reaching an important agreement with the Soviets, such as an trade agreement or an arms reduction treaty.

Table 6.2 also presents the impact of types of off-year congressional elections on the number of positive events. As Model 4 indicates, when the president's party controls the House going into the election, there is a decrease of about one and one-quarter events during the October through December time period. If the president's party is in the minority, there is an increase of less than one event during the same time period. Neither of these changes is statistically significant, however. Although the impact is not statistically significant, the change in behavior associated with congressional elections when the president's party is the minority party supports the theoretical model. This findings suggests that a president is more likely to change behavior toward the Soviets in those congressional elections when the chances of winning control of the House are low. It may also be an indication that Republican presidents are more likely to manipulate foreign policy than Democrats, because Democrats have been the majority party in the House since 1952.

Overall, elections do not appear to have a significant impact on the number of positive actions directed toward the Soviets. In none of the four models presented in Table 6.2 is there a statistically significant term for the impact of an election. This failure to find a significant impact is

disturbing because it indicates that there is not a pattern in the number of positive acts directed toward the Soviets that corresponds to the U.S. election cycle. This failure to find a significant impact in the number of positive acts could be due to a number of factors. First, the problem could lie with the theoretical model. Although plausible, leaders may choose to refrain from generating conflictual behavior in order to win elections. The cost of that behavior may be too high. Clearly, there are cases in which an incumbent has identified or enhanced an external threat in an attempt to rally support. These cases may occur on an infrequent and non-systematic basis. Another problem could lie with the data. They may not be sensitive enough to detect changes in foreign policy activity that are due to the domestic election cycle. Another problem could be due to the statistical procedure being used. By fitting a transfer function and including a term that attributes the key motivation of foreign policy action to a reaction to Soviet behavior, the statistical model may underestimate the impact of elections on foreign policy activity. Prior to abandoning the theory, though, further tests are in order.

The analysis of the impact of elections on the number of negative acts is presented in Table 6.3. Before fitting the four models in that table, a transfer function was estimated for the number of negative actions directed toward the Soviets based on the number of negative actions generated by the Soviet Union.

toward the U.S. Intervention terms were then estimated for each of the four models presented. The transfer function indicates that in an average quarter between 4.65 and 4.94 negative actions are directed toward the Soviets. The model also indicates a certain amount of restraint in responding to negative events. While there is a two-for-three return for positive events, it takes an increase of two negative actions by the Soviets to generate one negative event from the U.S. These responses occur during the same quarter as the initial acts generated by the Soviet Union. This estimate does not mean that there is not a complete *quid pro quo* for negative acts though; there may be an eye for an eye retaliation, but the response is not systematic. It may occur the same month in one case, but retaliation may be delayed six months or more in other situations.

This set of models is somewhat more complex than presented earlier in this chapter or in Chapter 5. The transfer functions for negative actions requires two autoregressive noise terms. The estimates of ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 is fairly consistent across models, ranging from .33 to .38 and from .24 to .31. The transfer functions fit the data well as indicated by the low values of the Q statistic. The p-values for Q range between 0.644 to 0.832.

Elections in general do not have a significant impact on the number of negative acts directed toward the Russians, as Model 1 indicates. Although there is a decrease of slightly less than one negative action during the election quarter, this change is

not statically significant. As results reported later in this chapter suggest, this term for the impact of elections in general may lack significance because different types of elections pull the number of negative actions in different directions. Because of the high level of variation, the estimate of the impact of all elections lumped together may have increased variation to the point that the estimate is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, an overall decrease was predicted for all elections. Although not statistically significant, this finding does lend support to the theoretical model.

In breaking elections down by whether they are for the presidency or for off-year congressional seats, Model 2 reveals an interesting result. Off-year congressional elections result in a decrease of 4.45 negative actions. This decrease, which occurs in the spring quarter prior to elections, is statistically significant. Presidential elections, on the other hand, result in an increase of 2.40 negative actions during the summer quarter before elections. This change is not statistically significant. The decrease in the number of negative actions prior to off-year elections, which corresponds to the theoretical model, suggests that presidents may wish to portray themselves as restrained leaders in dealing with the Soviets. As subsequent analysis indicates, the impact of off-year elections appears to be related to control of the House of Representatives. The theoretical model suggests that there is a decrease in the number of acts, although

the change for off-year elections should not be as large as that for presidential elections. Further, the decrease associated with off-year elections could be explained as the result of the president directing his attention toward the congressional campaigns and away from foreign affairs.

Although presidential elections in general do not have a significant impact on the number of negative events, the type of presidential election appears to be important. As the results of Model 3 indicate, open elections appear to result in a decrease of .74 negative events. This change is not statistically significant, however. When the incumbent is seeking re-election, the number of negative events increases by about three and one-third in the summer quarter preceding the election. This increase does not quite approach the standard level for statistical significance. When the incumbent is seeking re-election and the U.S. is engaged in a war, there is a significant reduction in the number of negative actions. As Table 6.3 indicates, there is a decrease of slightly more than seven and two-thirds negative actions during the election quarter. This decrease suggests that incumbent presidents attempt to reduce tension and portray themselves not as warriors but instead as determined leaders willing to take decisive action. Although this finding supports the theoretical model, it is not consistent with Stoll (1984). Stoll suggests that incumbents who are attempting to win re-election while the U.S. is at war would undertake acts

that could produce a rally point. Accordingly, an increase in either the number of positive or negative actions would be expected. Table 6.2 reported earlier that the number of positive acts did not increase. From Stoll's findings, an increase in the number of negative actions would therefore be expected. The fact that the number of positive actions do not show a significant increase at the same time suggests that the incumbent is using purposive restraint. This is not what Stoll would have anticipated. The variation and pulling in different directions between the impact of a war incumbent seeking re-election and a non-war incumbent seeking re-election could be the reason that presidential elections fail to yield a significant impact in Model 2. Because there is a significant decrease only during the election quarter, it is unlikely that the decrease is due to the war independent of the election. If it were the result of the war, it would show a significant impact for all quarters prior to the election. The theory would have expected a decrease for non-war incumbents and a slightly larger decrease for incumbents seeking re-election while the U.S. was engaged in a war.

Model 4 indicates that there is substantial variation in the impact of off-year congressional elections on the number of negative events. When the president's party controls the House, there is a reduction of close to six negative actions prior to the election. This reduction approaches standard levels of statistical significance. By the same token, when the

president's party is the minority party in the House, there is an increase in the number of negative actions. This increase is not statistically significant, however. The increase in negative actions is interesting when contrasted with the impact of wars on presidential elections reported in Model 3. In two out of the four elections where the president's party was in the minority, the U.S. was at war (1950, 1970). In a third election (1958), American troops had been dispatched to Lebanon shortly before the election. The fourth election (1974) followed Nixon's resignation. Nevertheless, a significant decrease in the number of negative acts was expected. The theory being tested assumes that the incumbent president undertakes a decrease in the number of negative acts toward the Soviets as the election nears in order to build his own support. That support, in turn, will result in an increase in votes for his party's candidates in the upcoming congressional elections.

Overall, the theoretical model was able to predict the pattern in the number of negative acts generated by the U.S. toward the Soviets. The analysis yielded significant coefficients in two types of elections where there was a decrease in the number of negative acts. This behavior was anticipated by the theoretical model.

A weakness of the analysis was the small number of significant coefficients. This problem may be due to the method used to assess the impact. Perhaps the data are not of high

enough quality to measure what needs to be measured. Clearly the data are measuring a dimension of foreign policy activity, but there may be problems with the data that prevent the assessment of an election impact. This problem could be due to an increase in the reporting of ordinary foreign policy acts during non-election periods. If there are a certain number of column inches in each issue of the paper the researcher is reviewing to abstract information on events devoted to foreign policy actions, regardless of whether there is an election underway, there may be an overabundance of marginal "interactions." In addition, as an election approaches, competition for coverage in the paper may increase. As a result, the amount of space, or column inches, normally devoted to foreign policy matters is reduced with more space being devoted to the election campaign itself.

Another factor limiting the number of significant coefficients may be the statistical method employed. The statistical model being used may make it impossible to detect a pattern in the data. To begin, inclusion of a term that measures the number of Soviet acts directed toward the U.S. may reduce the likelihood that an election impact can be measured. This incoming action term may obscure any effect that could be attributable to elections. Also, there may be a pattern in Soviet acts toward the U.S. that corresponds to the American domestic election cycle. The presence of such a cycle in Soviet actions would mute the independent impact of elections by themselves. These data, too,

may not be "hard" enough to be used in such a rigorous statistical analysis as transfer functions. Transfer functions were developed using hard data such as measures of temperature or water flow. In addition, the technique may be so strict that it would not detect a mild pattern in the data caused by an election cycle.

The impact of elections on the level of conflict or cooperation in foreign policy actions directed toward the Soviet Union are reported in Table 6.4. As the table indicates, elections appear to have an impact on the level of cooperation in foreign policy actions. The types of elections that are associated with significant changes in the number of negative actions, though, are not the same as those that have an impact on the level of cooperation. Instead, as the table suggests, the type of election that results in a decrease in the number of positive actions results in a significant increase in the level of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviets. This apparent paradox is explored next.

The transfer function model used to evaluate the impact of elections on the level of conflict and cooperation is more complex than in previous models. First, the model lacks a term for the mean. This indicates that the measure of conflict and cooperation is centered around zero. This transfer function also has two terms for measuring the impact of Soviet actions toward the U.S. The first term (ω_0) indicates that a unit change in the level of cooperation or conflict directed toward the U.S. will

result in a .38 unit change in U.S. behavior in the current quarter. Cooperative behavior is met with cooperative behavior, while conflictual behavior will result in greater hostility. The second term (ω_1), although bearing a negative sign, means that a unit change in Soviet behavior in the prior quarter will result in a .24 unit change in the current quarter by the Americans. The model estimates the formula:

$$(\omega_0 - \omega_1 B^1)\text{Soviet Behavior}_t$$

A negative value for ω_1 indicates that the current impact of Soviet behavior in the current time period is the result of current behavior plus (i.e., minus a minus) behavior in the prior time period.

This transfer function also required two autoregressive parameters in the noise model. Unlike the two terms used in the noise model for negative behavior, the noise model for the current transfer function has a seasonal term. The estimate for $_1$ was consistent across all models while the estimate for $_2$ ranged from .32 to .34. The Q statistic was low, indicating that the model was adequate.

As was found with previous models, elections in general do not appear to have a significant impact on the level of conflict or cooperation. Although the estimate of the impact of elections in Model 1 is not significant, it is consistent with the findings

for negative actions. Elections were found to result in a decrease of .71 negative actions in Table 6.3. In Table 6.4, the election term has a positive coefficient, indicating an increase in cooperation or a decrease in conflict. Because of great variation, as indicated by the low T value, it is difficult to glean any support for the theoretical model from this coefficient.

The table indicates that presidential elections, which resulted in an increase in negative actions in Table 6.3, appear to result in a decrease in the level of cooperation. Off-year congressional elections, which resulted in a decrease in the number of negative actions, are associated with an increase in the level of cooperation. The impacts of presidential elections and off-year congressional elections are not statistically significant. Although the changes in the levels of cooperation are consistent with what was found for the number of negative actions, the changes are not what the theoretical model predicted. The actions did not become more volatile. In fact, their intensity did not appear to change at all. While this speaks well for the consistency of the data, it indicates a problem with the theory or the method. The only possible redeeming factor in terms of the theory is that the parameters are not significant. A significant positive value, while indicating the existence of a pattern corresponding to the election cycle, would indicate that the president decides to be friendlier to Soviets as elections approach.

In examining the impact of types of presidential elections in Model 3, a significant impact is found for contests in which the incumbent is seeking re-election. In those years in which the incumbent attempts to succeed himself, there is an increase of almost four units (3.97) in the level of cooperation. This finding supports the theoretical model. Open elections result in a decrease in cooperation of almost two points (-1.93). This decrease is not significant. Although analysis of negative actions toward the Soviets indicated that there was a substantial and significant decrease in the number of negative actions when an incumbent sought re-election and the U.S. was at war, there is not a corresponding increase in the level of cooperation. Further, analysis of the negative events indicates that the number of negative actions increases when an incumbent president seeks re-election. This inconsistency may be due to the fact that number of events is not related to the content of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviets. In fact, this inconsistency tends to support the hypothesis that events are manipulated for political gain. A president can increase or decrease the number of events for a show of strength. What may be important to a stable relationship with the Soviet Union is not the number of actions but the content of those actions. A president may wish to warm relationships with the Soviets as an election approaches in an attempt to negotiate a treaty. At the same time, he may wish to avoid giving the impression to the populace that he is weak

towards the Soviets. Accordingly, he may increase the number of negative actions while actually warming relations. Given that this behavior is purposive, it would not be inconsistent with the theory. The number of negative acts would show a tough stance. The number of acts contribute to the appearance. The increase in cooperation, though, is not as easily discernible. Given that there is an increase in the number of negative acts, any act, although cooperative in content, may be viewed by the populace as another tough stand being taken against the Russians.

This complex relationship does not hold for off-year congressional elections. As Model 4 indicates, the significant decrease in negative actions for off-year elections in which the president's party controls the House, reported in Table 6.3, results in a slight increase in the level of cooperation. The impact is also felt in different time periods. The decrease in negative actions occurs in the spring prior to the election. The 1.17 unit increase in cooperation occurs during the election quarter. The increase in negative actions associated with off-year elections in which the president's party does not control the House may be the cause of the 2.63 unit decrease in cooperative behavior reported in Table 6.4. Neither type of election asserts a statistically significant impact on the level of cooperation and conflict. This failure to find a significant impact is again disturbing in light of the theory being examined. A significant change, particularly a significant increase in the

level of cooperation was expected. This lack of a significant finding questions both the theory and the method used to test it.

The analysis of the impact of elections on U.S. behavior to the Soviets raises a number of questions concerning the theoretical argument and the empirical methods used to test it. Several of the findings support the theoretical argument. This is encouraging given that the chances of finding an election cycle appeared to be most promising in U.S./Soviet behavior.

The ability of the theory to explain or predict a pattern in U.S. behavior to the Soviets in certain contexts supports the theoretical model. The limited number of statistically significant coefficients suggest there may be problems with the method used to test the hypotheses. The problem could be due to the data or the statistical procedures used to examine them. The data may not be able to reveal the existence of the election cycle due to the way they are generated or collected. The statistical method may to be too rigorous for the data that are being used. Further, the model being estimated may be incorrect by implying that foreign policy acts by the U.S. are either in reaction to acts undertaken by the Soviets or as results of the domestic elections.

Summary and Conclusion

The nature and content of actions directed toward the Soviet Union has varied greatly from 1948 through 1978. This period

marked the transition from the Big Four alliance through the Cold War and into the period of detente. During the period covered by this study, there have been a number of intense confrontations. Also, there have been attempts at developing understanding and negotiating solutions to problems.

During this twenty-year period, there have been ten major peaks in U.S. actions directed toward the Soviets. The first four involved Berlin. The fifth coincided with the Cuban missile crisis. The remaining five are not associated with particular or dramatic incidents. Of the ten peaks, seven occurred during an election year or in times of domestic crisis. There is not a peak associated with every election, though, and every domestic crisis is not associated with an increase in foreign policy actions directed toward the Soviet Union. Although there are a number of similarities between the number of events and the presence of an election or domestic crisis, those similarities do not appear to exist for measures of cooperation and conflict.

Transfer function analysis of the relationship between elections and changes in foreign policy activity with the Soviets yielded a number of findings. First, elections do not appear to have a significant impact on either the total number of actions or the number of positive actions initiated by the U.S. Elections do appear to have an impact on the number of negative actions, though. There is a significant decrease in the number of negative actions when there is an off-year congressional election. This

relationship is especially pronounced in those elections in which the president's party controls the House of Representatives. Negative actions show an increase during presidential election years in general, but this increase is not significant. When the U.S. is engaged in a war and the incumbent president is seeking re-election, there is a significant decrease in the number of negative events. This change in the number of negative events does not appear to affect the tone of foreign policy actions as measured by the level of cooperation. The level of cooperation does improve, however, in those years in which the president seeks re-election. The changes support the theoretical model being tested.

TABLE 6.1
Analysis of the Total Number of Events

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.02	3.28
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.66	10.52
Any Election	ω_0	1	1.80	0.99
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.53	6.64

Q at 24 lags = 28.24; Prob. = 0.168

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.78	3.66
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.63	9.73
Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-3.71	-1.53
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	0	1.23	0.46
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.52	6.56

Q at 24 lags = 25.06; Prob. = 0.294

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.21	3.45
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.66	10.58
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	4.57	1.29
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-6.43	-1.29
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	7.55	1.85
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.53	6.72

Q at 24 lags = 27.62; Prob. = 0.189

Continued on next page

TABLE 6.1-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.26	3.48
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.64	9.94
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	0	-2.50	-0.66
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	4.61	1.26
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.51	6.38

Q at 24 lags = 25.47; Prob. = 0.275

TABLE 6.2
Analysis of Positive Actions

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.69	4.39
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.68	12.87
Any Election	ω_0	1	-0.86	-0.65
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.49	6.16

Q at 24 lags = 27.66; Prob. = 0.187

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.61	4.25
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.68	12.86
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	1.44	1.24
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	1	-0.85	-0.65
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.50	6.26

Q at 24 lags = 27.24; Prob. = 0.202

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.60	4.26
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.69	12.85
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	2	-2.66	-1.55
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	0.99	0.41
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	2.94	1.48
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.50	6.19

Q at 24 lags = 27.32; Prob. = 0.199

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TABLE 6.2-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.43	4.13
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.70	12.47
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	0	-1.24	-0.67
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	0.71	0.40
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.48	5.98

Q at 24 lags = 24.60; Prob. = 0.317

TABLE 6.3
Analysis of Negative Actions

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		4.94	3.33
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.53	8.19
Any Election	ω_0	0	-0.71	1.38
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.38	4.19
	ϕ_2	2	0.24	2.44

Q at 24 lags = 17.43; Prob. = 0.684

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		4.65	3.13
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.57	8.89
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	2.40	1.30
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	2	-4.45	-2.09
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.34	3.58
	ϕ_2	2	0.30	3.15

Q at 24 lags = 17.03; Prob. = 0.709

Continued on next page

TABLE 6.3-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		4.75	3.18
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.56	8.79
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	3.38	1.40
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-7.68	-1.94
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-0.74	-0.23
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.36	3.91
	ϕ_2	2	0.28	2.84

Q at 24 lags = 18.07; Prob. = 0.644

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		4.73	3.20
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.56	8.74
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	-5.89	-1.81
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	3.92	1.41
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.33	3.55
	ϕ_2	2	0.31	3.22

Q at 24 lags = 14.82; Prob. = 0.832

TABLE 6.4
Analysis of Level of Cooperation

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.38	5.67
	ω_1	1	-0.24	-3.50
Any Election	ω_0	0	0.37	0.38
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.42	5.01
	ϕ_2	4	0.32	3.54

Q at 24 lags = 24.74; Prob. = 0.310

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.40	5.70
	ω_1	1	-0.24	-3.62
Presidential Elections	ω_0	2	-2.00	-1.57
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	2	1.16	0.79
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.42	4.87
	ϕ_2	4	0.32	3.58

Q at 24 lags = 23.53; Prob. = 0.372

Continued on next page

TABLE 6.4-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.40	5.76
	ω_1	1	-0.23	-3.38
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	3.97	2.04
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	1.15	0.42
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-1.93	-0.87
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.42	4.96
	ϕ_2	4	0.34	3.75

Q at 24 lags = 28.42; Prob. = 0.162

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.39	5.73
	ω_1	1	-0.24	-3.45
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	0	1.17	0.57
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	-2.63	-1.36
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.42	4.85
	ϕ_2	4	0.34	3.76

Q at 24 lags = 23.40; Prob. = 0.379



Figure 6.1: Analysis of U.S. Actions Toward The Soviet Union



Chapter 7

The Election Cycle in Foreign Policy Actions Toward Friendly Nations

In Chapters 5 and 6, analysis has been presented concerning the election cycle in foreign policy actions toward all nations and toward a adversarial nation. This chapter examines the existence of an election cycle in foreign policy behavior with friendly nations. Two nations that have a history of friendship with the U.S. were chosen: Great Britain and Israel. These nations were chosen because of their generally positive relationship with the U.S. and their frequency of interaction. In the following sections, the fluctuation in relations between the U.S and these two nations will be reviewed. The presence of a pattern in actions that corresponds to the domestic election cycle will be tested.

Britain and Israel were selected on account of the number of actions directed toward them by the U.S. Between 1948 and 1978, the U.S. has averaged 8.11 actions a quarter toward Great Britain and 9.03 toward Israel. Further, there have been only three calendar quarters out of 124 that the U.S. did not initiate any actions toward England and only one in which no actions were directed toward Israel. U.S. actions have been more friendly toward the British than toward the Israelis. On average, 7.01 positive actions were directed toward the Britain each quarter

while only 6.51 were directed toward Israel. Although the number of positive actions directed toward each nation was approximately the same, the U.S. was more likely to direct negative actions toward Israel than toward Britain. Slightly more than one negative action was directed toward Britain each quarter (1.02) while 2.36 were directed toward Israel. Further, in fifty-six out of the 124 quarters covered by this study, there were no negative actions directed toward England. There are only thirty-four quarters in which the U.S. did not generate a negative action toward Israel. Actions toward Britain had an average level of cooperation of 10.55 while actions toward Israel were 8.75.

Six hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 concerning U.S. behavior toward nations will be tested. By analyzing behavior toward two friendly nations, the results of the hypotheses can be compared and contrasted. Any differences can be explored and examined. The hypotheses suggest that there is a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. As the election approaches, there will be a decrease in the number of positive actions toward these two friendly nations and an increase in the number of negative actions. Further, there will be a decrease in the level of cooperation shown each nation.

The four measures of foreign policy activity developed in Chapter 4 will be used to test these hypotheses. The first measure is the total number of actions generated by the U.S. toward each nation. This measure is an indicator of foreign

policy activity in general. The measure does not examine the type of that activity, either positive or negative. The second measure is the number of positive actions toward each nation. The third is the number of negative acts. The fourth is the level of cooperation shown each nation by the U.S. This measure utilizes a scale proposed by Azar and Havener (1976) that ranges from 92 (for voluntary unification of two nations) to -102 (for total war). This weighted scale provides a measure of the relative intensity of conflict and cooperation. Cooperative acts have positive values, while hostile acts have negative values. This scale can be interpreted as a measure of cooperation.

To test the hypotheses, four equations or models will be estimated for each measure of foreign policy activity for each nation. The models will be estimated using Box-Jenkins transfer functions and Box-Tiao intervention analysis. Each equation includes a term measuring the impact of the same type of foreign policy actions directed at the U.S. by the target nation, either Britain or Israel. This measure of actions generated toward the U.S. will account or control for the number of actions by the U.S. that may be initiated in response to actions by either Britain or Israel. Inclusion of the term for British or Israeli behavior toward the U.S. serves as a control variable to explain most of the variation in foreign policy actions. By including only this term and a term for elections, the statistical model assumes that U.S. actions are generated only as a response to

British or Israeli behavior and domestic elections. This takes a simplistic if not incorrect view of the motivation for foreign policy behavior. Explaining all foreign policy behavior is not the goal of this research. Rather, the goal is to explore changes in behavior due to domestic elections.

The equations estimated for each measure of foreign policy activity classify elections in contextual terms. Model 1 examines the impact of all elections--presidential and off-year congressional--as one impact. Model 2 classifies elections as either presidential or off-year congressional. Model 3 examines only presidential elections. It classifies these elections as either those in which the incumbent is attempting to remain in office and the U.S. is not at war, those in which the incumbent is seeking re-election and the U.S. is at war, and open elections. Model 4 examines only off-year congressional contests. It classifies them according to whether the president's party controls the House of Representatives.

The Pattern in U.S. Policy Toward Britain

The pattern of foreign policy actions toward Britain is shown in Figure 7.1. The figure indicates that the number of actions directed toward Britain has remained steady over time. As noted, on average, 8.11 events were directed toward the British. The median number of actions is seven. There are three quarters in which no actions were directed to England. During the first

quarter of 1957, the U.S. generated twenty-four actions toward Britain, the highest of any quarter covered by the study. This peak coincides with the resignation of Anthony Eden as Prime Minister and the appointment of Harold Macmillan as successor. During this quarter, Macmillan met with President Eisenhower to discus a number of topics. In any given quarter, most of the actions are positive. The median number of positive actions is six, and there are only four quarters during the study in which no positive actions are undertaken. The median number of negative actions is one and the highest number of negative actions initiated during any quarter is seven. This occurred during the fourth quarter of 1956 and coincided with a disagreement between the U.S. and Britain concerning how to end the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt.

The level of cooperation in foreign policy actions has been stable over time, as Figure 7.2 illustrates. Cooperation is measured using the Azar and Havener scale described in Chapter 4. As noted, the average level of cooperation has been 10.55 with a median value of 10.46. The level of cooperation has fallen below zero only four times: the first quarter of 1949; the first quarter of 1950; the third quarter of 1966; and the third quarter of 1971. The level of cooperation has surged above twenty-five on only two occasions: the first quarter of 1958 and the second quarter of 1960. On three occasions it has a value of zero

corresponding to the three quarters in which there were no positive or negative actions directed toward the British.

In developing transfer function models for the three measures of the number of events, additional manipulation of the input series was required. This manipulation was needed on account of a problem with non-stationarity. The measures of the number of events generated by the British government toward the U.S. do not have stationary variances. The non-stationary variances result in problems for the estimation process. Non-stationarity of variance is a violation of the assumptions behind the ARIMA model process. To alleviate the variance problem, all three series--the measure of the total number of events, the measure of the number of positive events, and the measure of the number of negative events--were logged. Because several of the observations in these series were zero, particularly the series measuring the number of negative actions, a constant (0.5) was added to each observation before taking the log. This eliminated the problem of the generation of missing values by taking the log of zero. Although not widely used in time series studies, this process of adding a small value to a cell with a zero values is advocated in the analysis of contingency tables (Grizzle, Starmer, and Koch, 1969). The measure of the level of cooperation did not indicate a problem with either non-stationarity of variance or trend and was not logged. The measures of the total number of events and the

number of positive events were also differenced after taking the logged value. Appropriate ARIMA models were developed for each series before constructing transfer functions. The measures of the number of actions the U.S. initiated toward Britain does not appear to have a problem with non-stationarity of variance. Accordingly, these measures were not logged.

In examining the impact of elections on the total number of actions undertaken toward Britain, several significant factors were found. The results of those analyses are presented in Table 7.1. The transfer functions developed for each of the four models presented in the table had relatively consistent estimates of the series (-2.71 to -2.84) and of the impact of actions initiated by the British toward the U.S. (4.99 to 5.12). None of the four models required a noise model, and all indicated adequate fit with low values of the Q statistic. The measures of impact suggest that for each action generated by the British government toward the U.S., about five actions are returned. This measure of impact is larger than any found earlier. It is indicative of the special relationship between the U.S. and Britain.

As the table reports, elections, in general, do not appear to exert a significant impact on the total number of foreign policy actions undertaken toward Britain. An increase of 1.31 acts was found in the January through March period of election years, but the increase was not statistically significant. The

lack of statistical significance could be due to several factors. It could be the result of off-setting changes between positive and negative acts that, when considered together, do not show a significant change. The failure to find significance could also be due to different types of impact for different elections. This explanation seems to be the most plausible based upon an examination of the results of Model 2.

Model 2 indicates that there is a significant change in the number of actions undertaken toward Britain prior to both presidential and off-year congressional contests. The size and timing of the impact varies depending upon the type of election. This variation probably resulted in the finding of an insignificant impact in Model 1. The table indicates that during the months of July, August, and September of presidential election years, there is an increase of 2.45 actions toward Britain. This change has a two-tailed probability of 0.055, only slightly above standard levels of statistical significance. Prior to off-year congressional elections, there is a slightly higher increase in the number of actions-- 3.08. This increase occurs during the months of January, February, and March. The findings of Model 2 support the hypothesis that there is a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. The difference in timing is curious, though. There may be several reasonable explanations for the difference. First, is there a reason to expect that off-year

congressional races would elicit the same exact behavior as presidential campaigns? To the extent that these two types of election campaigns are different there could be variation in how the president utilized foreign policy actions. A second reason for the difference is that many instances, incumbent congressmen not only have to win elections in November, but they also have to win primary election to have their party's nomination. Because these primaries are generally held in the late spring, an increase in the number of actions in the January through March period could be expected to have the same impact on the primaries that an increase in the July through September period would have on general elections.

In examining the impacts of types of presidential elections, Model 3 indicates that the changes in the number of actions toward Britain are associated only with those elections in which the incumbent is seeking re-election. Open elections do not result in a significant change in behavior. Further, there is a different impact depending on whether the U.S. is engaged in a war. As the table indicates, there is an increase of 4.65 actions in those years where the incumbent is seeking re-election. This change occurs during the election quarter. If the U.S. is engaged in a war, there is a decrease of 2.38 actions during the same time period. Although the data suggest an increase of 3.25 actions during the July through September period before open elections, this increase is not statistically significant (the

two-tailed probability value is 0.13). The timing of the change in the number of acts raises several questions. To be sure, the changes associated with incumbents seeking re-election may occur both before and after the election. A significant change during the election quarter was not found for open elections, though. This absence of a significant change for open elections suggests that the increases found for the incumbents is not structural and caused by the election alone. Further, the differing directions of the impacts depending on whether the U.S. is engaged in a war supports the hypotheses that there is a change in behavior associated with these elections. Also, the decrease in actions for incumbents seeking re-election while the U.S. is at war could be due to the war itself. The significant decrease was not found, though, in any other quarter preceding the election. This would tend to rule out the possibility that the decrease was due to the war alone. Again, the finding suggests a change in behavior corresponding to a domestic election.

The change in the direction of impact in the total number of actions depending upon whether the U.S. is at war is interesting. One possible explanation would be that when the U.S. is not at war, the president attempts to portray himself as a world leader. In that vein, he would increase the number of actions with other nations, particularly friendly nations. By the same token, when the U.S. is at war, the president may wish to portray a leader who is in complete control of the situation and is not distracted

by other foreign policy problems. As a result, he decreases the contact with the allies as the election approaches. Another explanation is that there is a finite number of actions a president can perform as an election approaches. Due to the war, the president must devote his attention to the conflict. He has little time left to devote toward the allies.

Although a significant impact was found for off-year congressional elections, the effect seems to differ depending on whether the president's party controls the House as Model 4 indicates. Even though the effect of off-year contests in Model 2 was significant, the impact of different types of off-year elections appears to be mixed. When the president's party controls the House going into the election, there is a decrease of 1.48 actions. This change is not statistically significant, though. When the president's party is the minority party in the House there is an increase of 4.09 actions in the months of January, February, and March of election years. This increase approaches standard levels of statistical significance ($p=0.062$). This increase is larger than that reported in Model 2 for off-year elections in general. The reason for the difference in size is likely due to the effect reported in Model 2 being muted by including both types of off-year races. The timing of the change again suggests that the change in foreign policy acts is designed to effect primary elections. The reason for the lack of a significant change in those elections in which the president's

party controls the House could be due to a willingness to tolerate a loss of House seats. Control of the House may not have been an issue. The impact associated with the president's party being the minority party is due to an attempt to limit the number of seats lost in the election. The findings, although mixed, support the hypotheses that there is a change in behavior associated with the domestic election cycle.

Overall, while the analysis shows that some types of elections do not have a significant effect on the number of actions, others do. A slight increase of about one and one-third events was noted during the January through March period preceding elections in general, but this increase was not significant. When these elections were classified as either presidential elections or off-year congressional races, significant impacts were noted for both types. The timing of the impacts were different. The analysis indicates that there is an increase of 2.45 actions in the July through September period preceding presidential elections. This increase has a two-tailed probability value of 0.055. For off-year congressional contests, there is an increase of 3.08 actions in the January through March period before the elections. These differences could be due to the agendas preceding the elections. In presidential contests, the incumbent may be willing to devote more time to actions toward the British as the election approaches in an attempt to show statesmanship qualities. By the same token, the timing of

the increase in off-year congressional contests may be due to the president attempting to generate interest in the campaigns as early as possible in order to affect the outcome of primary elections. This increased interest in off-year elections could result in increases in campaign contributions.

The impact of elections on the number of positive acts toward Britain are reported in Table 7.2. As the table indicates, elections in general do not appear to have a significant effect on the number of positive events. A slight, but statistically insignificant, increase of 1.11 acts was found in the January through March period. This lack of a significant impact could be due to a number of problems. First, it could mean that different types of elections have different types of impacts. The impacts could be in different directions or in different time periods. Also, the lack of a significant impact could be an indication of a problem with the theoretical model being tested.

When elections are classified as either presidential or off-year contests a significant impact is found. Model 2 reports that there is an increase in the number of positive events during the first-half of the year before the elections. There is an increase of 2.38 positive actions during the months of January, February, and March. This is followed by an increase of 2.43 actions for the April through June period. Although the data indicate an increase in the number of acts in the July through

September period before an election, this change is not statistically significant. This lack of a significant impact for presidential elections does not support the theoretical model. A significant decrease in the number of positive acts prior to presidential elections was anticipated. The findings, while supporting the hypothesis that there is a change associated with of-year elections, do not strongly support the theory of a cycle in foreign policy actions corresponding to the domestic election cycle. The lack of a significant impact could be due to a number of factors. First, it could be an indication that there is a problem with the theory. Earlier analyses did not support the theoretical model, though. The observed behavior did not correspond with the anticipated outcome. The findings for the total number of events presented in Table 7.1 did support the theory. Also, the problem the could be that the theory doesn't apply to positive acts toward allies. In addition, the lack of a significant finding could also be due to variation across types of presidential elections in impact. As Model 3 indicates, this does not appear to be the case.

As the table indicates, when presidential elections are classified by type, no statistically significant effect was found. The data do suggest an increase in the number of positive of events during the election quarter for elections in which the incumbent was seeking reelection. Further a similar increase occurring in the January through March period prior to elections

was found for war incumbents. In addition, a decrease in the number of positive events in the spring preceding open presidential elections was indicated. None of these changes were statistically significant, however. The failure to find a significant impact for presidential elections could indicate that there is a problem with the theoretical model. That does not seem to be the case because the model was able to predict the outcome in the total number of actions as reported in Table 7.1. Instead, the problem appears to be that the president does not manipulate the number of positive acts in order to win presidential elections. Yet he does seem to be willing to use the positive acts to win off-year congressional races as the results of Model 2 and Model 4 indicate.

As the table indicates in reporting the results of Model 4, the increase in the number of positive actions associated with off-year congressional elections appears to be due to those races in which the president's party is the minority party in the House. There is an increase of 3.21 positive actions, on average, during the January through March period prior to off-year elections. The number of positive actions increases to 4.63 during the following three months. The increase could be due to the president attempting to build support for his party's congressional candidates. A similar impact was not found for those off-year contests in which the president's party controlled the House, though. Since the president's party generally loses

House seats in off-year races, those elections in which his party has fewer seats to spare appear to be more important. Accordingly, the president begins to marshal his resources in order to help his party's candidates win their races.

The increase in the number of positive acts associated with off-year races that is lacking for presidential elections could be an indicator of the risk involved in taking actions. Without regard to the target nation, there may be little or no risk involved in taking positive actions. Therefore the president willingly increases the number of positive actions as these types of elections approach. Positive acts may present a no-lose situation: they do not damage relations with allies, they do not develop into issues that could be damaging politically, and they may help members of the president's party win congressional primaries. One reason that there is not an increase in the number of positive acts before presidential elections is that there may be other things the incumbent can do outside the realm of foreign policy activity that provide a larger benefit. These could include changes in domestic policy. While offering a greater benefit, they may be more risky: there is a chance that their impact could backfire and result in a loss of prospective voters instead of a gain. For example, the positive action of Canada's prime minister in supporting an expanded trade agreement with the U.S. almost cost him the 1988 election. In those elections in which his staying in office is at stake, the

president may choose to utilize these actions that offer the greatest benefit. Since there is risk associated with them, the president may avoid implementing them during congressional campaigns. Further, even if they were used during off-year elections, they would not be apparent from these data being analyzed.

Interestingly, as Table 7.3 indicates, there is an increase in the number of negative actions associated with elections in general. This change in behavior was predicted by the theoretical model. Although the increase is small, the results of Model 1 indicate that there is an increase of 0.91--close to one negative action--during election quarters of both presidential and off-year congressional election years. The change amounts to less than one action, but its presence is statistically significant. The direction of the change does agree with the theoretical model. It indicates that because of the election, the U.S. initiates one more hostile act toward Britain than it would ordinarily. This is an increase even controlling for the number of hostile acts taken by Britain toward the U.S.

In classifying elections by type, the table reports that presidential elections are associated with significant changes in the number of negative actions directed toward Britain. Further, these changes correspond with behavior anticipated by the theoretical model. When the elections are classified by either presidential or off-year races, the analysis indicates that

presidential contests have a significant impact on the number of negative events. Further, this impact is felt over two calendar quarters. As Model 2 reports, there is an increase of 1.21 negative actions in the months of July, August, and September of presidential election years. This increase continues at the same rate through the election quarter. Off-year congressional races are associated with an increase of .76 negative actions during the election quarter. The increase associated with off-year contests is not statistically significant, though. The increase in the number of negative acts prior to presidential elections and the lack of a significant increase before off-year contests could be due to the risk involved in initiating a negative act. A negative act may result in an increased awareness of the president as a leader. Its benefit may be greater than a positive action. This increased awareness could result in an increase in votes. At the same time, the negative act is riskier because it could both damage relations with another nation and create an issue that could damage the president politically. Accordingly, the negative acts would be used in contests in which the stakes were high.

The findings of Model 3 support this notion. As the table indicates, the increase in the number of negative actions is associated with those elections in which incumbents are attempting to stay in office. According to the table, there is an increase of 2.31 negative actions in the July through September quarter prior to the election when the incumbent is

attempting to succeed himself and the U.S. is not at war. During the election quarter, the number of negative acts increases to 2.37. Open elections and re-election campaigns when the U.S. is at war are not associated with statistically significant increases in the number of negative actions. This behavior generally corresponds with the theoretical model.

The increases associated with re-election campaigns are important given the fairly low number of negative actions directed toward the British. The increases also support the hypothesis that there is a pattern in foreign policy actions that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. The increases could be due to a president attempting to show that he controls the relationship with Britain and the other allies. As the election approaches, the president, who is seeking re-election, attempts to portray a leader who not only controls his nation but is able to control friendly alliances as well. Again, the negative acts may offer a greater benefit--at a greater risk--than positive acts. Accordingly, they are used when the stakes are high. Although, based upon the theoretical model being tested, the incumbent has an interest in the outcome of an open election, the stakes may not be great enough for him to attempt to alter the outcome by initiating hostile actions toward allies. An incumbents seeking re-election while the U.S. is at war may avoid using hostile acts toward allies to avoid the appearance of being unable to get along with other nations, particularly friendly ones. Further,

he may be depending on support from allies as part of the war effort. A hostile action could hamper the alliance.

Table 7.3 also indicates that classifying an off-year contest by whether the president's party controls the House does not detect a change in the number of negative acts toward Britain. Although previous analyses indicated that off-year congressional campaigns, particularly those in which the president's party was the minority party in the House, were associated with changes in the total number of actions and the number of positive acts, similar changes are not found for negative actions. This again could be an indication that negative actions are held in reserve and are used sparingly. This finding tends to support the theoretical model being tested.

Earlier in this chapter, tables were presented that indicted the impact of elections on the total number of actions toward Britain, the number of positive acts, and the number of negative acts. Table 7.4 reports the impact of elections on the average level of cooperation of those actions. As the table indicates, elections in general are not associated with changes in the level of cooperation shown Britain even though they were found to be associated with changes in the number of negative actions in Table 7.3. Although this lack of a significant impact does not support the hypothesis that elections affect the level of cooperation shown other nations and the intensity of that cooperation, it does not necessarily mean that there is a problem

in the theoretical model. Instead, it suggests that even though actions may be undertaken for domestic political gain, these actions are undertaken in such a manner that they do not affect the general level of cooperation of friendship.

Classifying elections as either presidential or off-year congressional contests also fails to yield a significant impact. Although Table 7.3 reported that presidential elections are associated with an increase in the number of negative actions and Table 7.2 indicated a change in the number of positive acts associated with off-year races, these changes do not appear to affect the level of cooperation toward Britain. The difference in findings between analyses of the number of acts and the level of cooperation does not indicate that there is a problem with the theoretical model. Instead the behavior is not inconsistent with the thrust that leaders initiate foreign policy actions for political gain. These changes in the number of actions may be planned to maximize domestic impact while minimizing the impact on the target nation.

Classifying presidential elections by type also fails to identify a statistically significant impact on the level of cooperation, too. One of the more interesting findings of Model 3 presented in Table 7.4 is that elections in which the incumbent is attempting to stay in office are associated with an increase in the level of cooperation that approaches statistical significance (probability=0.06). These same elections were

associated in Table 7.3 with increases in the number of negative actions. The table indicates that in the spring quarter prior to these elections the level of cooperation increase 5.58 points. As Table 7.3 reported, this increase in cooperation is followed by two consecutive quarters in which the number of negative actions increases. This suggests that even though the number of actions may change, their overall content is not altered. Further, this increase in the level of cooperation prior to elections may be a form of prior apology for the subsequent increase in the number of negative actions. A non-significant decrease in the level of cooperation is noted for presidential re-elections campaigns that occur during war years. Also, there appears to be an increase in the level of cooperation prior to open presidential elections, but this increase is also not significant. Again, this failure to find a significant impact associated with the level of cooperation associated with elections, while failing to support the hypothesis, does not indicate a problem with the model. The change, while not significant, is in the direction suggested by the theory.

The table also reports that neither type of off-year congressional race exerts a significant impact on the level of cooperation. Although off-year races in which the president's party was the minority party in the House are associated with increase in the number of positive acts, they do not result in a significant increase in the level of cooperation. In fact, the

level of cooperation decreases during the election quarter for these types of contests. The decrease is not significant, however. Off-year contests in which the president's party controls the House are associated with a non-significant increase in the level of cooperation in the spring of the election year. Although it is not significant, the direction of change is consistent with the theoretical model.

The Domestic Election Cycle and Foreign Policy Actions Toward Israel

Even before statehood was proclaimed on May 14-15, 1948, the U.S. had been interacting with the area of Transjordan that was to become Israel. The relationship between Israel and the U.S. has been strengthened by four wars in the middle east. The salience of Israel as an object for foreign policy action has varied over time as Figure 7.3 indicates. Since 1948, the number of actions directed toward Israel each quarter has averaged around nine. The total number of actions consists of an average of 6.51 positive acts and 2.36 negative acts. The U.S. failed to initiate actions toward Israel in only one of the 124 quarters covered in the present study.

As the figure indicates, there have been seven peaks in which the U.S. undertook more than twenty-five actions. The peaks coincide with or follow Arab-Israeli wars (the first quarter of 1957; the second quarter of 1967; the fourth quarter of 1973) or

with peace initiatives (the second quarter of 1974; the third quarter of 1975; the third quarter of 1977; the first quarter of 1978). Interestingly, during the quarter in which the Camp David peace conference occurred (the third quarter of 1978), there were only sixteen actions initiated toward Israel, fifteen of those positive in nature.

The first major peak in the figure is associated with the 1956 Arab-Israeli war. The day before the Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, President Eisenhower sternly warned Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion about taking forceful action in the middle east. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces swarmed across the Sinai into Egyptian territory. Two days later, despite a protest by Eisenhower, France and Britain invade Egypt in an attempt to instill a truce and to keep the Suez Canal open. On November 4, 1956, the war against Egypt ended. The next day, the United Nations voted to create a multi-national police force to institute and maintain a cease fire between Israel and Egypt. In late November, the U.S. joined a U.N. majority in demanding that Israel, France, and Britain withdraw from Egyptian territory.

The next peak in U.S.-Israeli relations occurred in 1967. Less than a month after the U.N. peacekeeping force sent to the Sinai following the 1956 war left, Israel launched an attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The attack began June 5 with an Israeli air strike that destroyed 450 Arab planes. Israeli forces again swarmed across the Sinai. Six days later, the war

ended with a cease fire. Shortly before the war began, Israel attacked the U.S.S. Liberty in the Mediterranean, killing thirty-four seamen and wounding seventy-five. After the war ended, President Johnson offered a five-point middle east peace plan.

The peak in 1973 coincides with the Yom Kippur war, which began October 6 with an Egyptian invasion of Israeli occupied territory. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal at five points. At the same time, Syrian forces launched a two-pronged attack in the Golan Heights. The war continued until October 24, following an Israeli counterattack that isolated the city of Suez and the Egyptian Third Army. Following the war, in early November, the U.S. and Egypt resumed diplomatic relations. On November 11, Israel and Egypt signed a prisoner-of-war exchange agreement sponsored by the U.S. In late December, a mideast peace conference was convened in Geneva.

The peaks in 1974 and 1975 are associated with visits by high U.S. officials to the Israel. In June 1974, President Nixon visited the Middle East and spoke with a number of leaders. The 1975 peak coincides with Egypt and Israel signing an agreement on the Sinai in Geneva. The agreement had been negotiated in part by Henry Kissinger who had engaged in "shuttle diplomacy": the flying between the capitals of Israel and Egypt and the conduct of negotiation session with leaders of each nation.

The peaks in 1977 and 1978 are related to continuations of the Geneva peace talks. In July 1977, President Carter and

Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin met in Washington to discuss the prospects of reconvening the Geneva conference. Two months later, the Israel Cabinet voted to accept the U.S. proposal to reconvene the conference. The first quarter of 1978 saw a collapse of the peace talks when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat recalled his delegation in mid-January. Two weeks later, Sadat flew to Washington for consultation. Sadat's visit was followed six days later by a trip by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan who met with an assistant Secretary of State in New York. Shortly after Dayan's visit, the U.S. announced it would sell $4.8 billion in jet warplanes to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The quarter ended with an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in response to a terrorist attack that killed more than thirty Israelis.

Figure 7.4 shows the relationship between the level of cooperation and the number of actions initiated toward Israel. The figure suggests that the level of cooperation is independent of the number of positive actions undertaken. A sharp increase in the number of negative actions, though, may result in a decrease in the level of cooperation. The negative value in the level of cooperation occurring during the 1956 war and the third quarter of 1977 are associated with increase in the number of negative actions.

Neither Figure 7.3 nor Figure 7.4 indicate a pattern in foreign policy activity that corresponds to the U.S. election

cycle. There are not distinct peaks corresponding to presidential or congressional elections. Also, there does not appear to be a pattern in the direction of change prior to elections. The change in the level of activity does not appear to be systematic. Further, more rigorous analysis appears to be in order.

Analysis of the relationship between U.S. elections and the total number of actions undertaken toward Israel is presented in Table 7.5. The first set of results presented in the table examine the effect of elections in general on U.S. actions toward Israel. The data indicate a slight but statistically non-significant change. Given that there are no serious problems with the theoretical model being tested, the failure to find a significant impact for elections in general could be due to several factors. First, there could be variations in the timing and direction of impact among the types of elections being examined. This variation between types of elections could result in the inability to find a significant overall affect for elections in general. Another problem could be that there are offsetting impacts across elections in the number of positive and negative actions. This offsetting impact could result in an insignificant amount of systematic change in the total number of actions. The failure to find a significant impact does not necessarily indicate a serious problem with the theory being tested.

When classifying elections according to whether they are presidential or off-year congressional races, the data again fail to reveal a significant impact. Although the data indicate that there is a decrease of 2.20 acts with presidential elections and an increase of 1.54 acts in the spring prior to off-year contests, the changes are not statistically significant. The failure to find a statistically significant impact related to these types of elections is, again, troublesome, but does not mean that there is a serious problem with the theoretical model. Although the findings do not support the hypotheses, the lack of significance may be due the measure itself. Variation across types of presidential or off-year elections or offsetting changes in the number of positive and negative acts could be the cause of the problem.

In examining the impact of types of presidential elections, the results of Model 3 indicate that there is a significant impact associated with one type of election. The number of actions initiated toward Israel drops when incumbents are seeking re-election and the U.S. is involved in a war. The table reports that there is a decrease of 6.45 actions toward Israel during the quarter these elections are held. Table 7.1 indicates a similar decrease, though much smaller, in foreign policy actions toward Britain. The data indicate an increase in the number of actions during other re-election campaigns and a slight decrease preceding open elections, but these changes are not statistically

significant. The variation across types of elections suggests that the decrease associated with re-election campaigns undertaken while the U.S. is at war is not a structural change. If it were structural and caused by elections in general, decreases would be found for all three types of elections. Also, since the change occurred only during the election quarter, it is unlikely to be caused by the war alone. These two factors indicate that it is the intersection of war an the presidential election that causes the decrease.

That finding supports the notion that there are changes in foreign policy behavior associated with elections, but it does not necessarily support the concept of a leader who manipulates foreign policy in order to win elections. A rival explanation is that the interaction of the war and the election campaign forces the incumbent to devote less time to foreign affairs in general. As a result, actions toward a number of states--including Israel--may drop. The extent to which this is true is an indication of a shortcoming of the theory.

The failure to find a significant impact associated with the other types of presidential elections may also indicate a slight problem with the theoretical model. An increase in the number of actions would be anticipated for both open elections and non-war re-election campaigns. Aqain, a possible cause could be offsetting reductions in the number of positive and negative actions. The viability of this explanation will be examined

during the discussion of the changes in the number of positive acts and the number of negative acts.

When off-year congressional races are classified by type, an increase in the number of events is found that approaches statistical significance. As the results of Model 4 indicate, in those races which the president's party controls the House going into the election, there is an increase of 4.44 actions during the April through June period (probability=.06). In those elections in which the president's party is in the minority in the House, there is a non-significant decrease of 1.97 actions. This finding is different from that reported in Table 7.1. In that table, where foreign policy actions toward Britain were examined, there was an increase when the president's party was the minority party in the House. The inconsistency in behavior toward the two nations indicates a weakness in theoretical model. For the model to be consistent, similar changes would have to occur in the foreign policy behavior toward both nations. This difference, which requires the addition of target nation as a contextual variable, suggests that some clarification is needed in the model. The difference could be due to the president acting as an opportunist in manipulating behavior instead of functioning as a calculating manipulator. There may have been more opportunities to exploit with one nation than the other.

Several differences between the behavior of the U.S. toward Britain and the behavior toward Israel are found in Table 7.6.

This table, which reports the impact of U.S. actions on the number of positive acts initiated toward Israel, can be compared with Table 7.2, which examines the impact when Britain is the target nation. One slight difference occurs in the results of Model 1. As Table 7.6 reports, there is a decrease of 1.51 positive acts toward Israel during all election quarters. This change has a two-tailed probability of 0.06, approaching standard levels of statistical significance. No such change was found in U.S. behavior toward Britain. Instead, as Table 7.2 reported, there was a statistically insignificant increase of 1.11 acts in the January through March period of election years. This difference in direction and of significance of impact (if a probability level of 0.06 is entertained as being significant) indicates a need for clarification in the theory: to explain the election cycle in foreign policy behavior, a contextual variable of target nation needs to be included. The classification of target nations as either friends or adversaries is not sufficient. Again, this variation in behavior may be due to opportunities available for exploitation. The variation does not in itself mean there is a critical flaw in the model.

Another indication of this variation is evident in the results of Model 2. As the table indicates, there is a decrease of 2.73 positive acts toward Israel associated with presidential elections. There is also decrease of 2.03 positive acts in related to off-year races, but this change is not significant.

This change corresponds to the theoretical model. It does not agree with the types of changes found in U.S. behavior toward Britain. In examining Table 7.2, where behavior toward Britain is reported, there is an increase--although not statistically significant-- or 1.78 acts associated with presidential election. The difference of there being a significant change in behavior toward one nation while having no impact on behavior toward another, can be tolerated. The difference between behavior toward Israel and Britain is not difficult to explain since it is significant in one case and not significant in the other. A similar situation occurs in the examination of the impact of off-year races on the number of positive actions directed toward Israel. Table 7.6 indicates a non-significant decrease of 2.03 acts. By the same token, Table 7.2 indicates that there is a significant increase in the number of positive acts toward Britain that last for two calendar quarters before the election. Again, the change is significant for one nation and not the other.

This difference in findings does not necessarily indicate a problem with the model being tested. According to the model, behavior toward two friendly nations should be the same. The data suggest the behavior is different. The findings are not consistent or statistically significant for both nations. The size and the direction of the difference can not be explained within the model. To explain the behavior, which appears to be

caused by the domestic election cycle, an additional factor such as the opportunity to exploit situations needs to be included. All nations of a particular type do not appear to be treated the same.

A similar set of findings occurs in the examination of the impact of types of presidential elections. Table 7.6 indicates there is a decrease in the number of positive actions associated with both open election and re-election campaigns conducted while the U.S. is at war. There is a non-significant decrease associated with reelections campaigns conducted when the U.S. is not at war. In reexamining Table 7.2, no statistically significant impacts were found. Further, in both variables in Table 7.2, the direction of the change appeared to be positive. The theoretical model hypothesized a decrease in the number of positive actions. The analysis of behavior toward Israel supports that hypothesis. The analysis of behavior toward Britain did not support that hypothesis, but the findings were not statistically significant either. The behavior toward Britain does not necessarily conflict with behavior toward Israel. To be sure, there are plausible reasons outside the theoretical model why the behavior changed. The decrease associated with re-election campaigns conducted while the U.S. is at war could be due to the president being distracted by the campaign and the war effort. The decrease with open elections could be due to the incumbent campaigning for his successor

instead of conducting foreign policy actions. Nevertheless, the findings of behavior toward Israel corresponds with that hypothesized from the theoretical model.

Another consistent finding is shown in examining the impact of off-year elections when the president's party is the minority party in the House. As Table 7.6 indicates, there is a reduction of 3.32 positive acts toward Israel in the July through September period before these elections. This contrasts with an increase of more than three positive acts toward Britain in the months of January, February, and March before these elections, followed by an increase of 4.63 positive acts toward Britain in the April through June quarter. The behavior is not consistent toward both nations. The variation could be due to opportunities available for exploitation and no not mean there is a serious flaw with the model.

The variation in behavior toward Israel and toward Britain disappears in the analysis of negative actions. As Table 7.7 indicates, U.S. behavior toward Israel in terms of the number of negative acts is very similar to U.S. behavior toward Britain. There are some differences, though, in the timing of the impact and the pattern of the impact. The mean of the number of negative acts toward Israel each quarter is close to that for Britain. There is a difference in the response to negative acts from Israel compared to the response to Britain. In the case of Israel, the U.S. responds with 2.6 negative acts for each

negative action received. In the case of Britain, the response is estimated at between 0.46 to 0.54 negative acts sent for each negative act received. This difference in response indicates a difference in relationship between the U.S. and each nation. It suggests that the U.S. responds much more decisively and forcefully to negative actions from Israel than from Britain. Part of this could be due to the difference in the image projected by each nation. Britain is reserved and stolid. Israel projects an image of acting much more due to emotion. Another reason for the difference may be due to the image the U.S. wishes to project to other nations. Although Israel is an ally, many of its actions have been undertaken in defiance of the U.S., or at least its publicly stated policy. One example of this type of independent behavior is the 1956 invasion of Egypt, undertaken in the face of a warning from President Eisenhower. In order to effect an image that the U.S. can exert control, it likely that the U.S. would want to respond quickly and decisively to any hostile act from Israel.

As the results of Model 1 indicate, there is an increase of 0.98 negative acts toward Israel during the first quarter of each election year. The size of the impact is close to that found in Table 7.3, which examines the pattern in negative acts toward Britain. The timing is substantially different, however. In the analysis of actions toward Britain, the increase of 0.91 negative acts associated with elections in general occurred during the

election quarter. Both changes appear small, but there close to one and one-half the number of negative actions expected on average (μ=0.63 for Britain; μ=0.68 for Israel). To explain the difference in timing, the contextual variable of the target nation must be employed. A reason for the early pre-election increase in negative actions toward Israel could be to limit the impact of political fallout. Earlier in this chapter, in the analysis of negative acts toward Britain, negative actions were described as being riskier than positive actions. If that is true, it may be the case that the risk also varies with the target nation. The use of a contextual variable to explain the difference in timing of the impact is not as problematic as the case of the difference in the direction of impact in the number of positive acts. The theory did not address the exact timing of the change in behavior. It seems reasonable that there would be some variation across target nations in the timing of actions. It is difficult to imagine how a surge in the number of acts toward all nations individually could be managed in a single calendar quarter. The difference in timing by two calendar quarters, while indicating variation, is acceptable.

Table 7.7 is consistent with the findings reported in Table 7.3 for U.S. actions toward Britain and supports the theoretical model. One explanation is that presidents perceive that the populace on one level does not pay attention to the content of act. On this level, a positive act registers the same impact as a

negative act. On a second level, though, negative acts may be perceived as being more dramatic than a positive act. The drama of the act is remembered without the act being classified as being harmful or helpful to the friendly nation. This dramatic and therefore memorable impact is the factor that the president is trying to create.

The results of Model 2 in Table 7.7 indicate a consistent pattern in behavior toward friendly nations. The increase in the number of negative actions appears to be due to presidential elections. When elections are classified as either presidential or off-year contests, a significant impact is found for presidential elections only. The impact of presidential elections is felt in two separate quarters. During the January through March quarter, there is an increase of 1.42 negative actions. A significant change is not observed during the second quarter, but reappears for the July through September period prior to the election. At that time, there is a second increase of 1.45 negative acts. The impact of off-year elections is not significant. This bimodal pattern is unusual. It sounds simplistic to report that the reason the impact is bimodal is that the change in the number of negative acts during the months of April, May, and June is not statistically significant. Yet that in fact is the case. There was a change in the number of negative actions, but that change was not significant and was dropped from the model and is not reported in Table 7.7. The

term for the April through June period was not dropped from the model for cosmetic reasons or because it was not significant. The data indicated a strong bimodal impact. As a result, the model presented in the table excludes that insignificant term.

As Model 3 indicates, the surges in the number of negative acts appear to be due to those presidential elections in which the incumbent attempts to succeed himself. During these elections, there is an increase of 2.83 negative actions during the January through March quarter. The number of negative acts returns to normal for the following quarter. During July, August, and September, the number of negative actions again increases, this time by 2.74. As the table indicates, significant impacts were not found for either open elections or those elections in which the incumbent attempts to remain in office while the U.S. is at war.

This change is similar to what was found for U.S. behavior toward Britain. Further, these changes support the hypothesis that there is a change in U.S. foreign policy corresponding to a domestic election cycle. In Table 7.3, an increase of more than two and one-third negative acts toward Britain were reported for the last half of presidential election years in which the U.S. is not at war and the incumbent is attempting to retain his position. There is a difference in the timing of behavior toward Britain and Israel. In the case of Israel, there is an increase in the number of acts during the January through March period.

For the next three months, the number of negative acts falls to its normal level. In the July through September quarter, the number of acts toward Israel moves upward again, then falls to its normal level during the election quarter.

The bimodal impact of presidential elections on the number of negative actions has several possible explanations. One scenario would involve an incumbent who would tweak Israel by increasing the number of negative acts, pause, then tweak it again as the election approached. The reason for increasing the number of negative acts is to illustrate who controls the relationship between Israel and the U.S. By falling back to the normal level of negative actions between increases, the incumbent wants to show that, although the U.S. has been more hostile, it has not significantly changed its ongoing policy toward Israel. A problem with this explanation is that it assumes the incumbent to be a showman who gratuitously increases the number of hostile actions not once but twice as the election approaches.

A second explanation is also possible. The analysis of the change in the number of acts toward Israel presented in Figure 7.3 indicates that peaks occur during war and peace initiatives. The increase during wars, too, is associated with getting Israel either to keep from starting a war, as was the case before the 1956 invasion of Egypt, or to initiate a cease-fire agreement. It appears that hostile words or negative acts might be a way of getting Israel to seriously consider a peace plan. Accordingly,

the bimodal increase before the election might be the result of such a strategy. There seems to be a high likelihood that if an incumbent president were able to implement a successful peace plan in the Middle East prior to an election, he would win. If that is the case, it would seem reasonable that he would increase the negative acts, or hostile words, toward Israel in an attempt to move her toward the bargaining table. By reducing the number of acts in the subsequent quarter, he allows the Israeli government to take action. To restate his intentions, the incumbent again increases the number of negative acts after a three-month lull.

As the results of Model 2 indicate, there is not a significant change in the number of negative acts toward Israel prior to off-year elections. Model 4 in Table 7.7 indicates that this lack of a significant change continues even when elections are classified by whether the president's party controls the House. This lack of significant change associated with off-year elections is consistent with the findings of U.S. behavior toward Britain presented in Table 7.3. This similarity reinforces the notion that negative actions have a higher risk associated with them than positive actions. Accordingly, the incumbent uses them only when the stakes are the highest: when he is seeking re-election. These findings, while not directly supporting the hypotheses, are not inconsistent with the theoretical model being tested.

In examining the impact of election on the amount of cooperation shown Israel, mixed results are found as Table 7.8 indicates. The data suggest that elections in general result in a decrease in cooperation. Although the impact found in Model 1 does not meet standard levels of significance, the table indicates that elections produce a decrease in cooperation of 3.16 units (probability = 0.07). Although this decrease was predicted by the model, the results are consistent with those found in Table 7.4 which reported the impact of elections on foreign policy actions toward Britain. In both Table 7.8 and Table 7.4, elections in general are associated with a decrease in the level of cooperation. In both instances, too, the change in cooperation was not statistically significant. This change indicates that before any type of national election there is an increase in hostility toward Israel.

The results of Model 2 presented in Table 7.8 suggests that the decrease in the level of cooperation shown Israel may be due to a change in behavior associated with presidential elections. The table indicates that in the January through March quarter prior to presidential elections, there is a decrease of 4.62 units of cooperation. This change in the level of cooperation is consistent with those found in Table 7.7 which reported an increase of 1.42 negative acts was found in the January through March quarter before presidential elections. This change is consistent with the findings of U.S. behavior toward Britain found

in Table 7.4. In that table, a decrease in the level of cooperation was associated with presidential elections. The impact associated with presidential election reported in Table 7.4 is not statistically significant. When classifying presidential elections by type, the significant impact reported in Model 2 disappears. All three types of presidential elections are associated with a decrease in the level of cooperation, yet the decreases do not meet standard levels of statistical significance. The largest decrease is associated with open elections, 7.33 units and has a statistical probability of 0.07. The inability to find a significant impact when classifying presidential elections by type is no doubt due to variation within each kind of election. The problem caused by this variation is reduced when presidential elections are grouped together.

Even though the impact of presidential elections is not statistically significant, the direction of the impact is different than that predicted by the theoretical model. The model hypothesized that as presidential elections approached, the intensity of behavior would increase. The data suggest that the level of cooperation decreases but that there is not a significant change in the intensity. The behavior toward Israel is different for that found toward Britain and reported in Table 7.4. The decrease in cooperation toward Israel may be due to a number of factors. Notwithstanding the fact that Israel is an ally, U.S. policy towards the nation becomes an emotional issue. Negative

actions are more dramatic than positive acts. They are more likely to be remembered for the drama than the content. Further, an increase in negative acts is consistent with the theoretical model. The change in the level of cooperation is due to an increase in negative acts, possibly undertaken for their drama. Another explanation for the decrease in the level of cooperation shown Israel may be the peace process. In an attempt to encourage Israel to undertake or follow through on a peace initiative, the U.S. may become more hostile. The hostility is designed to identify the master of the dyadic relationship.

Even though off-year congressional elections did not appear to have a significant impact on foreign policy activity toward Israel in Model 2, these elections do have some impact as the results of Model 4 indicates. Those off-year races conducted when the president's party is the minority party in the House are associated with a 6.86 unit increase in the level of cooperation shown Israel. By the same token, those off-year races conducted when the president's party controls the House are associated with a decrease in the level of cooperation. Although this decrease in not statistically significant, it is almost the same size as the increase found for the other type of off-year election. Further, the decrease occurs in the same calendar quarter as the decrease found for presidential elections. This pattern of behavior is different for that found between the U.S. and Britain reported in Table 7.4.

The increase found in the analysis of Model 4 is consistent with the theoretical model. The actions become more intense. The findings also indicate there is a difference in behavior toward Israel depending on whether the president's party controls the House. The increase in cooperation for off-year elections in which the president's party are no doubt the reason that off-year elections have a positive although statistically non-significant parameter in Model 2. Further, they are the only type of election associated with an increase in cooperative behavior toward Israel.

This increase, which occurs during the election quarter, may be due to a president attempting to sway pro-Israel voters immediately before the election. The increase in cooperative behavior is intended to arose voters who may be disinterested. As part of an effort to minimize the number of seats that will be lost in the off-year election, the president shows an increase in cooperative actions toward Israel.

Summary

In evaluating the effect of elections on the total number of events, it was determined that both presidential and off-year elections effect the total number of actions directed toward Britain. These classifications of election did not have an effect on foreign policy toward Israel. In breaking down presidential elections, a significant impact on actions toward

Britain was found for both elections in which incumbents were attempting to succeed themselves and the U.S. was at war and when the U.S. was not at war. When the U.S. was at war, the number of actions decreased. When the U.S. was not at war, the number of actions increased. Although a similar pattern was found for Israel, only the decrease associated with the U.S. being at war was statistically significant. Further, the timing of the impact was the same. The changes for both nations occurred during the election quarter.

Types of off-year elections were also associated with changes in behavior toward both nations. The changes, though, varied depending on whether the president's party controlled the House of Representatives. When the president's party was the minority party in the House, there is an increase of 4.09 actions toward Britain during an election year. By the same token, when the president's party controls the House, there is an increase of 4.44 actions toward Israel.

A number of variations were noted in analysis of the number of positive actions. To begin, elections, in general, result in a decrease of 1.51 positive actions toward Israel. There was no effect on the number of actions toward Britain. Off-year elections result in an a two-quarter increase in the number of positive actions toward Britain. These elections did not have a significant impact on the number of positive actions initiated with Israel. Presidential elections, though, result in a

decrease of 2.73 positive acts toward Israel. They do not affect the number of acts undertaken with Britain. As far as types of presidential elections, there is a decrease in the number of positive acts toward Israel when an incumbent is seeking reelection and the U.S. is at war and when there is an open election. A similar relationship does not exist with Britain. Off-year congressional races in which the president's party is the minority in the House do have a significant impact on both U.S. behavior toward Britain and Israel. The impact is in differing directions, though. There is a two-quarter increase in the number of positive acts with Britain prior to these elections. There is a decrease in the number of friendly acts toward Israel prior to these elections, though.

It is in the analysis of the number of negative actions that the similarities begin to occur. Elections, in general, result in an increase in the number of negative acts toward Britain and Israel. The impact is of similar size (0.91 for Britain, 0.98 for Israel). The impact occurs in different quarters, though. Presidential elections also result in increases in the number of negative actions toward both nations. The increase occurs over two quarters for both nations, too. Again, the size of the increase is similar, but the timing is different. The impact of presidential elections appears to be related to elections in which incumbents are attempting to succeed themselves. For both nations, there is a two quarter increase in the number of

negative actions from the U.S. The increase is similar in size, but occurs in different quarters before the election. No effect was found for off-year congressional elections for either nation.

No significant similarities were found in the analysis of the level of cooperation shown to either nation. Elections in general result in a decrease in the level of cooperation toward Israel ($p=0.07$). There is no effect on the level of cooperation shown Britain. While presidential elections result in a decrease in the level of cooperation shown Israel, they do not appear to have a significant impact on U.S. behavior toward Britain. Open presidential election result in a substantial decrease in the level of cooperation toward Israel ($p=0.06$) but they do not affect U.S. behavior toward Britain. There is an increase in the level of cooperation toward Britain, though, when an incumbent president attempts to succeed himself and the U.S. is not at war. The only elections in which there is a significant increase in the level of cooperation toward Israel are off-year contests in which the president's party is the minority in the House. These elections do not affect U.S. policy toward Britain.

What do these patterns reveal? Do they support the hypotheses? Overall, the analysis does support the hypothesis that foreign policy behavior is affected by the domestic election cycle. As elections approach, there are changes in the way the U.S. treats other nations. The U.S. does not treat all friendly nations the same. Why would we expect the U.S. to treat two

nations with different interests the same? The chief connection between the two friendly nations examined--Britain and Israel-- is that they are friends of the U.S. The relationship between the U.S. and these nations is different. The U.S. has had a relationship with Britain for more than 200 years. For the much of that time, the relationship has been friendly. Further, the U.S. has fought with Britain in two world wars. Israel has been in existence as a nation for forty-one years. During that time, it has been engaged in four wars with its neighbors. In none of those wars were U.S. troops fighting on the side of Israel. The U.S. has generally assumed the role of the peacemaker.

Given their different relationships with the U.S. over time, there is no indication that foreign policy behavior should be exactly the same toward both nations. Therefore, the differences of the impacts of elections on foreign policy actions toward both nations are not unexpected. The similarities, particularly those involving the number of negative actions, may be due to the friendly relationship with the U.S.

TABLE 7.1
Analysis of the Total Number of Actions
Directed Toward Britain

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-2.81	-2.79
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	5.12	11.22
Any Election	ω_0	3	1.31	1.30

Q at 24 lags = 7.23; Prob. = 0.999

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-2.71	-2.75
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	4.99	11.05
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	2.45	1.93
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	3	3.08	2.14

Q at 24 lags = 9.30; Prob. = 0.995

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-2.80	-2.84
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	5.12	11.52
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	0	4.65	2.52
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-2.38	-2.52
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	3.25	1.52

Q at 24 lags = 12.21; Prob. = 0.967

Continued on next page

TABLE 7.1-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-2.74	-2.75
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	5.12	11.27
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	1	-1.48	-0.68
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	3	4.09	1.88

Q at 24 lags = 7.40; Prob. = 0.999

TABLE 7.2
Analysis of Positive Actions
Directed Toward Britain

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-2.88	-3.49
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	4.97	12.49
Any Election	ω_0	3	1.11	1.32

Q at 24 lags = 9.21; Prob. = 0.995

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-2.90	-3.60
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	4.84	12.34
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	1.78	1.66
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	2	2.43	2.02
	ω_1	3	-2.38	-1.96

Q at 24 lags = 12.92; Prob. = 0.954

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-3.24	-3.77
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	5.20	12.55
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	0	2.42	1.52
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	3	2.64	1.14
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	2	-2.40	-1.30

Q at 24 lags = 13.08; Prob. = 0.950

Continued on next page

TABLE 7.2-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		-3.09	-3.89
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	5.04	13.10
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	1	-1.38	-0.78
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	2	4.63	3.00
	ω_1	3	-3.21	-2.08

Q at 24 lags = 12.18; Prob. = 0.968

TABLE 7.3
Analysis of Negative Actions
Directed Toward Britain

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.63	4.86
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.51	4.14
Any Election	ω_0	0	0.91	2.94

Q at 24 lags = 16.50; Prob. = 0.833

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.56	4.39
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.47	3.85
Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	1.21	3.03
	ω_1	1	-1.21	-3.00
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	0	0.76	1.81

Q at 24 lags = 20.27; Prob. = 0.626

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.64	5.49
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.46	3.97
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	0	2.37	4.30
	ω_1	1	-2.31	-4.14
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-0.44	-0.57
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	0.57	0.89

Q at 24 lags = 20.30; Prob. = 0.624

Continued on next page

TABLE 7.3-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.78	5.99
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.54	4.30
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	0	0.46	0.75
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	1	-1.06	-1.73

Q at 24 lags = 16.40; Prob. = 0.838

TABLE 7.4
Analysis of the Level of Cooperation
Directed Toward Britain

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		8.57	9.83
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.28	3.44
Any Election	ω_0	1	-2.25	-1.43

Q at 24 lags = 17.81; Prob. = 0.768

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		8.82	9.95
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.26	3.16
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	-3.05	-1.49
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	3	-2.56	-1.12

Q at 24 lags = 19.03; Prob. = 0.699

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		8.13	9.34
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.29	3.48
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	2	5.58	1.88
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	2	-5.64	-1.36
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	2	3.07	0.90

Q at 24 lags = 21.57; Prob. = 0.546

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TABLE 7.4-Continued

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		8.43	9.88
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.28	3.39
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	1.59	0.46
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	-4.85	-1.61

Q at 24 lags = 20.07; Prob. = 0.638

TABLE 7.5
Analysis of The Total Number of Actions
Directed Toward Israel

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.02	2.93
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.78	12.57
Any Election	ω_0	0	-1.31	-1.27
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.20	2.32
	ϕ_2	2	0.36	4.10

Q at 24 lags = 17.19; Prob. = 0.700

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.98	2.86
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.78	12.50
Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-2.20	-1.56
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	2	1.54	0.97
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.22	2.52
	ϕ_2	2	0.34	3.78

Q at 24 lags = 18.53; Prob. = 0.615

Continued on next page

TABLE 7.5-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		3.09	2.87
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.77	12.05
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	3.08	1.45
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-6.45	-2.25
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	2	-3.52	-1.50
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.20	2.34
	ϕ_2	2	0.40	4.55

Q at 24 lags = 20.94; Prob. = 0.463

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.88	2.73
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.78	12.55
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	4.44	1.86
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	1	-1.97	-0.95
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.21	2.43
	ϕ_2	2	0.36	4.11

Q at 24 lags = 16.29; Prob. = 0.753

TABLE 7.6
Analysis of the Number of Positive Actions
Directed Toward Israel

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.51	2.96
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.78	11.40
Any Election	ω_0	0	-1.51	-1.86
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.15	1.76
	ϕ_2	2	0.44	5.23

Q at 24 lags = 22.90; Prob. = 0.349

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.63	3.13
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.79	11.64
Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-2.73	-2.52
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	1	-2.03	-1.66
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.17	2.03
	ϕ_2	2	0.42	4.89

Q at 24 lags = 25.55; Prob. = 0.224

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TABLE 7.6-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.49	2.87
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.80	11.68
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	0	-2.07	-1.27
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	0	-5.14	-2.23
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	3	-3.63	-1.94
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.15	1.78
	ϕ_2	2	0.44	5.22

Q at 24 lags = 22.17; Prob. = 0.390

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		2.36	2.69
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.79	11.58
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	2	3.16	1.68
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	1	-3.32	-2.03
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.16	1.91
	ϕ_2	2	0.44	5.29

Q at 24 lags = 29.72; Prob. = 0.098

TABLE 7.7
Analysis of the Number of Negative Actions
Directed Toward Israel

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.68	3.03
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	2.68	16.60
Any Election	ω_0	3	0.98	2.48
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.26	2.85

Q at 24 lags = 10.84; Prob. = 0.977

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.57	2.43
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	2.66	16.66
Presidential Elections	ω_0	1	1.45	2.28
	ω_1	3	-1.42	-2.84
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	0	0.86	1.61
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.31	3.41

Q at 24 lags = 12.26; Prob. = 0.952

Continued on next page

TABLE 7.7-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.68	3.23
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	2.64	17.59
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	2.74	3.88
	ω_1	3	-2.83	-4.02
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	1	-0.86	-0.87
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	0	-0.57	-0.71
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.29	3.18

Q at 24 lags = 9.88; Prob. = 0.987

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		0.84	3.91
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	2.68	16.41
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	0	0.73	0.91
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	2	-1.10	-1.39
Noise Model	ϕ_1	1	0.23	2.51

Q at 24 lags = 16.40; Prob. = 0.838

TABLE 7.8
Analysis of the Level of Cooperation
Directed Toward Israel

MODEL 1: IMPACT OF ANY ELECTION

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.33	7.54
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.36	4.22
Any Election	ω_0	3	-3.16	-1.80
Noise Model	ϕ_1	4	0.26	2.88

Q at 24 lags = 25.15; Prob. = 0.290

MODEL 2: IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		6.98	7.19
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.36	4.31
Presidential Elections	ω_0	3	-4.62	-2.03
Off Year Congressional Elections	ω_0	0	3.93	1.62
Noise Model	ϕ_1	4	0.27	2.94

Q at 24 lags = 24.01; Prob. = 0.347

Continued on next page

TABLE 7.8-Continued

MODEL 3: IMPACT OF TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.34	8.00
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.36	4.23
Incumbent Seeking Re-election	ω_0	1	-3.85	-1.13
Incumbent Seeking Re-election While at War	ω_0	3	-6.85	-1.43
Open Presidential Elections	ω_0	3	-7.33	-1.87
Noise Model	ϕ_1	4	0.22	2.36

Q at 24 lags = 27.46; Prob. = 0.194

MODEL 4: IMPACT OF TYPES OF OFF-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Variables	Parameter	Lag	Estimate	T Value
	μ		7.08	7.46
Incoming Actions	ω_0	0	0.31	3.69
President's Party Controls House	ω_0	3	-6.74	-1.74
President's Party Minority in House	ω_0	0	6.86	2.01
Noise Model	ϕ_1	4	0.27	2.91

Q at 24 lags = 26.67; Prob. = 0.224



Figure 7.1: Analysis of U.S. Actions Toward Britain



Figure 7.2: Analysis of the Cooperation Shown Britain

Figure 7.3: Analysis of U.S. Actions Toward Israel





Figure 7.4: Analysis of the Cooperation Shown Israel

Chapter 8

Summary and Conclusion

In Chapters 1 through 7, the existence of a pattern in foreign policy activity corresponding to the domestic election cycle has been examined. In this chapter, the existence of that pattern is reviewed in light of the empirical findings. Needed refinements and enhancements to the theoretical model and the methods used to test it are discussed. In addition, suggestions are offered for future research efforts.

The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 is based upon the notion that leaders exploit available resources in order to win elections. One resource is foreign policy. Foreign policy activity can be used to reinforce the image of the leader as a powerful elite. The image of power can be enhanced by portraying the leader as an important international executive, meeting with other heads of state to discuss and solve problems facing his and other nations. Foreign policy actions can also be used to boost government popularity by taking decisive steps against national enemies. The leader's rivals in an election may contest his expertise in domestic issues, but the incumbent is pre-eminent in foreign policy actions. For example, one of the first issues to emerge in the 1988 presidential election was the lack of foreign policy experience of the Democratic nominee, Michael Dukakis. Even the Republican vice presidential nominee,

J. Danforth Quayle, repeatedly echoed that he had more foreign policy experience from serving in the Senate than did Dukakis, who served as governor of Massachusetts.

While previous research has not addressed the existence of a pattern in foreign policy activity corresponding to the domestic election cycle, there have been a number of studies in related areas. The three most closely related areas of research are presidential popularity, political economy, and studies of domestic and foreign conflict. Research on presidential popularity has indicated that three factors are closely related to a president's approval rating. The first two are the president's charisma, which is related to his initial approval level, and the performance of the economy. The third factor is the existence of dramatic international events. When a dramatic foreign action occurs, a president's popularity rating soars.

Closely related to the impact of economic performance on presidential approval are the studies by political economists of political business cycles. These studies, enumerated in Chapter 2, suggest that leaders manipulate the economy to boost economic performance as elections approach, thereby increasing their share of the vote. This periodic manipulation results in a pattern in economic indicators that corresponds to the domestic election cycle.

The third area of previous research addresses the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict. As

discussed in Chapter 2, several researchers have proposed the idea that when a leader is confronted with domestic strife, he undertakes foreign adventures. This foreign conflict is intended to distract the electorate from immediate domestic problems. As a result of the foreign hostilities, the electorate unites behind their national leader. This idea of foreign conflict resulting in increased support for a nation's leader is similar to findings in presidential popularity research on the impact of dramatic events.

Tests

A theoretical model based upon this previous research was developed in Chapter 3. A set of hypotheses were derived to test the existence of the model. These hypotheses were tested using quantitative measures of foreign policy activity and longitudinal statistical techniques.

The data used to test the hypotheses were obtained from Azar's (1980b) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). The information in COPDAB covers the period from 1948 through 1978. The data were abstracted from news reports on foreign policy actions between nations. The data indicate the type of action, the nation undertaking the action, and the target nation. Several scales were developed from these data, including measures of the total number of actions, the number of cooperative or

positive actions, the number of negative or hostile acts, and an indicator of the relative level of cooperation of the actions.

Changes in these measures over time were examined using Box-Jenkins-Tiao (Box and Jenkins, 1976; Box and Tiao, 1975) time series analysis. The measures were derived from U.S. foreign policy actions toward other nations and were used as the dependent variable. A set of indicator variables was used to assess the impact of national elections on foreign policy behavior. Because of possible confounding factors, the elections were grouped according to a variety of types.

During the thirty-year period covered by the study, there were eight presidential elections and eight off-year congressional contests. The impact of all elections was examined, along with the impact of presidential elections compared to off-year races. Presidential elections were subsequently classified according to whether they were open or whether the incumbent was seeking re-election. Elections involving incumbents were classified according to whether the U.S. was engaged in a war. Off-year contests were classified according to whether the president's party controlled the House of Representatives.

Foreign policy analysts maintain that many foreign policy actions initiated by a nation are in response to actions received. In order to determine the impact of elections apart from reciprocal foreign policy actions, measures of acts received by the U.S. were included in each time series model developed.

The analysis assessed the impact of elections and popularity on foreign policy behavior in general and on actions directed toward adversaries or allies in particular. As a result, separate statistical models were developed on four measures of foreign policy behavior. Models were developed for behavior toward all nations grouped together, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Israel. The results of those analyses were presented in preceding chapters.

Findings

The theoretical model being tested suggested that there would be a pattern in foreign policy behavior that corresponds to the domestic election cycle. That pattern should manifest itself as a decrease in the number of hostile acts toward adversaries and an increase in the number of cooperative acts toward them. By the same token, there should be a decrease in the number of cooperative acts toward allies and an increase in the number of hostile acts. In both instances, the intensity of the actions should increase as the election nears. In the case of the United States, the pattern should be more pronounced in presidential elections than in off-year contests. Further, the pattern should be more apparent when the incumbent is seeking re-election than for open elections.

Overall, the findings of the statistical models generally support the theory being tested. Significant changes were not

found for all elections. In those elections where significant changes were found, the change was usually in the direction predicted by the theoretical model.

As the findings presented in Chapter 5 indicated, a pattern corresponding to the U.S. domestic election cycle was found in foreign policy actions toward all other nations. The changes in behavior corresponded to theoretical expectations. The analysis found that there was a pronounced change associated with presidential elections in the total number of actions and the relative level of cooperation shown other nations. This drop tended to occur during the election quarter and could have been due to the candidate devoting more time to election activities than to foreign policy. While there was no significant change in behavior associated with incumbents seeking re-election when the U.S. was not at war, there is a substantial increase associated with open elections in the total number of actions and in the number of hostile actions. The only change that corresponded to theoretical expectations was the increase in the number of negative actions prior to elections. This change corresponds to the findings of Stoll (1984).

The analysis also found changes in U.S. behavior toward the Soviet Union associated with the domestic election cycle that corresponded to the theoretical model. The analysis suggested a decrease in the number of negative acts toward the Soviets associated with presidential elections. In particular, there is a

significant decrease in hostile acts toward the Soviet Union prior to elections in which the incumbent seeks to remain in office and the U.S. is engaged in a war. Also, there is an increase in the relative level of cooperation shown to the Soviets prior to elections for other incumbents. The analysis also revealed an increase in the total number of actions toward the Soviets prior to open presidential elections.

The findings of the analysis of U.S. behavior toward Great Britain yielded the greatest support for the theoretical model. That analysis indicated that there was an increase in the total number of acts generated toward the British prior to presidential elections in general and before elections involving incumbents when the U.S. is not at war in particular. Also, there is an increase in the relative level of cooperation shown the British prior to incumbent re-election attempts when the U.S. is not at war. While the analysis did find an increase in the number of positive acts toward the British, this increase was prior to off-year races instead of presidential contests. As the theoretical model suggested, the analysis uncovered a systematic increase in the number of negative acts toward the British prior to presidential elections, particularly those in which the incumbent seeks re-election and the U.S. is not at war.

In addition, there were several significant changes in U.S. behavior toward Israel corresponding to the theoretical model. The analysis reported that there are systematic decreases in the

number of cooperative acts toward Israel prior to presidential elections. These decreases are especially pronounced prior to elections involving incumbents when the U.S. is at war and open elections. In addition, the analysis found a decrease in the level of cooperation shown Israel prior to presidential elections.

Discussion

A critical review of the findings suggests the conclusion that there is a good deal of quantitative support for the theoretical model. Where significant relationships were found, they corresponded to it. There are some weaknesses in the theoretical model, however. Frequently, the impact of elections was not statistically significant. The inability of the analysis to find significant relationships may be due to a number of factors and not attributable to the theoretical model. One problem could be due to the statistical procedures employed. A second weakness could be attributed to the data.

The strongest support for the theoretical model is found in Chapter 5. In this monadic test--the behavior of the U.S. toward all nations--changes in foreign policy activity were found prior to elections. These changes were in the direction suggested by the theoretical model. By the fact that the support was greatest in the monadic test, additional insight is available on the type

of leader that manipulates foreign policy behavior. The findings also provide some implications for democratic theory.

Although the president appears to manipulate foreign policy behavior, his approach is exploitative instead of calculating. He exploits situations as they occur; he does not stage them. It is because of the exploitative approach that the support is greatest for U.S. behavior toward all nations.

If the president's behavior were calculating, there would be greater support for the theoretical model in the analysis of U.S. actions toward the Soviet Union in Chapter 6. Instead, behavior toward the Soviet Union varies across elections. By the same token, the exploitative nature is evidenced by the difference between U.S. behavior toward Britain and U.S. behavior toward Israel as discussed in Chapter 7. If the president were calculating, there would not be strong differences between U.S. behavior toward the two nations. If he were calculating, the behavior toward each nation would be similar. The differences in behavior are likely due to the exploitative nature of the manipulation.

To be sure, the Box-Jenkins, Box-Tiao methods used to test the model are rigorous. In developing the statistical model, any systematic structure in the independent measure of actions directed toward the U.S. is extracted in the prewhitening process. Each measure of actions undertaken by the U.S. is also prewhitened. What is left over is referred to as "white noise"

(Box and Jenkins, 1976). The term white noise is borrowed from engineering and implies that the observations are devoid of any autoregressive or moving average structure. The prewhitening process can obscure some underlying relationships (Pierce, 1977).

A second aspect of the time series analysis that could reduce the impact of a domestic election cycle is the use of a reciprocity variable in the model. The presence of a measure of the number of actions directed toward the U.S. overstates the impact of reciprocal actions. The statistical model implies that the motivations for foreign policy activity are actions directed toward the U.S. and the domestic election cycle. It does not allow for any innovation in foreign policy behavior.

The primary reason for this problem with accounting for reciprocity lies with the data. There is no adequate way to measure reciprocity with existing event data collections. To accurately account for reciprocal actions, every action coded for a nation would have to be evaluated to determine whether it was undertaken in response to an action received. Ideally, sets of reciprocal actions would be identified and matched. A further problem with reciprocal actions is that a response to an action received can generate a reciprocal act in return. The process of reciprocity resembles the path of a tennis ball thrown into a box. The ball bounces from one wall to another. Eventually, the ball loses its energy and comes to rest. Similarly, reciprocal acts can be exchanged between nations until interest wanes. With the

data currently available, it is not possible to account for this process. Accordingly, the impact of reciprocity is either over- or understated.

A second problem with the data used in the study is that they do not indicate whether the head of state was the initiator of the action. The focus of the theoretical model was on the behavior of the leader of a nation. Some actions are undertaken by representatives of a nation who may directly or indirectly report to the head of state but who also may have some degree of independence. The activities of interest are those that directly involve the head of state; these actions portray him as the leader and focus on his abilities and talents. Actions undertaken by lower-echelon agencies or personnel may not be directly the result of executive decision or motivation. Many actions may be canned responses.

A related problem with the data are the sources from which they are derived. In order to concentrate on the behavior of the head of state, perhaps only such sources as speeches by the executive or papers of the head of state should be abstracted. It is through these documents that the head of state records his actions and offers an indication of the way he wishes to have the actions interpreted. Data derived from a content analysis of these documents may indicate the pattern predicted by the theoretical model that the event data do not reveal.

The analyses also suggest several problems with the theoretical model. The model views use of foreign policy actions as an end rather than a process. Perhaps the manipulation of foreign policy should be treated as a process instead. Also, the theoretical model institutionalizes the use of discretionary power. As a result, its use is viewed as a requirement. It no longer becomes discretionary.

The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 puts forward the idea that leaders have a large amount of discretionary power in dealing with other nations. With this power, they are able to manipulate foreign policy activity to boost their control of the government and to win elections. The model then assumes that every leader has knowledge of this process and willingly exploits it to his advantage. The existence of power may not guarantee its recognition or use. The tests of the model assumed that all leaders would choose to exploit these resources. The variation in the manipulation of foreign policy was attributed to the context of the election or change in popularity. According to the model, the use of this power is institutionalized.

The analyses of the data do not support that conclusion. Although certain leaders may manipulate foreign policy activity to win elections, the data indicate that there is variation in the use of this power. The exploitation of resources, such as foreign policy actions, may vary across leadership styles. Certain leaders may be more likely to manipulate foreign policy

than others. This characteristic could be related to style of management and control. Certain leaders could recognize the ability to manipulate foreign policy but choose to pursue other tactics. Others may see that use of foreign policy actions would be to their advantage.

The use of foreign policy could vary across contextual settings, too. In certain elections, changes in domestic policy may produce a much greater impact than foreign policy. In other instances, a particular part of domestic policy, such as economic performance, may be of greater significance (suggesting that there is a set of purely domestic factors that can affect the economy). Also, certain leaders may have the reputation of being masters of foreign policy and foreign relations. These leaders may purposely choose to downplay foreign actions as elections approach while they attempt to stress other leadership skills.

Future Research

The possible problems with the theoretical model do not mean that the research should be abandoned. Instead, the criticisms are areas for departure for future research. There are several other approaches that should be explored also. One approach would be to examine manipulation of foreign policy as a process. Instead of concentrating on whether the manipulation occurs, the focus should be on whether it is effective. Are leaders that manipulate

foreign policy more likely to win elections than those that do not? This research question can be addressed by first identifying those leaders who manipulate foreign policy. Instead of fitting models for groups of elections, separate interaction terms should be tested for each election. After identifying the elections in which there was a marked change in behavior, the next step would be to evaluate whether the incumbent won the election.

A second research approach would link manipulation of foreign policy with leadership style. Are there certain types of leaders who are more likely to manipulate foreign policy than others? This research program would adopt the approach of Barber (1972) in evaluating leadership styles. Leaders would be grouped according to management style. Elections would then be grouped according to the leadership style of the incumbent. The analysis would evaluate whether one particular type of leader was more likely to manipulate foreign policy than another.

A third approach would be to investigate the existence of an election cycle in the foreign policy behavior of other nations. The model was tested evaluating the behavior of the U.S. The reason for choosing American foreign policy was that it seemed that if the model would hold for any nation, it would hold for the U.S. This idea is based on the free hand given the president in foreign affairs, the two party system, and the fixed election period. The model did not appear to hold for the U.S., but the problem may be due to the way in which the hypotheses were tested.

One problem in that regard mentioned earlier in this chapter concerned the measure of reciprocity. It may be the case that reciprocal actions involving the U.S. are over reported. This may not be the case for other nations. Accordingly, the problems attributed to reciprocal acts may be minimized.

Summary

This chapter presents a brief review of the research into an election cycle in foreign policy activities. A theoretical model that suggested that leaders manipulate foreign policy to boost the support for their government and to win elections was described. The method used to test that model was reviewed.

A summary of the results of those tests was presented. Overall, the statistical analysis did support the theory. Where significant impacts were found, the changes generally corresponded to the theoretical model. In many cases, no significant change in foreign policy behavior was found as elections approached. Several explanations were offered concerning why the tests did not support the model. These included the statistical method employed to test the relationship and problems with the data. Suggestions for additional research were presented.

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